Academic freedom and its protection in the law of European states: measuring an international human right by Beiter, Klaus et al.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Academic Freedom and Its Protection in 
the Law of European States 
Measuring an International Human Right 
Klaus D. Beiter 
Associate Professor, North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus), 
Faculty of Law, South Africa 
Klaus.Beiter@nwu.ac.za 
 
Terence Karran 
Professor of Higher Education Policy, School of Education, 
University of Lincoln, uk 
TerenceK@lincoln.ac.uk 
 
Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua 
Senior Lecturer, University of Ghana, School of Law, Ghana 
KAppiagyeiAtua@ug.edu.gh 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Focusing on those countries that are members of the European Union, it may be noted 
that these countries are bound under international human rights agreements, such as 
the International Covenants on Civil and Political, and Economic, Social and Cultural 
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Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights, to safeguard academic freedom 
under provisions providing for the right to freedom of expression, the right to edu- 
cation, and respect for ‘the freedom indispensable for scientific research.’ unesco’s 
Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel, a 
‘soft-law’ document of 1997, concretises international human rights requirements to 
be complied with to make the protection of the right to academic freedom effective. 
Relying on a set of human rights indicators, the present article assesses the extent to 
which the constitutions, laws on higher education, and other relevant legislation of eu 
states implement the Recommendation’s criteria. The situation of academic freedom 
in practice will not be assessed here. The results for the various countries have been 
quantified and countries ranked in accordance with ‘their performance.’ The assess- 
ment demonstrates that, overall, the state of the protection of the right to academic 
freedom in the law of European states is one of ‘ill-health.’ Institutional autonomy is 
being misconstrued as exhausting the concept of academic freedom, self-governance 
in higher education institutions sacrificed for ‘executive-style’ management, and 
employment security abrogated to cater for ‘changing employment needs’ in higher 
education. 
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1 Introduction 
In two articles published in 2007 and 2009, respectively, Terence Karran had 
analysed whether the then 23 Member States of the European Union provided 
a high, medium or low level of protection of the right to academic freedom,1 
alternatively, whether they complied fully, partially or not at all with it.2 Karran 
chose parameters of measurement based on notably unesco’s Recommenda- 
tion concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel of 1997. He 
considered his assessment to be a preliminary one 
 
1 T. Karran, ‘Academic Freedom in Europe: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis,’ Higher Edu- 
cation Policy 20(3) (2007) 289–313. 
2 T. Karran, ‘Academic Freedom in Europe: Reviewing unesco’s Recommendation,’ British 
Journal of Educational Studies 57(2) (2009) 191–215. 
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in that it addresses the constitutional and legislative frameworks in rela- 
tion to academic freedom, thereby establishing the basis for subsequent 
empirical work to examine how the concept is interpreted and perceived 
by academic staff undertaking their day to day work within Europe’s 
universities.3 
The latter day-to-day experience of academic freedom by academic staff in Eu- 
ropean universities is indeed currently being scrutinised by the authors, and 
will be reported on in subsequent publications. However, little did the authors 
know at the time of Karran’s assessment that the ‘redesigning’ of higher educa- 
tion (‘he’) in European countries – and the concomitant modification of he 
legislation this would entail – would be pursued at such a speed and with such 
a vehemence. 
National constitutions and he laws in Europe continue emphasising the 
importance of the right to academic freedom. A closer look at the detail of 
he law, however, reveals that the eloquent commitments to academic free- 
dom contained in bills of rights or the introductory sections of he laws in 
truth increasingly merely pay lip-service to this important right once held in 
esteem in most parts of Europe. Ever since Karran has published his find- 
ings, there have been significant changes in the legislation on he in many 
European countries, enhancing levels of autonomy (or, what policy-makers 
consider to constitute autonomy) of he institutions, and limiting the extent 
to which academic staff are involved in the governance (or ‘management,’ as 
it has become accustomed to be called) of institutions, reducing the scope 
of their participation in strategic decision-making, while simultaneously in- 
creasing that of rectors (rectorates) (and deans/heads of departments) and 
external ‘experts.’ Moreover, the law regulating conditions of employment 
of academic staff in he is more and more guided by notions of ‘flexibilisa- 
tion,’ legitimising the conclusion of fixed-term contracts of service (without 
long-term perspectives) also at post-entry levels of the academic career, and 
assuring that contracts of service can be terminated on operational grounds 
without restraint. 
Hence, in the light of these circumstances – and before commenting on 
the assessment of the de facto situation of academic freedom in Europe – it 
is meaningful to undertake a renewed assessment of the state of health of the 
right to academic freedom in the law of the now 28 eu Member States,4 relying 
 
3 Karran (n 1) 289. 
4 It may well be asked why the article does not rather focus on states in their capacity as 
Member States of the Council of Europe, which as a regional organisation focuses on the 
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essentially on the standards of unesco’s Recommendation. This article relies 
on the parameters of the right to academic freedom used by Karran (i.e., 1. the 
protection of ‘academic freedom’ in the constitution or other legislation, 2. the 
autonomy of institutions of he, 3. academic self-governance, and 4. academic 
tenure), adding a fifth: the ratification of international agreements relevant to 
the protection of the right to academic freedom. The analysis has, moreover, 
been refined by defining 37 specific indicators to measure compliance by indi- 
vidual states. The focus, naturally, has been on defining human rights indica- 
tors, i.e. indicators operationalising the requirements of the right to academic 
freedom as protected under international human rights law. The approach 
has been to accord a numeric value to each indicator in accordance with its 
relative weight as adjudged under international human rights law. Adding up 
the scores of states for each of these values makes it possible to rank states 
regarding five core aspects, but also overall in their protection of the right to 
academic freedom. 
As for the structure of the article, Part 2 outlines the nature of the require- 
ment of legislation applied in assessing the ‘legal’ protection of the right to 
academic freedom. Part 3 comments on the right to academic freedom as 
protected under international human rights law. Part 4 focuses specifically on 
unesco’s Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teach- 
ing Personnel of 1997 and its provisions on academic freedom. Part 5 touches 
on the issue of the legitimacy of using indicators and rankings in determining 
compliance with human rights standards. Part 6 presents the standard score- 
card developed ‘to measure’ the legal protection of the right to academic free- 
dom in each of the 28 eu states. Part 7 refers to the modus operandi applied 
and some of the practical difficulties encountered in the assessment exercise. 
Part 8 reflects the results of the actual assessment for each of five main cat- 
egories of assessment (incorporating the five parameters mentioned above), 
and also overall, for eu states. Based on the results, Part 9 then comments on 
the state of health of the legal protection of the right to academic freedom in 
Europe, and Part 10 explains the extent to which the findings may be viewed 
as reflecting violations of the right to academic freedom and also the right to 
education. 
 
 
 
promotion of human rights as one of its primary tasks, the eu ’s role rather being to facilitate 
the economic and, to a more limited extent, the political integration of its members. The 
reason simply is that it would have exceeded available resources to study the legal situation 
in 47 states at very different stages of development as opposed to that in 28 more or less 
homogeneous states. 
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2 Assessing the ‘Legal’ Protection of the Right to Academic Freedom: 
The Requirement of Legislation 
This article is written in the context of a larger project on the right to academic 
freedom conducted at the University of Lincoln, uk, examining the doctrinal 
basis of the right to academic freedom in terms of international human 
rights law and further assessing the level of protection of that right in various 
regional contexts, concentrating on the European and African contexts for 
the moment. This article looks at the legal protection of the right to academic 
freedom in Europe, i.e. its protection in the legislation of the 28 eu Member 
States – its factual protection in European countries only to be analysed at a 
later stage. An overall picture of the situation of the right to academic freedom 
in Europe, to be sure, would have to take account of the findings with regard to 
both its legal and factual protection. 
The next heading will demonstrate that the two un Human Rights Cove- 
nants of 1966 must be considered to safeguard academic freedom inter alia 
under provisions providing for the right to freedom of expression, the right to 
education, and respect for ‘the freedom indispensable for scientific research.’ 
The Human Rights Committee, the body of independent human rights experts 
supervising implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi- 
cal Rights, has, in one of its General Comments, stressed that ‘unless Covenant 
rights are already protected by … domestic laws or practices, States Parties are 
required on ratification to make such changes to domestic laws and practices 
as are necessary to ensure their conformity with the Covenant.’5 Likewise, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the body of indepen- 
dent human rights experts supervising implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, entertains the view that 
in realising rights under this Covenant, ‘in many instances legislation is highly 
 
 
5 un, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, un Doc. ccpr/c/21/Rev.1/Add.13 
(2004), para. 13. In fact, Art. 2(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
provides that ‘[w]here not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each 
State Party to the … Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the … Covenant, to adopt such laws or 
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the … Covenant’ 
(emphasis added). See also M. Nowak, ‘Article 2: Domestic Implementation and Prohibition 
of Discrimination,’ in u.n. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: ccpr Commentary (N.P. En- 
gel, 2nd rev. ed. 2005) 27–75, at para. 56 (59–60) (stating that ‘the formulation “legislative or 
other measures” demonstrates the priority of legislative measures’). 
 Beiter, Karran and Appiagyei-Atua 
 
6  
 
desirable and in some cases may even be indispensable.’6 Although the Cov- 
enants do not unequivocally make the adoption of legislation mandatory, it 
is submitted that these Committee statements suggest that – to secure the 
effective realisation of human rights and to respect fundamental principles 
of democracy – all salient elements in the definition of the various human 
rights, the general framework authorising measures aimed at fulfilling them, 
and possible limitations of those rights be contained in legislation adopted by 
national parliaments.7 Such legislation will increase the visibility of the rights 
to those entitled to claim them, bind organs of government to respect, protect, 
and fulfil them, and enable right-holders to enforce them before competent 
administrative or judicial tribunals. Subordinate legislation as adopted by ex- 
ecutive/administrative organs of state may then ‘add flesh to the bones’ and 
operationalise the norms contained in primary legislation, but cannot sub- 
stitute the latter where it is mandatory. Ultimately, the functionaries/organs 
adopting subordinate legislation are (usually) not directly legitimated by and 
accountable to the electorate. Protective standards contained in subordinate 
legislation may, moreover, easily be changed or abrogated again.8 
 
 
6 un, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3, The 
Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), un Doc. E/1991/23, 
Annex iii, 86 (1991), para. 3. Art. 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights provides that ‘[e]ach State Party to the … Covenant undertakes to take 
steps … with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised 
in the … Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of leg- 
islative measures’ (emphasis added). See also M.C. Craven, The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (Clarendon, 1995) 125 
(stating that ‘it has commonly been asserted that the enactment of legislation is essential 
to the implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights on the domestic plane’); 
M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Hart, 2009) para. 
2.14 (55) (remarking that ‘[l]egislative measures are indispensable in the protection of all 
human rights, including esc rights’). 
7 In fact, for limitations of rights, this is confirmed in the various general and specific limita- 
tion provisions of the two Covenants. 
8 Where essential aspects of the right to academic freedom have been provided for in gov- 
ernment regulations or directives, or university statutes (but not in parliamentary legisla- 
tion), this ordinarily does not, therefore, satisfy (or fully satisfy) requirements for adequate 
‘legal’ protection. The same holds true with regard to collective agreements, which, as such, 
constitute neither primary nor secondary legislation. Human rights entitlements should 
not be made contingent on collective bargaining. The assessment undertaken in this article 
has borne out that a number of the states analysed regulate essential aspects of the right to 
academic freedom only at the level of secondary legislation (e.g. Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, 
or the uk), or collective agreements (e.g. Austria, or the Netherlands). 
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Accordingly, a state’s human rights and he legislation should adequately 
protect academic freedom and institutional autonomy. As stressed by, for ex- 
ample, the Council of Europe, ‘these principles should … be reaffirmed and 
guaranteed by law, preferably in the constitution.’9 In many cases, the absence 
of such legislation or its failure to provide effective guarantees will constitute 
the basis for threats to academic freedom and institutional autonomy. Nev- 
ertheless, it needs to be pointed out that although the chances of academic 
freedom enjoying protection are greatly enhanced where an adequate legisla- 
tive framework is provided for, this will not always be the case. Conversely, 
‘[p]ractice on the ground often reveals a stronger cultural commitment to 
freedom than is apparent from perusal of the laws.’10 It is for this reason that 
a comprehensive picture of the state of the right to academic freedom will 
also have to take its protection in practice – as a result of institutional, faculty, 
and/or departmental regulations, policies, and customs – into account. The 
factual protection of the right to academic freedom in Europe will, however, 
only be analysed in subsequent publications, relying primarily on the results 
of an online survey on academic freedom, open for participation by academic 
staff in Europe since 2015 until further notice.11 
The present assessment of compliance with the criteria of unesco’s Rec- 
ommendation of 1997 – the Recommendation in its Preamble establishing a 
clear link with un human rights treaty law – will essentially examine whether 
states have complied with the requirement of adopting legislation protect- 
ing the different aspects of the right to academic freedom, as described in the 
Recommendation, applying the standards in respect of ‘legislation’ as just de- 
scribed with regard to the un Covenants.12 Clearly, parliamentary legislation 
on its own is not enough to realise human rights. Other means (governmen- 
tal policies, regulations and directives, university statutes, financial resources, 
infrastructure, personnel, information, etc.) will also have to be relied on. The 
large-scale absence of primary legislation on the topic, as the case of the United 
Kingdom exemplifies, does not necessarily mean that academic freedom may 
not, all the same, enjoy protection in practice. However, the chances of it 
 
9 Recom. 1762 (2006) on Academic Freedom and University Autonomy, Parliamentary As- 
sembly, Council of Europe, para. 7. 
10 M. Newman, 2007, ‘u.k. Lowest on Freedom List,’ Times Higher Education, 28 September 
2007 (quoting Conor Gearty, (then) Director of the Centre for the Study of Human Rights 
at the London School of Economics), retrieved 15 May 2016, https://www.timeshigher 
education.co.uk/news/uk-lowest-on-freedom-list/310603.article. 
11 The survey is accessible at https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/AcademicFreedomSurvey. 
12 The results of the present assessment of the legal protection of the right to academic 
freedom in Europe will also be reported on in Vol. 49 (2016) of Vanderbilt Journal of Trans- 
national Law and Vol. 10 (2016) of New Zealand Journal of Research on Europe. 
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enjoying such protection are greatly enhanced where an adequate legislative 
framework is provided for. 
 
3 The Right to Academic Freedom under International Human 
Rights Law 
In his chapter on the right to education in the first major textbook on eco- 
nomic, social and cultural rights in international law, Manfred Nowak in 1995 
still had to concede that international law largely neglected the topic of aca- 
demic freedom and institutional autonomy.13 This remains true today to the 
extent that international ‘hard’ law (treaties legally binding on states parties 
thereto) is concerned. The right to academic freedom, as such, is not protected 
in the two un human rights covenants – the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (‘iccpr’)14 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (‘icescr’),15 both of 1966 – or in any other binding 
instrument of international law at the global or regional level. 
Certain provisions of the various human rights treaties applicable globally 
or regionally may, however, be relied on to protect (particular aspects of) the 
right to academic freedom.16 Focusing specifically on the un human rights 
covenants,17 these include: 
− Articles 2(1) and 26 iccpr, and Article 2(2) icescr, forbidding discrimina- 
tion on inter alia the ground of ‘political or other opinion’ (probably also if 
the opinion is ‘academic’ in nature), 
 
 
13 M. Nowak, ‘The Right to Education,’ in A. Eide et al. (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook (1995) 189–211, at 209–210. 
14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 999 unts 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) [hereinafter iccpr]. 
15 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 
16 December 1966, 993 unts 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) [hereinafter icescr]. 
16 See R. Quinn and J. Levine, ‘Intellectual-hrds and Claims for Academic Freedom under 
Human Rights Law,’ International Journal of Human Rights 18(7–8) (2014) 898–920, at 904, 
for an overview of relevant provisions in this respect in the major global and regional 
human rights instruments (including the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948). 
17 See ibid 902–912, for an analysis of the Covenant provisions referred to in the discussion 
that follows and their relevance to the right to academic freedom in the light of relevant 
international legal materials (decisions of international human rights tribunals, General 
Comments of un human rights treaty monitoring bodies, reports of un Special Rappor- 
teurs, etc.). 
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− Article 6 iccpr on the right to life (brutal regimes sometimes executing 
academics), 
− Article 7 iccpr, prohibiting torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treat- 
ment or punishment (clearly including where this takes place in relation to 
certain academic views or actions), 
− Article 9 iccpr, addressing the right to liberty and security of the person (rel- 
evant, for example, where an academic is arbitrarily arrested and detained 
(and falsely prosecuted) in retaliation for certain academic views or actions), 
− Article 12 iccpr on the right to liberty of movement, and Article 13 iccpr 
on the right of aliens not to be arbitrarily expelled from a state (Articles 12 
and 13 guaranteeing the ability of members of the academic community to 
travel abroad, to return home, and to move freely within a state for the pur- 
poses of study, teaching and research),18 
− Article 14 iccpr, protecting the right to a fair and public hearing by a com- 
petent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law in civil and 
criminal cases (also cases relating to rights and duties in the sphere of aca- 
demic freedom), 
− Article 17 iccpr, prohibiting arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy 
or correspondence (e.g. inspecting or censoring an academic’s communica- 
tion), and unlawful attacks on honour or reputation (e.g. untrue allegations 
aboutanacademicinretaliationforcertainacademicviewsoractions), 
− Article 18 iccpr on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
(potentially also encompassing the right of academics to object to teaching 
or carrying out research on the ground that doing so would be contrary to 
their conscience, religion or beliefs),19 
− Article 21 iccpr on the right of peaceful assembly (affording protection, for 
example, to academics organising a conference, in which opinions critical 
of a government’s policies in one area or another are expressed), 
− Article 22 iccpr on the right to freedom of association (on which members 
of the academic community would rely, for instance, to protect their right 
to form and join trade unions attending to their interests, including those 
related to academic freedom),20 
 
18 In this context, see, e.g., K. Beiter, ‘The Protection of the Right to Academic Mobility un- 
der International Human Rights Law,’ in M. Tight and N. Maadad (eds.), Academic Mobil- 
ity (Emerald, 2014) 243–265. 
19 It is not entirely clear whether Art. 18 iccpr covers a general right of ‘conscientious ob- 
jection.’ See M. Nowak, ‘Article 18: Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion and Belief,’ 
in u.n. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: ccpr Commentary (N.P. Engel, 2nd rev. ed. 
2005) 406–436, at paras. 10–11 (412–413), paras. 27–32 (421–425). 
20 Art. 22 iccpr ‘only applies to private associations.’ See un, Human Rights Commit- 
tee, Wallmann v. Austria, Comm. No. 1002/2001, un Doc. ccpr/c/80/d/1002/2001 
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− Article 25(c) iccpr, guaranteeing the right of citizens of access to the public 
service in their country without discrimination, for example, on the ground 
of ‘political or other opinion’ (academics in many countries being civil ser- 
vants), and 
– Article 15(1)(c) icescr, protecting the right ‘[t]o benefit from the protection 
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which [one] is the author,’ thus also protecting the 
right of researchers to claim ‘ownership’ of and dispose over their scholarly 
writings (copyright) or inventions (patents).21 
Three Covenant provisions provide protection for the right to academic free- 
dom more comprehensively: 
− Article 19 iccpr on the right to freedom of opinion and expression,22 
− Article 15 icescr on cultural rights – notably giving expression, in Para- 
graph 3, to the right to respect for ‘the freedom indispensable for scientific 
research,’23 and 
− Article 13 icescr on the right to education. 
 
 
 
 
(1 April 2004), para. 9.4. It seems thus not to apply to public universities, but to, e.g., trade 
unions or private universities. 
21 In a wider sense, one could also mention Arts. 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12 icescr on the right to 
just and favourable conditions of work, the right to form and join trade unions, the right 
to social security, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to the high- 
est attainable standard of physical and mental health, respectively. Ultimately, academic 
freedom can only be enjoyed if the terms and conditions of employment are conducive 
for effective teaching and research. See unesco Recommendation concerning the Status 
of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel (1997), para. 40 (calling upon the employers of 
higher-education teaching personnel to establish terms and conditions of employment of 
the nature contemplated). 
22 Art. 19 iccpr needs to be read in conjunction with Art. 20 of the Covenant, which ‘limits’ 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression in that it prohibits ‘any propaganda for 
war’ and ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence.’ 
23 Where Art. 15(1)(b) icescr recognises the right ‘[t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications,’ this implies ensuring an environment of free enquiry in 
all settings where research takes place, making possible such progress in the first place. 
Art. 15(4) icescr enjoins states parties to ‘recognise the benefits to be derived from 
the encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the 
scientific and cultural fields.’ Again, international contacts and co-operation in the field 
of science are meaningful in an atmosphere of freedom of enquiry only. 
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Some commentators consider the right to freedom of opinion and expression 
and the right to education to constitute the two essential pillars of the right to 
academic freedom.24 Others contend that the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression must be viewed as the fundamental premise of the right to aca- 
demic freedom.25 Yet others again hold that, whereas all the various provisions 
cited above should play a role in protecting relevant aspects of the right to 
academic freedom, Article 13 icescr on the right to education – in the light of 
its particular ‘design’ – constitutes a complete locus for the right to academic 
freedom: ‘Article 13 icescr … constitutes the provision which concurrently 
assembles all aspects of academic freedom under “a single roof” and whose 
normative context provides the proper framework for interpretation.’26 There 
are writers who agree that all the various provisions mentioned should play a 
role as described, but who maintain that ‘Article 13 icescr alone is too weak a 
basis to support academic freedom.’27 
 
24 See, e.g., Quinn and Levine (n 16) 902–912, specifically 903–905, or B. Rajagopal, ‘Aca- 
demic Freedom as a Human Right: An Internationalist Perspective,’ Academe 89(3) (2003) 
25–28, at 27–28. Similarly, the Belgian Court of Arbitration, in a decision of 2005, held that 
the right to academic freedom represented an aspect of freedom of expression (Belgian 
Constitution, art. 19) and was also a part of the freedom of education (Constitution, art. 
24, § 1). Judgment of 23 November 2005 (No. 167/2005), Cour d’arbitrage, Moniteur Belge, 
2 December 2005, para. B.18.1. See M. Pâques, ‘Liberté académique et Cour d’Arbitrage,’ 
in Liber amicorum Paul Martens: L’humanisme dans la résolution des conflits: Utopie ou 
réalité? (Larcier, 2007) 399–418, for a discussion of the decision. 
25 See, e.g., K. Appiagyei-Atua, 2014, ‘A Theoretical Review of the Origins of Academic Free- 
dom,’ University Values, 3 July 2014, retrieved 1 July 2016, https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/ 
resources/a-theoretical-review-of-the-origins-of-academic-freedom. 
26 See K.D. Beiter, 2011, ‘The Doctrinal Place of the Right to Academic Freedom under the un 
Covenants on Human Rights,’ University Values (July 2011), https://perma.cc/6APS-UG32; 
K.D. Beiter, 2013, ‘The Doctrinal Place of the Right to Academic Freedom under the un 
Covenants on Human Rights: A Rejoinder to Antoon de Baets,’ University Values (Decem- 
ber 2013), https://perma.cc/69V2-SRMJ. 
27 See A. de Baets, 2012, ‘The Doctrinal Place of the Right to Academic Freedom un- 
der the un Covenants on Human Rights: A Rejoinder,’ University Values (May 2012), 
https://perma.cc/M2GF-JSP7; A. de Baets, 2014, ‘Some Puzzles of Academic Freedom 
(Part 1),’ University Values, 3 July 2014, retrieved 1 July 2016, https://www.scholarsa- 
trisk.org/resources/some-puzzles-of-academic-freedom-part-1; A. de Baets, 2015, ‘Some 
Puzzles of Academic Freedom (Parts 2 and 3),’ University Values, 9 January 2015, re- 
trieved 1 July 2016, https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/resources/some-puzzles-of-academic 
-freedom-parts-2-and-3. Problems associated with considering the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression as the basis of the right to academic freedom are, firstly, the 
fact that academic freedom entails much more than free speech rights, namely, also 
rights of ‘free action’ (e.g. conducting an experiment), and, secondly, the fact that 
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There have been noteworthy developments at the international level per- 
taining to the right to academic freedom. Three of these should briefly be re- 
ferred to. Firstly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
body of independent human rights experts supervising implementation of – 
and ‘authoritatively interpreting’ – the icescr, has, in its General Comment 
No. 13 on the Right to Education, made some interesting observations regarding 
‘academic freedom and institutional autonomy.’ It states, for example, that it 
‘has formed the view that the right to education can only be enjoyed if accom- 
panied by the academic freedom of staff and students’ and that ‘[a]ccordingly, 
even though the issue is not explicitly mentioned in Article 13, it is appropriate 
and necessary for the Committee to make some observations about academic 
freedom.’28 
 
the free speech rights covered are, in fact, special speech rights, circumscribed by the 
requirements of learning, teaching, and research. See E. Barendt, Academic Freedom 
and the Law: A Comparative Study (Hart, 2010) 17–21. Regarding the right to respect 
for ‘the freedom indispensable for scientific research’ in Art. 15(3) icescr, it should 
be noted that this is a general right belonging to all persons undertaking scientific 
research (including, e.g., researchers in private industry or those in public or private 
specialist institutes). It may be rendered as what is termed ‘Wissenschaftsfreiheit’ in 
German constitutional theory, perhaps best translated as ‘the right to free scholar- 
ship.’ The right to academic freedom, on the other hand, accrues to a smaller group 
of right-holders – namely academic staff in he institutions (or research institutions 
‘close’ to the educational milieu) – but it entails entitlements which are more far- 
reaching in their scope. As has been pointed out by a commentator, ‘[a]cademic 
freedom, as it is understood in the United Kingdom and the United States is, in 
contrast [to ‘Wissenschaftsfreiheit’], a special right to which only those engaged in 
teaching and research at universities and other comparable institutions are entitled.’ 
The freedom of those not working at the latter institutions ‘may be narrower than it 
is for university professors.’ The right to academic freedom is, however, also enjoyed 
by students in he, but the scope of their right is reduced when compared to that of 
academic staff. See ibid 37–38. For a detailed account of the doctrinal place of the 
right to academic freedom under the un human rights covenants, see K.D. Beiter, 
T. Karran and K. Appiagyei-Atua, ‘Yearning to Belong: Finding a “Home” for the Right 
to Academic Freedom in the u.n. Human Rights Covenants,’ Intercultural Human 
Rights Law Review (forthcoming Vol. 11, 2016). 
28 un, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, The 
Right to Education (Art. 13), un Doc. e/c.12/1999/10 (1999) [hereinafter General Com- 
ment No. 13], para. 38. The Committee then goes on to provide a definition of ‘academic 
freedom,’ essentially resembling that cited at n 45 below, and to describe the concept of 
‘institutional autonomy.’ Ibid paras. 39, 40, respectively. General Comments are interpre- 
tative tools. The Committee generates them in an attempt to clarify Covenant provisions. 
Though not legally binding, they do have considerable legal weight. 
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Secondly, the European Court of Human Rights, deciding on applications 
alleging violations of the rights set out in the European Convention on Human 
Rights (‘echr’) of 1950,29 as amended and supplemented, has, in recent years, 
in cases turning on issues of free speech in an academic context, started com- 
menting on certain aspects of the right to academic freedom, resolving these 
cases on the basis of Article 10 of the Convention, this provision protecting the 
right to freedom of expression. The first judgment that expressly referred to ac- 
ademic freedom was Sorguç v. Turkey. In this case, the Court ‘underline[d] the 
importance of academic freedom, which comprises the academics’ freedom to 
express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work 
and freedom to distribute knowledge and truth without restriction.’30 
Thirdly, in 1997, unesco – the un specialised agency with primary re- 
sponsibility for international co-operation in the fields of education, the 
natural, social, and human sciences, culture, and communication – adopted 
the Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching 
Personnel.31 The Recommendation ‘applies to all higher-education teaching 
personnel.’32 This means ‘all those persons in institutions or programmes of 
higher education who are engaged to teach and/or to undertake scholarship 
 
 
29 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature 4 November 1950, ets 5 (entered into force 3 September 1953) [here- 
inafter echr]. 
30 Sorguç v. Turkey, Appl. No. 17089/03, ECtHR, 2nd Sec., 23 June 2009, para. 35. When making 
its comments on academic freedom, the Court referred to Recom. 1762 (2006) on Aca- 
demic Freedom and University Autonomy, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe. 
See Sorguç, para. 21. It may be mentioned that the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe has recently adopted another document on the subject, Recom. cm/Rec(2012)7 
on the Responsibility of Public Authorities for Academic Freedom and Institutional Au- 
tonomy. Other cases dealing with academic freedom include Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy, 
Appl. No. 39128/05, ECtHR, 2nd Sec., 20 October 2009; Sapan v. Turkey, Appl. No. 44102/04, 
ECtHR, 2nd Sec., 8 June 2010; Aksu v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. 4149/04, 41029/04, ECtHR, Grand 
Chamber, 15 March 2012; Hasan Yazıcı v. Turkey, Appl. No. 40877/07, ECtHR, 2nd Sec., 
15 April 2014; Mustafa Erdoğan v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. 346/04, 39779/04, ECtHR, 2nd Sec., 
27 May 2014. In the latter case, see also the interesting Joint Concurring Opinion of 
Judges Sajó, Vučinić and Kūris, developing criteria for the protection of ‘extramural’ 
speech of academics. All judgments are available in the Court’s online hudoc database 
at http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home&c=. 
31 General Conference (unesco), Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher- 
Education Teaching Personnel, unesco Doc. 29 C/Res. 11 (1997) [hereinafter (the) unes- 
co Recommendation]. 
32 Ibid para. 2. 
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and/ortoundertakeresearchand/ortoprovideeducationalservicestostudents  or 
to the community at large.’33 The Recommendation addresses aspects of aca- 
demic freedom in several of its provisions. These provisions will be used as the 
basis for assessing compliance with the right to academic freedom in Europe 
in the discussion that follows; on the one hand, because the provisions consti- 
tute the most current expression of agreed international standards on the topic, 
on the other, because they must be considered to ‘give content’ to un human 
rights law as expressed in the un human rights covenants referred to above.34 
 
4 unesco’s Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher- 
Education Teaching Personnel of 1997 and Its Provisions on 
Academic Freedom 
unesco’s Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teach- 
ing Personnel of 1997 deals with a multitude of issues in seeking to safeguard 
the rights and duties of higher-education teaching personnel. The following 
topics are covered: 
− guiding principles (regarding he and teaching personnel in he) (part iii, 
paras. 3–9); 
− educational objectives and policies (in the sphere of he) (part iv, paras. 
10–16); 
 
 
33 Ibid para. 1(f). Predating this Recommendation is another Recommendation adopted by 
unesco: the Recommendation on the Status of Scientific Researchers of 1974. This in- 
strument, applicable, as it is, to scientific researchers, and protecting, amongst others, 
their freedom of research, covers a wider group of researchers than only those in he. The 
Recommendation defines ‘scientific researchers’ as ‘those persons responsible for inves- 
tigating a specific domain in science or technology’ – ‘sciences’ meaning the sciences 
concerned with social facts and phenomena, to the extent that theoretical elements are 
capable of being validated – irrespective of the type of establishment in which such re- 
searchers work, the motivation underlying the research, and the kind of application to 
which it relates most immediately. Ibid para. 1. 
34 In its Preamble, the Recommendation thus establishes a clear link with un human rights 
treaty law, referring to Art. 13(2)(c) icescr on the right to higher education. See further 
Arts. 18–23 icescr, articulating the responsibility of the un specialised agencies, such as 
unesco, to concretise Covenant provisions by adopting relevant conventions and rec- 
ommendations. See K.D. Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Education by International 
Law: Including a Systematic Analysis of Article 13 of the International Covenant on Econom- 
ic, Social and Cultural Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 229–232, 280. 
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− institutional rights, duties, and responsibilities (institutional autonomy and 
institutional accountability) (part v, paras. 17–24); 
− rights and freedoms of higher-education teaching personnel (individual 
rights and freedoms (civil rights, academic freedom, publication rights, and 
the international exchange of information), and self-governance and col- 
legiality) (part vi, paras. 25–32); 
− duties and responsibilities of higher-education teaching  personnel  
(part vii, paras. 33–36); 
− preparation for the profession (part viii, paras. 37–39); 
– terms and conditions of employment (entry into the academic profession; 
security of employment; appraisal; discipline and dismissal; negotiation of 
terms and conditions of employment; salaries, workload, social security 
benefits, health and safety; study and research leave and annual holidays; 
terms and conditions of employment of women, disabled and part-time 
higher-education teaching personnel) (part ix, paras. 40–72); 
− utilisation and implementation (part x, paras. 73–76); and 
− final provision (providing that the Recommendation may not be invoked 
to diminish a more favourable status already granted to higher-education 
teaching personnel) (part xi, para. 77). 
The Recommendation is more than a mere code regulating the profession of 
he teaching. Apart from improving the professional, material, and social posi- 
tion of higher-education teaching personnel, it is also, as a result of improve- 
ments in that position, aimed at enhancing the quality of the he system.35 It 
is appreciated that the goals of he, such as pursuit, advancement, and trans- 
fer of knowledge, satisfying students’ higher educational needs, and securing 
a well-qualified work force, can only be reached if there exists a he system 
of high quality.36 Recognising the decisive role of higher education teaching 
personnel towards reaching the stated goals, such personnel ‘[must] enjoy the 
status commensurate with this role.’37 Although the Recommendation is not 
as such ‘an international instrument on academic freedom,’ guaranteeing aca- 
demic freedom in he is a fundamental concern of the document. Already the 
Preamble to the Recommendation, in Recitals 8 and 9, 
[e]xpress[es] concern regarding the vulnerability of the academic 
community to untoward political pressures which could undermine 
 
35 See ibid 280. 
36 unesco Recommendation, Preamble, Recitals 3, 4. 
37 Ibid, Preamble, Recitals 5, 10. 
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academic freedom, [and] [c]onsider[s] that the right to education, teach- 
ing and research can only be fully enjoyed in an atmosphere of academic 
freedom and autonomy for institutions of higher education and that the 
open communication of findings, hypotheses and opinions lies at the 
very heart of higher education and provides the strongest guarantee of 
the accuracy and objectivity of scholarship and research[,] 
thus recognising the importance of ensuring academic freedom and institu- 
tional autonomy if he is to achieve the objectives identified above.38 Various 
provisions of the Recommendation focus on aspects of academic freedom. 
The provisions – apart from addressing freedom of teaching and freedom in 
carrying out research – cover at least three additional aspects, namely, self- 
governance in he by the academic community, employment security (includ- 
ing ‘tenure’), and the autonomy of institutions of he. These various rights are, 
however, to be interpreted in the light of special duties and responsibilities 
for staff and students, and the fact that a proper balance between the level 
of autonomy enjoyed by he institutions and their systems of accountability 
should be ensured. All the above elements taken together make up what may 
be termed ‘the right to academic freedom.’39 
 
38 While academic freedom is thus to ensure that ‘proper’ learning, teaching and research 
can take place, at a more abstract level, the justification for safeguarding academic free- 
dom may be stated to be two-fold: firstly, ensuring that academics can engage in a free 
search for the truth for the benefit of society as a whole, and, secondly, advancing ‘ethical 
individualism’ (values of intellectual independence). See R. Dworkin, ‘We Need a New 
Interpretation of Academic Freedom,’ in L. Menand (ed.), The Future of Academic Free- 
dom (1996) 181–198, at 185–189 (referring to the instrumental and ethical ground of protec- 
tion in this context, respectively). On yet another level, the purpose of academic freedom 
may be stated to be to promote human dignity, i.e. the human dignity of academics as 
members of the academic profession, and the human dignity of all those who benefit 
from academic freedom and its ‘production’ of truth and progress. Generally on the ra- 
tionale for the protection of academic freedom as a human right, see Beiter et al. (n 27). 
39 See, e.g., T. Karran, ‘Academic Freedom in Europe: Time for a Magna Charta?,’ Higher 
Education Policy 22(2) (2009) 163–189, or J. Vrielink et al., Academic Freedom as a Fun- 
damental Right (League of European Research Universities, Advice Paper No. 6, Decem- 
ber 2010), retrieved 15 May 2016, http://www.leru.org/files/publications/AP6_Academic_ 
final_Jan_2011.pdf, for a discussion of the various elements (rights, duties, responsibili- 
ties) of the right to academic freedom. See also General Comment No. 13 (n 28) paras. 
38–40. The unesco Recommendation thus contains provisions on ‘Institutional autono- 
my’ (v.a.), paras. 17–21, ‘Institutional accountability’ (v.b.), paras. 22–24, ‘Individual rights 
and freedoms: civil rights, academic freedom, publication rights, and the international 
exchange of information’ (vi.a.), paras. 25–30, ‘Self-governance and collegiality’ (vi.b.), 
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unesco’s Recommendations are not legally binding. However, it would be 
wrong to hold them to be legally irrelevant. They ‘bind’ as soft-law. Appreci- 
ating that Recommendations have been adopted by the General Conference 
of unesco, they must be considered to reflect an international consensus on 
the specific subject matter dealt with. Recommendations ‘have a normative 
character in their intent and effects and the States concerned regard them 
as political or moral commitments.’40 Note should be taken of Paragraph 74 
of the Recommendation, which calls upon ‘Member States and higher edu- 
cation institutions [to] take all feasible steps to apply the provisions [of the 
Recommendation] to give effect, within their respective territories, to the 
principles set forth in [the] Recommendation.’ Moreover, under unesco’s 
Constitution, unesco’s members are obliged to submit the various recom- 
mendations adopted to their competent authorities so that the latter may take 
cognisance of their provisions, and further to report on the measures taken 
towards and the progress made in implementing recommendations.41 As the 
Recommendation deals with international labour and international education 
law, supervision of its implementation by unesco Member States is entrust- 
ed to a Joint ilo/unesco Committee of Experts on the Application of the 
Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel (‘ceart’).42 The Commit- 
tee is composed of twelve independent experts – six appointed by unesco, 
six by the ilo. It holds sessions every three years. The Committee essentially 
performs two tasks: It examines relevant data, including the reports referred 
to, to adjudge application of the Recommendation, and it examines allegations 
received from teachers’ organisations on the non-observance of provisions of 
the Recommendation in Member States.43 
 
 
paras. 31–32, ‘Duties and responsibilities of higher-education teaching personnel’ (vii), 
paras. 33–36, and ‘Security of employment’ (ix.b.), paras. 45–46. 
40 Y. Daudet and K. Singh, The Right to Education: An Analysis of unesco’s Standard-Setting 
Instruments (unesco, 2001) 45, retrieved 15 May 2016, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ 
images/0012/001238/123817e.pdf. 
41 Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 
opened for signature 16 November 1945, 4 unts 275 (entered into force 4 November 1946), 
art. iv(4), (6), respectively. 
42 Already in 1966, unesco adopted a Recommendation concerning the Status of Teachers, 
applicable to teachers in schools from the pre-primary up to completion of the secondary 
level of education. 
43 For more information on the supervision of the relevant Recommendations, see 
Beiter (n 34) 282–284; and ceart ’s latest sessional reports, e.g., Rep., 10th Session, 28 
September-2 October 2009, ilo/unesco Doc. ceart/10/2009; Rep., 11th Session, 8–12 
October 2012, ilo/unesco Doc. ceart/11/2012/9; Rep., 12th Session, 20–24 April 2015, 
ilo/unesco Doc. ceart/12/2015/14. 
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As alluded to above, the various provisions of the Recommendation address- 
ing aspects of academic freedom may broadly be divided into four groups:44 
1. Provisions on individual rights and freedoms in Paragraphs 25 to 30; 
2. Provisions on institutional autonomy in Paragraphs 17 to 21; 
3. Provisions on self-governance and collegiality in Paragraphs 31 and 32; 
and 
4. Provisions on security of employment, including ‘tenure or its functional 
equivalent, where applicable,’ in Paragraphs 45 and 46. 
A few words should be said with regard to each of the aspects protected. 
Firstly, regarding provisions on individual rights and freedoms, these envis- 
age academics enjoying ‘internationally recognised civil, political, social and 
cultural rights applicable to all citizens’ (Para. 26) and ‘the principle of aca- 
demic freedom’ (Para. 27). Regarding the former rights, the Recommendation, 
in fact, refers to many of the rights mentioned under the previous heading, 
such as freedom of thought, conscience, religion, expression, assembly, and 
association, freedom and security of the person, freedom of movement, etc. 
The principle of academic freedom, on the other hand, implicates 
the right [of higher-education teaching personnel], without constriction 
by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom 
in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results 
thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or 
system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and 
freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies. 
All higher-education teaching personnel should have the right to fulfil 
their functions without discrimination of any kind and without fear of 
repression by the state or any other source.45 
Scholars have been described as ‘dangerous’ minds.46 As one of the Recom- 
mendation’s guiding principles articulates, ‘[i]nstitutions of  higher education 
… are communities of scholars preserving, disseminating and expressing freely 
 
 
44 See Karran (n 2) 195–196. 
45 See, e.g., Karran (n 39) 170–175, A. Prüm and R. Ergec, ‘La liberté académique,’ Revue du 
droit public et de la science politique en France et à l’étranger No. 1 (2010) 1–28, at 13–17, or 
Vrielink et al. (n 39) paras. 27–59 (9–18), on ‘the principle of academic freedom’ (in effect, 
academic freedom as an individual right) as an aspect of the right to academic freedom. 
46 R. Quinn, ‘Defending “Dangerous” Minds: Reflections on the Work of the Scholars at Risk 
Network,’ Items & Issues 5(1–2) (2004) 1–5, at 1. 
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their opinions on traditional knowledge and culture, and pursuing new knowl- 
edge without constriction by prescribed doctrines.’47 Challenging orthodox 
ideas and beliefs and creating new knowledge mean that, ‘because of the nature 
of their work, academics are more naturally led in to conflict with governments 
and other seats of authority.’48 For this reason, advances in he depend not only 
on infrastructure and resources, but need to be underpinned by academic free- 
dom.49 Higher-education teaching personnel accordingly ‘have a right to carry 
out research work without any interference, or any suppression, … subject to … 
recognised professional principles of intellectual rigour, scientific enquiry and 
research ethics.’ They ‘should also have the right to publish and communicate 
the conclusions of the research of which they are authors or co-authors.’50 They 
further ‘have the right to teach without any interference, subject to accepted 
professional principles,’ ‘should not be forced to instruct against their own best 
knowledge and conscience,’ and ‘should play a significant role in determining 
the curriculum.’51 Academic freedom is subject to important duties and re- 
sponsibilities, as described in Paragraphs 33 to 36. There is, for example, a duty 
of higher-education teaching personnel ‘to teach students effectively’ as there 
is a duty ‘to base … research and scholarship on an honest search for knowledge 
with due respect for evidence, impartial reasoning and honesty in reporting.’52 
Secondly, the Recommendation’s provisions on institutional autonomy 
oblige unesco Member States ‘to protect higher education institutions from 
threats to their autonomy coming from any source.’53 Threats need not, there- 
fore, necessarily emanate from the state, but they may also, for example, origi- 
nate with private actors such as private companies commissioning research. In 
terms of Paragraph 17 of the Recommendation, institutional autonomy means 
 
that degree of self-governance necessary for effective decision-making 
by institutions of higher education regarding their academic work, 
standards, management and related activities consistent with systems of 
 
47 unesco Recommendation, para. 4. 
48 Karran (n 2) 191. 
49 See unesco Recommendation, para. 5 (also one of the Recommendation’s guiding 
principles). 
50 Ibid para. 29. 
51 Ibid para. 28. 
52 Ibid para. 34(a), (c), respectively. See, e.g., D. Kennedy, Academic Duty (Harvard up, 1997), 
on academic duties. 
53 unesco Recommendation, para. 19. See, e.g., Prüm and Ergec (n 45) 18–21, or Vrielink 
et al. (n 39) paras. 60–76 (18–22), on institutional autonomy as an aspect of the right to 
academic freedom. 
 Beiter, Karran and Appiagyei-Atua 
 
20  
 
public accountability, especially in respect of funding provided by the 
state, and respect for academic freedom and human rights. 
It is important to appreciate that there is no automatic link between institu- 
tional autonomy and individual academic freedom: ‘[A] highly autonomous 
institution may offer its members only a limited degree of academic freedom.’ 
In fact, ‘[a]s certain responsibilities move gradually from public authorities to 
higher education institutions, academic freedom could be endangered.’54 It 
is for this reason that the unesco Recommendation stresses that a proper 
interpretation of institutional autonomy needs to render that term as auton- 
omy ‘consistent with … respect for academic freedom.’ As it were, the Recom- 
mendation understands autonomy to be ‘the institutional form of academic 
freedom.’55 Autonomy should further ‘not be used by higher education institu- 
tions as a pretext to limit the rights of higher-education teaching personnel 
provided for in [the] Recommendation.’56 Autonomy must go hand in hand 
with public accountability. The Recommendation requires ‘Member States 
and higher education institutions [to] ensure a proper balance between the 
level of autonomy enjoyed by higher education institutions and their systems 
of accountability.’57 he institutions are thus accountable for a commitment to 
quality in teaching and research, ensuring high quality education, the creation 
of codes of ethics to guide teaching and research, honest and open accounting, 
and an efficient use of resources.58 They are also accountable for ‘assistance 
in the fulfilment of economic, social, cultural and political rights,’ ‘ensuring 
that they address themselves to the contemporary problems facing society,’ 
and ‘play[ing] an important role in enhancing the labour market opportunities 
of their graduates.’59 Very importantly, he institutions are accountable for the 
‘effective support of academic freedom and fundamental human rights.’60 
 
54 P. Zgaga, ‘Reconsidering University Autonomy and Governance: From Academic Freedom 
to Institutional Autonomy,’ in H.G. Schuetze et al. (eds.), University Governance and Re- 
form: Policy, Fads, and Experience in International Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 
11–22, at 19. 
55 unesco Recommendation, para. 18. See W. Berka, ‘Die Quadratur des Kreises: Univer- 
sitätsautonomie und Wissenschaftsfreiheit,’ Zeitschrift für Hochschulrecht, Hochschulma- 
nagement und Hochschulpolitik 7(2) (2008) 37–48, on the general difficulty of reconciling 
institutional autonomy and academic freedom, emphasising the Austrian context. 
56 unesco Recommendation, para. 20. 
57 Ibid para. 22, caput. 
58 See ibid para. 22(b), (d), (k), (i), (j), respectively. 
59 Ibid para. 22(l), (m). 
60 Ibid para. 22(c). 
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Thirdly, unesco’s Recommendation contains provisions on self-governance, 
i.e. the participation of higher-education teaching personnel in the gover- 
nance of institutions of he, and on principles of collegiality, in Paragraphs 
31 and 32, respectively. Academics pursue their scholarly activities within an 
institutional setting. The institutions in which they work will have to organ- 
ise themselves – their structures, governance and activities – in one way or 
another. Respect for academic freedom implies that the organisation is such 
as will ensure that free teaching and research can take place in the institu- 
tions. This will be the case if the specific way a he institution organises itself 
is of a nature as will guarantee that decisions taken by persons/organs will 
be ‘in the best interest of science and scholarship’ (‘wissenschaftsadäquat’). 
This, in turn, will only be the case if academics, as those entitled to claim 
academic freedom, can sufficiently participate in the taking of these deci- 
sions. Clearly, by virtue of their training and competence, their long-lasting 
professional occupation with certain subject matter as well as the fact that 
such decisions will have a long-term effect on their scholarly work, academ- 
ics are best qualified to ensure that decisions taken are ‘in the best interest 
of science and scholarship’ and support academic freedom.61 Self-governance 
under  unesco’s  Recommendation  entails  that  higher-education  teaching 
personnel 
 
should have the right and opportunity, without discrimination of any 
kind, according to their abilities, to take part in the governing bodies and 
to criticise the functioning of higher education institutions, including 
their own, while respecting the right of other sections of the academic 
community to participate, and they should also have the right to elect a 
 
 
 
 
61 See the Hamburgisches Hochschulgesetz case, Judgment of 20 July 2010, Bundesverfas- 
sungsgericht der brd[Federal Constitutional Court of Germany], BVerfGE 127, 87, at paras. 
88–95 (114–118), for this line of reasoning in justification of the right of self-governance. 
The court, relying on important earlier case law, observed that the goal here had to be 
to ensure that relevant decisions were ‘in the best interest of science and scholarship’ 
(‘wissenschaftsadäquat’). See R. Müller-Terpitz, ‘Neue Leistungsstrukturen als Gefähr- 
dung der Wissenschaftsfreiheit?,’ Wissenschaftsrecht 44(3) (2011) 236–263, for a discussion 
of when governance arrangements of he institutions may be considered to be consistent 
with academic freedom. Although the article deals with the situation in Germany, most 
of its statements are equally applicable in a more general sense. See, e.g., Karran (n 39) 
175–176, Prüm and Ergec (n 45) 21–25, or Vrielink et al. (n 39) paras. 65–66 (19–20), on self- 
governance as an aspect of the right to academic freedom. 
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majority of representatives to academic bodies within the higher educa- 
tion institution.62 
The closely related principles of collegiality that are to apply in terms of the 
Recommendation 
include academic freedom, shared responsibility, the policy of participa- 
tion of all concerned in internal decision-making structures and prac- 
tices, and the development of consultative mechanisms. 
It is pointed out that 
[c]ollegial decision-making should encompass decisions regarding the 
administration and determination of policies of higher education, cur- 
ricula, research, extension work, the allocation of resources and other re- 
lated activities, in order to improve academic excellence and quality for 
the benefit of society at large.63 
If it has been explained above that institutional autonomy should be interpret- 
ed so as to be consistent with academic freedom, it should be added that ‘[s] 
elf-governance, collegiality and appropriate academic leadership are essential 
components of meaningful autonomy for institutions of higher education.’64 
Consequently, a he institution that enjoys substantial autonomy, but in which 
higher-education teaching personnel cannot sufficiently participate in the tak- 
ing of decisions having a bearing – whether in a wider or a narrower sense – on 
science and scholarship fails to comply with the requirement of institutional 
autonomy as understood by the Recommendation. 
Fourthly and finally, unesco’s Recommendation, in Paragraphs 45 and 46, 
emphasises that higher-education teaching personnel should enjoy security 
of employment, including ‘tenure or its functional equivalent, where applicable.’ 
In the Recommendation’s perception, tenure (or its equivalent) ‘constitutes 
one of the major procedural safeguards of academic freedom and against 
arbitrary decisions.’65 Tenure may seem anomalous in the modern working 
 
 
62 unesco Recommendation, para. 31. 
63 Ibid para. 32. 
64 Ibid para. 21. 
65 Ibid para. 45. Cf. M. Rendel, ‘Human Rights and Academic Freedom,’ in M. Tight (ed.), Aca- 
demic Freedom and Responsibility (Society for Research into Higher Education & Open up, 
1988) 74–87, at 87 (explaining that tenure also protects institutional autonomy: ‘Tenure is 
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environment, characterised by high employment mobility, regular retraining 
for new jobs, previous ones becoming obsolete, fixed-term contracts being 
awarded in respect of projects rather than ‘life-time jobs,’ and contracts of ser- 
vice that may easily be terminated on operational grounds. It is important to 
remember, however, that tenure is not granted to academics as ‘a mere propri- 
etary benefit,’ as it were. In the first paragraph of its caput, the 1940 Statement 
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, adopted by the American As- 
sociation of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges 
(today the Association of American Colleges and Universities), underlines that 
‘[i]nstitutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and 
not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution 
as a whole,’ ‘[t]he common good depend[ing] upon the free search for truth 
and its free exposition.’ Likewise, the us Supreme Court, in its landmark de- 
cision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, solemnly declared that ‘Our Nation is 
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcen- 
dental value to all of us, and not merely to the teachers concerned.’66 Hence, 
tenure – and academic freedom, which it protects by ensuring that academics 
can engage in a free search for the truth without having to fear losing their jobs, 
for example, because of the views expressed67 – are closely linked to scholars’ 
responsibility for promoting the interests of society as a whole through their 
teaching  and  research.68  Paragraph  46  of  unesco’s  Recommendation  en- 
visages tenure (or its equivalent) to be granted ‘after a reasonable period of 
probation’69 – ‘following rigorous evaluation’ – ‘to those who meet stated ob- 
jective criteria in teaching … [and] research to the satisfaction of an academic 
body.’ Tenure (or its equivalent) entails ‘continuing employment’ and potential 
 
 
important because it can defend not only the individual academic but also the institu- 
tion from ideological and managerial pressures, by helping them to continue to teach un- 
fashionable or unpopular subjects, to research inconvenient topics and to provide more 
centres of initiative than hierarchical management can.’). See, e.g., Karran (n 39) 177–185, 
or Prüm and Ergec (n 45) 26, on ‘tenure’ as an aspect of the right to academic freedom. 
66 385 us 589, at 603 (1967). 
67 See C. Russell, Academic Freedom (Routledge, 1993) 23 (stating that ‘[t]he point is not 
that academics may not be dismissed for their opinions: it is that they need freedom 
from fear thatthey might be so dismissed. Without it, they cannotbe counted on to do their 
work well.’). 
68 On the justification for safeguarding academic freedom and tenure, see n 38 above. 
69 Paragraph 42 of the unesco Recommendation stipulates that the duration of probation 
should be known in advance and conditions for its satisfactory completion strictly related 
to professional competence. Reasons should further be provided should a candidate fail 
to complete the probation satisfactorily. There should also be a right to appeal. 
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dismissal ‘on professional grounds and in accordance with due process’ only. 
The Recommendation allows release ‘for bona fide financial reasons, provided 
that all the financial accounts are open to public inspection, that the institu- 
tion has taken all reasonable alternative steps to prevent termination of em- 
ployment, and that there are legal safeguards against bias in any termination 
of employment procedure.’ Moreover, tenure (or its equivalent) ‘should be 
safeguarded as far as possible even when changes in the organisation of or 
within a higher education institution or system are made.’ 
 
5 Indicators and Rankings: Some Observations 
Relying on a set of specific indicators, the present article assesses the extent to 
which the constitutions, laws on he, and other relevant legislation of eu states 
implement the right to academic freedom, and ranks states in accordance with 
‘their performance.’ It has been argued that using indicators ‘to measure the 
world’ is tantamount to quietly exercising power.70 Selecting indicators, weight- 
ing them, and relying on the data they reflect are all political processes. Indica- 
tors constitute ‘a form of knowledge and a technology for governance.’ They 
‘influence governance when they form the basis for political decision making, 
public awareness, and the terms in which problems are conceptualized and 
solutions imagined.’ There is a linkage between indicators and power.71 This 
cannot be disputed. Indicators are used to assess accountability. It has been 
critically remarked that the growing use of quantitative indicators to measure 
accountability has transformed the meaning of accountability to mean ‘au- 
ditability,’ in a way ‘focusing on indicators rather than on the qualities that 
the measures are designed to evaluate.’ Such auditing, so the argument goes, 
may have a contrary effect to that intended, consequences not beneficial to 
accountability. Where doctors’ performance, for example, is publicly ranked 
utilising criteria including mortality rates, the consequence may be that doc- 
tors prefer not to intervene in critically ill patients so as not to risk tainting 
their scorecards. It is argued, as it were, that public measures may be used to 
 
 
 
70 S. Engle Merry et al. (eds.), The Quiet Power of Indicators: Measuring Governance, Cor- 
ruption, and Rule of Law (Cambridge up, 2015). Produced in the same context, see also 
K.E. Davis et al. (eds.), Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Quantification and 
Rankings (oup, 2012). 
71 K.E. Davis et al., ‘Introduction – The Local-Global Life of Indicators: Law, Power, and 
Resistance,’ in Engle Merry et al. (2015) (n 70) 1–25, at 1–2. 
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recreate social worlds.72 This is also undisputed. The assessment of academic 
freedom undertaken here and the indicators applied to this effect are clearly to 
constitute ‘a basis for political decision-making,’ decision-making supportive 
of the right to academic freedom and resulting in robust legal protection for 
that right. Care will be taken to not merely ‘audit’ state performance, but to ap- 
proximate a genuine qualitative assessment of state compliance with relevant 
criteria of the right to academic freedom.73 
As has been pointed out above, the right to academic freedom may arguably 
be considered rooted in the right to education. A former un Special Rappor- 
teur on the right to education has commented that 
[she] feels that the vast amounts of data which are being internationally 
generated within the field of education do not conform to the human 
rights approach to education, and a conceptual challenge remains for 
the human rights community to design indicators that would capture the 
essence of the right to education and human rights in education.74 
The indicators chosen here will purposively not measure whether he reforms 
in the countries concerned comply with requirements of economic or mana- 
gerial efficiency, as such criteria are irrelevant in – and in any event subordi- 
nate to – a human rights approach as binding on all the states considered in 
this assessment. The effort here will be to rely on human rights indicators – 
indicators operationalising the requirements of the right to academic free- 
dom as protected under international human rights law.75 Apart from one 
 
 
72 W. Nelson Espeland and M. Sauder, ‘Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Re- 
create Social Worlds,’ American Journal of Sociology 113(1) (July 2007) 1–40, specifically at 2. 
73 See also A. Rosga and M.L. Satterthwaie, ‘The Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human 
Rights,’ Berkeley Journal of International Law 27(2) (2009) 253–315, at 315 (indicators ‘are 
tools like any other. All tools can be misused …. The key lies in knowing where – and 
how – human judgment and political contestation should enter.’). 
74 K. Tomaševski, Progress Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Sub- 
mitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/25, un Doc. 
E/cn.4/2000/6 (1 February 2000), para. 73. 
75 A human rights indicator may be defined as ‘specific information on the state or condi- 
tion of an object, event, activity or outcome that can be related to human rights norms 
and standards; that addresses and reflects human rights principles and concerns; and that 
can be used to assess and monitor the promotion and implementation of human rights.’ 
See Office of the un High Commissioner for Human Rights (ohchr), Human Rights In- 
dicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation (hr/pub/12/5) (un, 2012) 16. Guid- 
ance in designing human rights indicators may usefully be sought in the former guide 
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indicator measuring ‘the percentage of academic staff with permanent con- 
tracts of service or on a tenure-track’ (Indicator E.1.2.), all other indicators have 
a clear qualitative focus, i.e. they measure ‘information beyond statistics.’76 
They assess whether the law of a country contains provisions on this or that 
aspect of academic freedom, and the degree to which these provisions may be 
considered compliant with accepted criteria of academic freedom as a human 
right. The qualitative dimension is also reflected in the fact that indicators will 
be weighted in accordance with their relative importance. The indicators ap- 
plied are ‘fact-based’ rather than ‘judgement-based.’ They assess ‘facts … that 
can … be directly observed or verified’ rather than ‘perceptions, opinions, as- 
sessment or judgements expressed by individuals.’77 Although ‘[e]lements of 
subjectivity in the … category of objective indicators cannot be fully excluded 
or isolated,’ ‘the use of transparent, specific and universally recognized defini- 
tions for particular … facts … contributes, in a general sense, to greater objectiv- 
ity when identifying and designing any type of indicator.’78 The indicators on 
academic freedom utilised here rely on extensive definitions as to the specific 
attributes that should be reflected by legal provisions on academic freedom.79 
 
 
and further in the following publications: un Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
and ohchr, The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators: Implementation Guide and Project 
Tools (un, 2011); ohchr, Manual on Human Rights Monitoring (hr/p/pt/7/Rev.1) (un, 
2011); S. McInerney-Lankford and H.-O. Sano, Human Rights Indicators in Development: An 
Introduction (World Bank Study, World Bank, 2010). 
76 Whereas a quantitative indicator is ‘any kind of indicator that is expressed primarily in 
quantitative form, such as numbers, percentages or indices,’ a qualitative indicator mea- 
sures ‘information beyond statistics that is qualitative in nature.’ See ohchr (2012) 16–17. 
77 Ibid 17. On this distinction between fact-based and judgement-based indicators, see ibid 
17–19. 
78 Ibid 17. 
79 For reasons of space, the definitions of the close to 40 indicators chosen cannot be 
produced below. An example will have to suffice. Indicator D.2.2.2. on Determining the 
Rector [1–0, 5–0] has been defined as follows: 
1 1. Academic staff exercise ‘control’ over who is chosen as the rector, the state is 
not required to appoint the rector or to confirm the chosen candidate, and the 
provisions on determining the rector comply also in all other respects with 
accepted requirements of academic self-governance (e.g. democratic principles) 
(= full compliance). 
0,5 2. (a) As in 1., except that academic staff do not exercise ‘control’ over who is cho- 
sen as the rector, but they have a graded, but clear right of participating in the 
selection procedures, alternatively, (b) as in 1., except that the state is required to 
appoint the rector or to confirm the chosen candidate, alternatively, (c) as in 1., 
except that, in the light of accepted requirements of academic self-governance 
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To the extent that a subjective assessment remains to be provided, this may, in 
all modesty, be stated to be an expert assessment. It is sometimes asserted that 
it is not feasible to measure human rights compliance because human rights 
relate to qualitative aspects of life, which are not amenable to being captured 
by indicators. It needs to be appreciated, however, that indicators ‘are tools that 
add value to assessments with a strong qualitative dimension; they do not re- 
place them.’80 Apart from the fact that, as pointed out, the indicators chosen 
in this assessment do have a clear qualitative focus, independent, holistic, non- 
indicator-based qualitative assessments of the state of the legal protection of 
the right to academic freedom in each European state remain necessary, but are 
rather the responsibility of experts in the various states. While the present as- 
sessment can thus provide an indication of the status quo in law, a comprehen- 
sive picture would have to be obtained by considering the drafting history of 
legislative provisions, governmental policy documents explaining the reasons 
for adopting certain legislative provisions, interpretations of legislative provi- 
sions by courts of law, etc. This, however, is beyond the purview of this article. 
In the light of the complexity of human rights, is it legitimate to use in- 
dicators to rank countries according to their human rights performance? 
Concurring with the view expressed by the Office of the un High Commission 
for Human Rights, it is submitted that this may be legitimate in certain cases: 
[I] dentified indicators can be used to undertake some comparison across 
countries, but such use is bound to be confined to comparing perfor- 
mance on a few specific human rights standards at a time, such as the 
right to education or the right to life or aspects of these rights …, and not 
the entire gamut of human rights.81 
 
 
(e.g. democratic principles), the provisions on determining the rector reveal cer- 
tain deficiencies, alternatively, (d) all cases, where more than one of (a), (b), and 
(c) would be applicable, but the cumulative effect of the deficiencies does not 
yet warrant describing the overall situation as one of non-compliance (= partial 
compliance). 
0 3. (a) Academic staff neither exercise ‘control’ over who is chosen as the rector, 
nor do they have a graded, but clear right of participating in the selection pro- 
cedures (additionally, 2. (b) and/or (c) could be applicable), alternatively, (b) all 
cases, where more than one of 2. (a), (b), and (c) would be applicable, and the 
cumulative effect of the deficiencies warrants describing the overall situation as 
one of non-compliance, alternatively, (c) all cases, where, in the light of accepted 
requirements of academic self-governance, the provisions on determining the 
rector reveal major deficiencies (= non-compliance). 
80 ohchr (2012) 21. 
81 Ibid 30. 
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The ranking undertaken here focuses on a clearly outlined aspect of human 
rights law, the right to academic freedom, focusing, moreover, only on the le- 
gal protection of that right. How should human rights indicators be concep- 
tualised? First of all, the attributes of the relevant human right need to be 
identified,82 before devising structural, process, and outcome indicators to 
measure these. Regarding the former, attributes are to be identified by (a) ex- 
haustively reading the relevant human rights standard so as not to overlook 
parts thereof, (b) selecting attributes that collectively reflect the essence of a 
right’s normative content, and articulating these in a way as to facilitate the 
subsequent identification of adequate indicators, and (c) ensuring that the at- 
tributes selected are mutually exclusive.83 Presently, an exhaustive reading of 
the unesco Recommendation of 1997 and other relevant international hu- 
man rights law (see Parts 3, 4, and 6) has been undertaken to identify relevant 
attributes of the right to academic freedom. Categorising these into different 
groups corresponding to the major elements of the right to academic freedom 
as reflected in the unesco Recommendation (i.e. the principle of academic 
freedom, institutional autonomy, academic self-governance, and employment 
security (including ‘tenure’)), and making sure that each of these groups cov- 
ers all salient aspects of the right within that group, help ensuring that the es- 
sence of the normative content of the right to academic freedom is adequately 
captured, and that as far as possible attributes do not overlap. Regarding the 
subsequent construction of indicators, it needs to be kept in mind that an over- 
all assessment of the state of realisation of a human right should rely on struc- 
tural, process, and outcome indicators.84 Whereas structural indicators assess 
commitment to implementing standards (the ratification and adoption of legal 
instruments),85 process indicators assess specific measures taken to imple- 
ment commitments (budget allocations, policies adopted, awareness-raising 
activities, etc.),86 and outcome indicators ‘capture individual and collective 
attainments that reflect the state of enjoyment of human rights in a given con- 
text’ (e.g. attainment levels for certain population groups or reported cases of 
violations, etc.).87 The present analysis focuses on structural indicators. Pro- 
cess and outcome indicators will be used when assessing the factual protection 
 
 
 
82 The ohchr states in this regard that indicators must be ‘anchored’ in human rights stan- 
dards (ibid 30), describing the procedure at 30–33. 
83 See ibid 31. 
84 See ibid 33–38. 
85 See ibid 34–35. 
86 See ibid 36–37. 
87 See ibid 37–38. 
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of the right to academic freedom by way of an online survey of academic staff 
at a future point. Finally, it has been stated that ‘there is a need to combine 
different sources and data-generating mechanisms to encourage a more com- 
prehensive and credible assessment of any human rights situation.’88 Poten- 
tial sources are events-based data on human rights violations, socio-economic 
data (administrative or researcher-gathered), perception and opinion surveys, 
and data based on expert judgements.89 This assessment relies on legislative 
information. The online survey alluded to will gather events-based data on vio- 
lations of the right to academic freedom, and also data on perceptions of and 
opinions on academic freedom among academics. 
 
6 Developing a Standard Scorecard ‘to Measure’ the Legal Protection 
of the Right to Academic Freedom in Europe 
There is no reason why the four parameters of the right to academic freedom, 
as defined in Part 4 above, should not, in an assessment of the legal protec- 
tion of the right to academic freedom in Europe, be given equal weight. Aca- 
demic freedom (individual freedom to teach and carry out research) is as im- 
portant as are each of institutional autonomy, self-governance, and tenure to 
buttress academic freedom.90 The four parameters will therefore be accorded 
equal weight in the standard scorecard used ‘to measure’ the right to academic 
freedom in each country examined – 20 percent each. The final 20 percent 
to arrive at an overall percentage score for each country assessed is accorded 
to the parameter ‘ratification of international agreements and constitutional 
protection.’ Altogether, 37 specific indicators measuring state compliance, con- 
cretising the main parameters, have been identified. As underlined, these are 
human rights indicators. A numeric value has been assigned to each indica- 
tor, mirroring its relative weight as adjudged in terms of international human 
rights law. When adding up the scores of states in respect of each of these val- 
ues, it is possible to rank states for each of the five parameters, but also overall. 
To eliminate subjectivity in ‘giving marks,’ the approach with regard to each 
 
 
 
88 Ibid 51. 
89 See ibid 52–68. 
90 See Karran (n 1) 291–292 (holding that ‘in the absence of data as to the relative impor- 
tance of various parameters of academic freedom, [it may be] assume[d] that all such 
parameters are equally important’). 
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indicator – following Karran’s earlier method in this respect – has been to de- 
termine whether there is ‘full compliance’ (full mark), ‘qualified compliance’ 
(half of the mark), or ‘non-compliance’ (no mark).91 Hence, a three-point scale 
is generally applied. In three instances it has been found expedient to apply a 
five-point scale, to highlight positions ‘between full and partial compliance’ 
and ‘between partial and non-compliance’ (see B., D.2.3., and E.3. of the score- 
card shown below). A two-point scale (‘full compliance’ or ‘non-compliance’) 
is used for indicators in A.1. on the ratification of international agreements. 
Some detail on the scorecard, its parameters and the various indicators will 
now be provided – for purposes of illustration, the example of the scorecard 
(with the results for Spain) reproduced at the end of this Part should be referred 
to. The first column (A) reflects whether the states at issue accept obligations 
of ‘superior normative force’ (in the sense of obligations not ‘merely’ originat- 
ing under ordinary legislation) relevant to the right to academic freedom, i.e. 
whether states have ratified relevant international agreements (10 percent), 
and whether their constitutions provide appropriate protection (10 percent). 
Regarding international agreements, the enquiry is whether states have ratified 
the following four global agreements: the iccpr of 1966 (with its Article 19 on 
the right to freedom of expression), the Optional Protocol to the iccpr of 1966 
(setting up a procedure in terms of which allegations of violations of Covenant 
rights may be brought before the Human Rights Committee), the icescr of 
1966 (with its Article 13 on the right to education), and the Optional Protocol 
to the icescr of 2008 (setting up a procedure in terms of which allegations of 
violations of Covenant rights may be brought before the Committee on Eco- 
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights); and the following regional agreement: the 
echr of 1950, as amended and supplemented (with its Article 10 on the right 
to freedom of expression).92 In view of their universal character, slightly more 
weight has been accorded to the global instruments (60 percent). A state that 
has ratified a treaty but has expressed a reservation to, notably, the right to 
 
91 Karran (n 2) 197–198. 
92  Although the echr also protects the right to education in Art. 2 of its Protocol No. 1, 
it does so negatively, stating that ‘[n]o person shall be denied the right to education.’ It 
has convincingly been argued that ‘[t]he right to university education is a human right’ 
under the echr. See Tarantino v. Italy, 2013–ii ECtHR 397, 416 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., 
partly dissenting). The nature and scope of state obligations flowing from the right to 
education under the echr remain contentious, however. See Beiter (n 34) 162–166. 
The European Social Charter (opened for signature 18 October 1961, ets 35 (entered into 
force 26 February 1965)) does not, also not in its revised version (opened for signature 3 
May 1996, ets 163 (entered into force 1 July 1999)), contain a right to higher 
education. 
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freedom of expression or the right to education, problematic from the perspec- 
tive of the right to academic freedom, will be considered to be ‘non-compliant.’ 
Regarding constitutional protection, it will be assessed whether there are ade- 
quate, problematic, or seriously deficient/no provisions in the constitutions of 
states in respect of each of the following: (1) the right to freedom of expression, 
(2) the right to academic freedom, and, as aspects of the latter, (3) institutional 
autonomy, and (4) academic self-governance (60 percent).93 It will further be 
assessed whether the normative context of constitutions (e.g. values reflected 
by relevant provisions, and specific or general limitations clauses) fully sup- 
ports the effective protection of the rights concerned (40 percent). 
The second to fifth columns consider whether states have complied with 
the requirement of adopting legislation providing expressly that academic 
freedom is to be protected (column B), and legislation satisfactorily concre- 
tising institutional autonomy (column C), self-governance (column D), and 
job security (including ‘tenure’) (column E) in he. Under column B, there is 
only one indicator, this enquiring whether he legislation contains express 
provisions on academic freedom (primarily in the sense of individual freedom 
to teach and carry out research). Do these comply with notably the Recom- 
mendation’s criteria on academic freedom and do they show that academic 
freedom should serve as a guiding principle for activity within he (full com- 
pliance)? Or, is there a mere reference to academic freedom, alternatively, are 
there more elaborate provisions on academic freedom, which, however, reveal 
various deficits (partial compliance)? Or, is there no reference to academic 
freedom at all (non-compliance)? Or, is there in fact a situation that may be de- 
scribed as being ‘between full and partial compliance’ or ‘between partial and 
non-compliance’? The indicator of column B thus applies a five-point scale to 
assess compliance. 
Column C covers indicators on institutional autonomy. The European Uni- 
versity Association (eua) monitors on an ongoing basis the extent to which he 
institutions in the various European states enjoy autonomy. As part of these 
 
 
 
 
93  Provisions on the right to education have not been taken into account. Full-fledged 
provisions on the right to education are found in only some European constitutions. 
The notion of protecting economic, social and cultural rights as entailing extensive 
positive obligations for states is still foreign to constitutional theory in most parts of 
Europe. Also tenure has not been considered separately here, as ‘tenure’ as a technical 
concept is unknown in many European countries. 
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efforts, it has produced two reports94 and administers an online platform,95 
which may usefully be consulted in establishing the elements encompassed by 
institutional autonomy. unesco’s Recommendation does not provide detail 
in this respect, and only remarks that ‘the nature of institutional autonomy 
may differ according to the type of establishment involved.’96 The eua thus 
distinguishes between organisational, financial, staffing, and academic 
autonomy,97 and, for each of these, applies various indicators to measure com- 
pliance. It needs to be emphasised, however, that the eua’s work reveals flaws 
when adjudged from a human rights perspective.98 Hence, although the eua 
indicators provide ‘a good starting point,’ in the end only some of these may 
usefully be applied (such as the indicators under C.2.) in establishing to what 
extent he institutions in the European states enjoy autonomy for purposes 
of this study. The indicators chosen in this assessment will enquire: whether 
there is a satisfactory, problematic, or seriously deficient/no provision in he 
 
94 T. Estermann and T. Nokkala, University Autonomyin Europe I: Exploratory Study (Final Re- 
port, eua, November 2009), retrieved 15 May 2016, http://www.eua.be/typo3conf/ext/bzb 
_securelink/pushFile.php?cuid=3040&file=fileadmin/user_upload/files/Publications/ 
University_Autonomy_in_Europe.pdf; T. Estermann et al., University Autonomy in 
Europe ii: The Scorecard (Final Report, eua, November 2011), retrieved 15 May 2016, http:// 
www.eua.be/Libraries/Publications/University_Autonomy_in_Europe_II_-_The_Score 
card.sflb.ashx. 
95 See the website ‘University Autonomy in Europe’ (eua, 2012), retrieved 15 May 2016, http:// 
www.university-autonomy.eu, with scorecards for university autonomy in 29 European 
countries. 
96 unesco Recommendation, para. 17. 
97 See the eua’s Lisbon Declaration: Europe’s Universities beyond 2010: Diversity with a 
Common Purpose, para. 26, retrieved 15 May 2016, http://www.eua.be/typo3conf/ext/ 
bzb_securelink/pushFile.php?cuid=398&file=fileadmin/user_upload/files/Lisbon_Con 
vention/Lisbon_Declaration.pdf. 
98 Whereas some of the eua’s indicators overtly contradict requirements of international 
human rights law (see K.D. Beiter, T. Karran and K. Appiagyei-Atua, ‘“Measuring” the 
Erosion of Academic Freedom as an International Human Right: A Report on the Legal 
Protection of Academic Freedom in Europe,’ Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
(forthcoming Vol. 49, 2016)), there is also a problem of a more general nature with the 
eua’s approach to institutional autonomy. The eua’s interpretation of institutional au- 
tonomy is far too technical in nature. It loses sight of the fact that institutional autonomy 
constitutes ‘the institutional form of academic freedom’ (unesco Recommendation, 
para. 18). Institutional autonomy must be understood to mean the independence of 
he institutions, enabling these to ensure academics can engage in a free search for the 
truth for the benefit of society as a whole, and can advance values of intellectual inde- 
pendence. See n 38 above. 
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legislation expressly protecting institutional autonomy (C.1.) (20 percent), how 
each of organisational, financial, staffing, and academic autonomy is realised 
by reference to one or two legitimate key indicators in each instance, each as- 
pect of autonomy weighted equally (C.2.) (40 percent),99 overall, how wide or 
narrow the extent of governmental powers are (C.3.) (20 percent),100 and, fi- 
nally, as to the extent to which institutional independence is protected against 
private interests (C.4.) (20 percent).101 
Column D covers indicators on self-governance. The first indicator ascertains 
whether there is a satisfactory, problematic, or seriously deficient/no provision 
in he legislation expressly protecting self-governance (D.1.) (10 percent). This 
is followed by a group of indicators examining the state of self-governance at 
the level of the he institution (D.2.), and another set of indicators measuring 
this at the faculty/departmental level (D.3.). As institutional decisions usually 
bind those adopting decisions at faculty/departmental level, self-governance 
at the institutional level has been accorded double the weight assigned to self- 
governance at faculty/departmental level (60 percent:30 percent). The indica- 
tors seek to ascertain whether he legislation safeguards the right of academic 
staff to sufficiently participate in the taking of decisions directly or indirectly 
related  to  science  and  scholarship.  unesco’s  Recommendation  requires 
academic staff to be able ‘to elect a majority of representatives to academic 
bodies within the higher education institution.’102 Countries will earn half the 
mark where they provide that 50 to 59 percent of the members of the senate 
(or its equivalent) are to be representatives of academic staff (D.2.1.). The same 
 
99 The indicators are: organisational autonomy (1. autonomy to determine the rector, 2. au- 
tonomy to decide on the internal structure (faculties, departments, etc.)), financial auton- 
omy (1. block grants with/without restrictions, line-item budgets, 2. express competence 
to perform commissioned research), staffing autonomy (right to define academic posi- 
tions and their requirements, and to recruit and promote academic staff), and academic 
autonomy (1. capacity to determine the selection criteria for bachelor students and to 
select the latter, 2. whether or not bachelor programmes need not be accredited). 
100 This covers the aspect of the form that state supervision takes, i.e. the question whether, 
additionally to supervising whether legal requirements have been complied with 
(German: ‘Rechtsaufsicht’), the state is also required to review decisions on their merits 
(German: ‘Fachaufsicht’). The former should always be an obligation of the state, the 
latter constitutes a diminution of institutional autonomy. 
101 For example, is there a clear statement in he legislation emphasising that private funding 
should not compromise the independence of teaching and research in he institutions? 
Is there a requirement to the effect that he institutions reveal the sources and scope of 
private funding? Is there a clear restriction of undue influence exercised by the represen- 
tatives of private interests on the he institution’s governing bodies? 
102 unesco Recommendation, para. 31. 
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applies with regard to the composition of collegial bodies at faculty/depart- 
mental level (D.3.1.). A higher percentage, ideally between 60 and 70 percent, 
will earn them the full mark.103 Whereas the taking of decisions on essentially 
academic matters constitutes the core competence of the senate (or its equiva- 
lent) or a faculty/departmental representative body, the primary responsibility 
of directing the institution/faculty/department accrues to the rector/dean/head 
of department, who is the institution’s/faculty’s/department’s chief executive 
officer. The unesco Recommendation does not comment on these positions 
separately. It does, however, state that academic staff should have the right 
‘to take part in the governing bodies,’104 and further enshrines the principle 
of collegiality, remarking that this includes shared responsibility, the partici- 
pation of all in internal decision-making, and consultative mechanisms.105 
Clearly, this is closest to the primus inter pares model, in terms of which aca- 
demic staff are to decide on ‘their leaders’ themselves, choosing them from 
among themselves, for a certain period of time, after which they become or- 
dinary members of staff again. Under this model, academic staff should also 
be able to express a lack of confidence in their leaders’ ability to lead, where 
appropriate. Specifically with regard to the rector, Karran has pointed out that, 
if these arrangements apply, the rector ‘is unlikely to take decisions that un- 
dermine the academic freedom of the staff, as [he/she] knows that at the end 
[of his/her] term of office, someone else could be elected as Rector and take 
retaliatory actions against [him/her].’106 Indicators on the rector (D.2.2.) or 
dean/head of department (D.3.2.) (accorded the same weight as indicators on 
the senate (or its equivalent) or faculty/departmental representative body, re- 
spectively) will thus ascertain, firstly, whether these officers come from within 
the institution/faculty/department and hold a PhD/are a professor, secondly, 
whether academic staff can exercise ‘control’ over who is chosen as the rector 
or dean/head of department, and, thirdly, whether they can exercise ‘control’ 
over the dismissal of the rector or dean/head of department by virtue of a vote 
of no-confidence. Apart from questions related to how purely academic mat- 
ters should be dealt with and how he institutions/faculties/departments should 
 
 
103 The assessment also takes into account whether the provisions on the composition of 
the senate (or its equivalent) or collegial bodies at faculty/departmental level also com- 
ply in all other respects with accepted requirements of academic self-governance (e.g. 
all categories of academic staff should take part in the election of representatives and be 
represented in the relevant bodies). 
104 unesco Recommendation, para. 31. 
105 Ibid para. 32. 
106   Karran (n 1) 303–304. 
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be directed, a final issue relates to the particular way strategic decision-making 
takes place. Also in this respect, academic staff should have a right to take part 
in the relevant governing bodies, i.e. those bodies responsible for strategic 
planning, general teaching/research policy, overall institutional development, 
preparing the budget, and adopting the he institution’s statutes.107 Strategic 
decision-making – only that at the institutional level to be considered here108 – 
would customarily be the task of the rector (rectorate) and the senate (or its 
equivalent) and/or – notably and increasingly nowadays – a separate board to 
which academic staff, external experts, and other stake-holders are elected/ 
appointed.109 In view of the increased importance of the latter boards in the 
governance of he institutions, and as the extent to which science and scholar- 
ship can flourish within a he institution significantly depends on how ‘strate- 
gic issues’ are resolved, Indicator D.2.3., which focuses on the composition of 
the body/bodies taking strategic decisions, has been assigned the same weight 
as indicators under D.2.1. and D.2.2. together. It is submitted that academic staff 
should ideally have at least 50 percent representation on any such body/bodies 
(for purposes of strategic decision-making).110 
Finally, Column E covers indicators on security of employment, includ- 
ing ‘tenure or its functional equivalent, where applicable.’ Indicators concern 
three topics: duration of contract of service (40 percent) (E.1.), termination 
of contract of service on operational grounds (30 percent) (E.2.), and pros- 
pect of advancement based on objective assessment of competence (30 per- 
cent) (E.3.). Regarding the first topic – unesco’s Recommendation referring 
 
 
107 Ultimately, Paragraph 32 of the unesco Recommendation highlights that ‘[c]ollegial 
decision-making should encompass decisions regarding the administration and determi- 
nation of policies of higher education, curricula, research, extension work, the allocation 
of resources and other related activities ….’ 
108 At faculty/departmental level, these questions should be resolved by the dean/head of 
department and staff (representative body). 
109 See Eurydice – The Information Network on Education in Europe, Higher Education 
Governance in Europe: Policies, Structures, Funding and Academic Staff (Eurydice, 2008) 
33–42, retrieved 15 May 2016, http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/ 
thematic_reports/091EN.pdf, on the typical governance bodies encountered in (Europe- 
an) he institutions. 
110 A five-point scale is applied to measure compliance with regard to Indicator D.2.3.: rep- 
resentation = at least 50%, 40–49%, 30–39%, less than 30%, but not negligible, or not 
noteworthy. Where there is a board consisting of external members, and academic staff 
may determine at least 50% of its members, this is considered to constitute partial com- 
pliance. Where they are not in a position to determine at least 50% of those members, 
this is considered to constitute non-compliance. 
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to ‘continuing employment following rigorous evaluation’111 – it is to be as- 
sessed whether the legal framework of the states concerned envisages per- 
manent contracts for academic staff, or alternatively, commencement on a 
tenure-track (i.e. during a first phase,112 a probationary period or fixed-term 
contracts with long-term prospects). A lowering of the standards of protec- 
tion may take on various forms: permanent contracts or commencement on 
a tenure-track at the level of senior positions (e.g. that of associate profes- 
sor) only (partial compliance), leaving the conclusion of permanent contracts 
generally to the discretion of the employer (partial or non-compliance),113 
or expressly providing for fixed-term contracts without long-term prospects 
at even senior levels (non-compliance).114 Indicators on the second topic, the 
termination of contracts of service on operational grounds, relate to require- 
ments in unesco’s Recommendation to the effect that potential dismissal of 
‘tenured’ staff should occur ‘on professional grounds and in accordance with 
due process’ only.115 Dismissals on grounds of serious misconduct, a flagrant 
violation of scholarly duties (e.g. fabrication of research results or plagiarism), 
or two or more consecutive negative appraisals of work quality will be permis- 
sible, if due process rules are observed.116 Dismissals on operational grounds 
(i.e. restructuring, down-sizing, reorganisation, or economic difficulties), how- 
ever, should ideally not take place. They will only be justifiable exceptional- 
ly, and provided all alternatives have been considered, appropriate priority 
criteria have been observed, a formalised procedure has been followed, and 
 
111 unesco Recommendation, para. 46. 
112 This would normally be the phase following the award of a doctoral degree. It has 
been held that this phase typically (and legitimately) is between 5–7 years. See Karran 
(n 39) 178. 
113 Much will depend on whether fixed-term contracts are subject to strict or rather lax re- 
quirements as regards legitimate cases of use, maximum number of successive contracts, 
and maximum cumulated duration. 
114 By way of exception, Indicator E.1.1. on the legal framework is supplemented by Indica- 
tor E.1.2. on the situation in practice, as it were, to verify the purport of legal provisions: 
66,7% or more of academic staff at post-entry levels (i.e. following any stage of doctoral 
employment) having permanent contracts of service or on a tenure-track = full compli- 
ance, 50–66,6% = partial compliance, and less than 50% = non-compliance. 
115 unesco Recommendation, para. 46. 
116 Note should be taken of Paragraph 47 of the unesco Recommendation on ‘Appraisal,’ 
Subparagraph (e) stating that the results of appraisal may legitimately be taken into 
account when ‘considering the renewal of employment,’ and of Paragraphs 48–51 on 
‘Discipline and dismissal,’ specifically Paragraph 50 on ‘dismissal as a disciplinary mea- 
sure.’ See Karran (n 39) 181–185 (figures 7, 8), for a description of due process rules in this 
context. 
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procedural safeguards have been respected.117 A first indicator (E.2.1.) ascer- 
tains whether there is an adequate, problematic, or seriously deficient/no 
provision in he legislation expressly prohibiting dismissals of specifically, but 
not solely, ‘academic staff with permanent contracts’ on operational grounds, 
or alternatively, providing strict protection in cases of such dismissals.118 A 
second indicator of equal weight (E.2.2.) enquires as to the level of protection 
afforded to academic staff, as defined, in cases of dismissals on operational 
grounds under ‘ordinary’ civil service and/or labour law. Finally, as regards the 
topic of a prospect of advancement based on an objective assessment of com- 
petence, since academic freedom is to be protected by restricting dismissal, 
it follows, by way of implication, that academic freedom should also not be 
infringed by preventing advancement in the academic career where it should 
take place. There should be procedures in place (also capable of being initi- 
ated by the academic concerned) in terms of which promotion is granted, 
provided that defined scholarly criteria have been met as objectively assessed, 
without the need for the academic having to newly apply for a higher position 
within his/her institution on a competitive basis. Indicator E.3. thus assesses 
whether legislation makes adequate provision (including, e.g., through a ten- 
ure-track system) for advancement to a higher position based on an objective 
assessment of competence.119 
 
7 Modus Operandi and Practical Difficulties Encountered 
in the Endeavour 
The assessment of the legal protection of the right to academic freedom in 
Europe undertaken here considers only public institutions of he and, among 
 
 
 
117 See Karran (n 39) 179–181, 184–185 (figures 5, 6, 8), for a description of due process rules in 
this context. 
118 Such a provision may largely be dispensed with where academic staff are civil servants 
whose discharge on very limited grounds, notably serious misconduct, is strictly regu- 
lated in civil service legislation. 
119 Indicator E.3. applies a five-point scale: adequate legislation, legislation with certain 
deficits, legislation with more serious deficits, legislation with substantial deficits, or no 
legislation. Where relevant procedures are provided for in a prominent and sector-wide 
collective agreement, in government regulations, or in the statutes of he institutions gen- 
erally, these will, depending on their specific nature, be rated to be ‘in partial compliance’ 
or ‘between partial and non-compliance.’ 
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Standard Scorecard ‘to Measure’ the Right to Academic Freedom 
 
 
Country A. The Ratification of Inter- 
national Agreements and 
Constitutional Protection 
(20%) 
B. The Express Protec- 
tion of Academic 
Freedom in he 
Legislation (20%) 
C. The Protection of Insti- 
tutional Autonomy in he 
Legislation (20%) 
D. The Protection of 
Self-Governance in he 
Legislation (20%) 
E. The Protection of 
Job Security (in- 
cluding ‘Tenure’) in 
Relevant Legisla- 
tion (20%) 
 
 
Spain 
66,5% 
1. The Ratification of Interna- 
tional Agreements (10) 10 
1.1. Global Level (6) 
[0–2,5–5–7,5–10 (x2)] 
7,5 
− 0 – No Reference to 
1. Provision on Institutional 
Autonomy [0–2–4] 4 
2. Autonomy in Detail (8) 2,5 
1. Provision on Academic 
Self-Governance [0–
1–2] 0 
1. Duration of 
Contract of Service  
(8) 8 
1.1.1. International Covenant on Academic Freedom at 2.1. Organisational (2) 2. Academic Self-Governance 1.1. Regulatory Frame- 
Civil and Political Rights 
(Art. 19, Right to Freedom 
of Expression) [0–1,5] 1,5 
1.1.2. Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
(International Petition 
Procedure) [0–1,5] 1,5 
1.1.3. International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
(Art. 13, Right to Educa- 
tion) [0–1,5] 1,5 
All (Non-Compliance) 
− 2,5 – Provision(s) 
Seriously Falling Short 
of Defined Standards 
(Between Partial and 
Non-Compliance) 
− 5 – Mere Reference 
to Academic Freedom/ 
Provisions Revealing 
Various Deficits (Partial 
Compliance) 
2.1.1. Autonomy to Deter- 
mine Rector [0–
0,5–1] 0 
2.1.2. Autonomy to Deter- 
mine Internal Struc- 
tures [0–0,5–1] 0 
2.2. Financial (2) 
2.2.1. State Grant as Block 
Grant [0–0,5–1] 1 
2.2.2. Express Competence 
to Perform 
Commissioned 
Research [0–0,5–1] 1 
at Institutional Level (12) 
8,5 
2.1. Senate (or its Equiva- 
lent) – Composition 
[0–1,5–3] 3 
2.2. Rector (3) 
2.2.1. Academic Position/ 
Qualification of 
Rector [0–0,5–1] 1 
2.2.2. Determining the 
Rector [0–0,5–1] 0,5 
2.2.3. Dismissing the Rector 
[0–0,5–1] 1 
work [0–2–4] 4 
1.2. Situation in Prac- 
tice [0–2–4] 4 
2. Termination of 
Contract of Service 
on Operational 
Grounds (6) 3 
2.1. Provision on 
Termination on 
Operational 
Grounds in 
he Legislation [0–
1,5–3] 1,5 
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Standard Scorecard ‘to Measure’ the Right to Academic Freedom (cont.) 
1.1.4. Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Interna- 
tional Petition Procedure) 
[0–1,5] 1,5 
1.2. Regional Level (4) 
European Convention on 
Human Rights (Art. 10, 
Right to Freedom of 
Expression) [0–4] 4 
2. Constitutional Protection  
(10) 10 
2.1. Provision on Right to 
Freedom of Expression 
[0–1–2] 2 
2.2. Provision on Right to Aca- 
demic Freedom [0–1–2] 2 
2.3. Reference to Institutional 
Autonomy [0–0,5–1] 1 
2.4. Reference to Academic Self- 
Governance [0–0,5–1] 1 
2.5. Robustness of Provisions 
[0–2–4] 4 
Total: 20 
− 7,5 – Some or Other 
Deficit in Otherwise 
Commendable Provi- 
sions (Between Full and 
Partial Compliance) 
− 10 – Academic 
Freedom Serves as 
Guiding Principle for 
Activity within he 
(Full Compliance) 
Total: 7,5×2=15 
2.3. Staffing (2) 
Right to Define Academ- 
ic Positions in he Institu- 
tions and their Require- 
ments, and to Recruit 
and Promote Academic 
Staff [0–1–2] 0 
2.4. Academic (2) 
2.4.1. Capacity to Determine 
Selection Criteria for 
Bachelor Students and 
to Select the Latter 
[0–0,5–1] 0,5 
2.4.2. Whether or Not 
Bachelor Programmes 
Need to be Accredited 
[0–0,5–1] 0 
3. Extent of Governmental 
Powers [0–2–4] 2 
4. Institutional Indepen- 
dence vis-à-vis Private 
Interests [0–2–4] 0 
Total: 8,5 
2.3. Participation in Stra- 
tegic Decision-Making 
(through Senate or its 
Equivalent, or Other- 
wise) [0–1,5–3–4,5–6] 3 
3. Academic Self-Governance 
at Faculty/Departmental 
Level (6) 3,5 
3.1. Collegial Bodies (3) 
3.1.1. Existence of Collegial 
Bodies [0–0,5–1] 1 
3.1.2. Composition of Colle- 
gial Bodies [0–1–2] 1 
3.2. Dean/Head of Depart- 
ment (3) 
3.2.1. Academic Position/ 
Qualification of Dean/ 
Head of Department 
[0–0,5–1] 1 
3.2.2. Determining the Dean/ 
Head of Department 
[0–0,5–1] 0,5 
3.2.3. Dismissing the Dean/ 
Head of Department 
[0–0,5–1] 0 
Total: 12 
2.2. Protection in the 
Case of Termina- 
tion on Opera- 
tional Grounds in 
Terms of Civil 
Service/Labour 
Legislation [0–
1,5–3] 1,5 
3. Prospect of 
Advancement 
Based on Objec- 
tive Assessment 
of Competence 
[0–1,5–3–4,5–6] 0 
Total: 11 
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these, only universities.120 The right to academic freedom naturally also needs 
to be respected in private institutions of he, though there may be differences 
in the scope of that right in that context.121 Further, infringements of academic 
freedom seem more prevalent in universities than, for example, polytechnics, 
which may not be as extensively involved in original research as universities.122 
These restrictions in the ambit of the enquiry were necessary in the light of 
limited human and time resources available to examine all relevant data. The 
analysis entailed an examination of 30 European he systems. States with a fed- 
eral structure in the field of he required a particular approach. In the case of 
Belgium, the he systems of Flanders and Wallonia were considered separately, 
omitting the German-speaking region. In the case of Germany with different 
he systems in each of the 16 Länder, it has been decided to study the situa- 
tion in the two Länder with the most inhabitants, Bavaria and North Rhine- 
Westphalia – one third of Germany’s population living in these Länder. The 
two he systems also reveal interesting differences, both Länder traditionally 
having been governed by conservative and social-democrat governments, re- 
spectively. As Germany’s Hochschulrahmengesetz (Framework Act on Higher 
Education) in its version of 1999123 is still on the law books (its abolition linger- 
ing on the political agenda), differences among the various he systems, though 
increasing, remain within bounds. Where appropriate, developments in the 
other Länder have been taken note of. Regarding Spain, certain powers in the 
field of he regulation rest with the autonomous regions. As for the United 
Kingdom, the situation essentially in England has been studied (more than 
80 percent of the uk ’s population living here), giving some consideration to 
elements of the Scottish system. 
 
 
120 Moreover, it only considers academic freedom of academic staff, but not that of students. 
It also does not consider artistic freedom, which is a related but separate concept. 
121 See, e.g., Tarantino v. Italy, 2013–ii ECtHR 397, 416 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., partly dis- 
senting) (‘States Parties’ margin of appreciation is wider with regard to the regulation 
of State schools and narrower with regard to that of private schools. An even narrower 
margin of appreciation applies a fortiori to higher education, where institutional auton- 
omy plays a pivotal role. (footnote omitted) Conversely, the more the State funds private 
schools and universities, the wider its margin of appreciation. (emphases omitted)’). 
122 Paragraph 1(e) of the unesco Recommendation states that ‘“institutions of higher edu- 
cation” means universities, other educational establishments, centres and structures of 
higher education, and centres of research and culture associated with any of the above, 
public or private, that are approved as such either through recognised accreditation sys- 
tems or by the competent state authorities.’ 
123 Hochschulrahmengesetz in the version of 19 January 1999, bgbl. i, at 18, last amended by 
Art. 2 of Law, 12 April 2007, bgbl. i, at 506. 
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The actual legislation of eu states constituted the primary source of infor- 
mation for purposes of the assessment. Legislation as in force at the beginning 
of 2014 has been studied.124 Where relevant language competencies existed 
(Dutch/Flemish, English, French, German, and Spanish), the original language 
versions of the legislation were consulted. In other cases, recourse was had 
to official or unofficial English-language translations that seemed reliable. In 
a few cases, no reliable English-language versions could be traced (Croatia, 
Greece, and Italy), probably because the states concerned had adopted new he 
legislation relatively recently. In these cases, but also to take account of recent 
amendments to he laws in the case of other states, online translation tools 
had to be utilised.125 In all instances has it been sought to verify the correct- 
ness of information by studying relevant secondary literature (journalistic and 
academic texts, and information available in online databases126), or informa- 
tion provided by states themselves.127 It will be appreciated that coping with 
voluminous and diverse sets of legislation in different languages is a daunting 
task. An error margin of up to three percent is thus conceivable. 
 
124 As North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany) adopted a new Hochschulzukunftsgesetz (Act on 
the Future of Higher Education) in September 2014, this was examined for purposes of 
the comparison. 
125 Citations from the constitutions, laws, and regulations used here should not be seen to 
reflect official translations, but rather are own renderings of the texts in the light of all 
sources available. 
126 In particular, these online databases were consulted: the Eurydice/Eurypedia website 
(maintained by the European Commission’s Education, Audiovisual and Culture Execu- 
tive Agency (eacea)), Eurydice and Eurypedia providing information on European edu- 
cation systems and policies: retrieved 15 May 2016, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/ 
mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Main_Page; the website of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (oecd), making available online, inter alia, the oecd 
Programme on Institutional Management in Higher Education’s journal Higher Educa- 
tion Management and Policy: retrieved 15 May 2016, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/edu 
cation/higher-education-management-and-policy_17269822; the website of the European 
University Association, supplying useful information on university autonomy: retrieved 
15 May 2016, http://www.eua.be; the website of the Center for Higher Education Policy 
Studies of the University of Twente (Netherlands), containing a collection of publications 
on he adopting an international comparative perspective: retrieved 15 May 2016, http:// 
www.utwente.nl/bms/cheps. 
127 Amongst others, the websites of the ministries responsible for he in the various eu Mem- 
ber States were thus consulted. Furthermore, a questionnaire asking eu Member States to 
provide information on the legislative framework in place for the protection of academic 
freedom was sent out to states on 3 October 2013. The response rate has been rather mod- 
est, with only one third of the states having responded. Nevertheless, of the replies that 
were received, some, like those from Denmark, Hungary, Slovakia, or Sweden, were very 
instructive. 
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8 The Legal Protection of the Right to Academic Freedom in Europe: 
The Results of the Assessment 
The following six headings provide a brief overview of state performance with 
regard to each of the five columns of the scorecard, and overall. Each head- 
ing provides concise information on trends identified, some examples, and a 
country ranking in the form of a table. Detail on individual state performance 
for each specific indicator is contained in the Annex to this article.128 
8.1 The Ratification of International Agreements and Constitutional 
Protection 
All 28 eu Member States have ratified the iccpr and the icescr of 1966 
(Indicators A.1.1.1. and A.1.1.3., respectively). The uk is the only Member State 
not to have ratified the Optional Protocol to the iccpr of 1966 (Indicator 
A.1.1.2.). Claims under Article 19 on the right to freedom of expression alleging 
that the uk has violated academic freedom can thus not be brought before 
the Human Rights Committee. In view of the recentness of the adoption of 
the Optional Protocol to the icescr in 2008, only eight states so far (Belgium, 
Finland, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain) have ratified 
it (Indicator A.1.1.4.). The Optional Protocol to the icescr entered into force 
on 5 May 2013.129 A number of states have expressed reservations with regard 
to Article 20 iccpr, which prohibits ‘any propaganda for war’ (Para. 1), and 
‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence’ (Para. 2). Malta and the uk reserve the 
right not to adopt legislation with regard to Article 20 as a whole. Belgium and 
Luxemburg do so as regards Article 20(1) on war propaganda. Ireland defers 
the right to adopt legislation on a specific criminal offence in the sphere of 
Article 20(1). Also Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden do not 
want to apply Article 20(1), Finland stating that applying this provision ‘might 
 
 
128  Where appropriate, the footnotes include references to literature on academic 
freedom as protected in the states assessed, available in English, French, German, 
or Spanish, focusing on more recent literature adopting a legal or quasi-legal 
approach. Regarding the three eu states with the largest populations, Germany, the uk, 
and France, reference should, as regards Germany and the uk, be had to Barendt (n 27) 
(see, specifically, the references to further literature at 316–318), and, as regards France, 
to O. Beaud, Les libertés universitaires à l’abandon? Pour une reconnaissance pleine et 
entière de la liberté académique (Dalloz, 2010) (and the references to further literature 
there). 
129  Status of ratification as at 19 March 2015 as reflected in the online databases of the  
un Treaty Collection, retrieved 15 May 2016, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties. 
aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. 
 Academic Freedom in the Law of European States 
 
43  
 
endanger the freedom of expression referred [to] in article 19 of the Covenant.’ 
Seeing that a wider consensus, holding that restrictions on war propaganda 
and hate speech constitute justifiable limitations of the right to freedom  
of expression, is absent in Europe (as is apparent from the many reservations 
expressed to Article 20), reservations to Article 20 have not been considered 
to amount to ‘non-compliance’ in the present analysis.130 Malta, however, 
has made a problematic reservation with regard to Article 22 iccpr on the 
right to freedom of association, stipulating that it ‘reserves the right not to 
apply article 22 to the extent that existing legislative measures may not be 
fully compatible with this article.’ All eu Member States are further bound 
by the relevant provisions of the echr, as amended and supplemented (Indi- 
cator A.1.2.).131 
Of all eu Member States, the constitutions of only Portugal and Spain meet 
all the criteria to earn full marks in the rubric ‘constitutional protection.’ The 
Spanish Constitution 1978, for example – in a robust constitutional context – 
provides express protection for the rights to freedom of expression and to aca- 
demic freedom, there also being explicit references to institutional autonomy 
and self-governance: 
Article 20 
1. The following rights are recognised and protected: 
a) to freely express and disseminate thoughts, ideas, and opinions by 
word, in writing, or by any other means of communication; 
b) to literary, artistic, scientific, and technical production and creation 
[freedom of science]; 
c) to academic freedom [‘la libertad de cátedra,’ literally meaning ‘the 
freedom of the academic chair’]; 
 
 
130  It has been stated that ‘[h]ere the issue is balancing two competing human rights 
[absence of discrimination v. freedom of expression], rather than a conflict between 
human rights and another value. Any resolution will require restricting the range of at 
least one of these rights. Therefore, any approach that plausibly protects the 
conceptual integrity of both rights must be described as controversial but defensible.’ 
See J. Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights,’ Human Rights Quarterly 
29(2) (2007) 281–306, at 302–303. 
131  Status of ratification as at 21 March 2015 as reflected on the Council of Europe’s 
official Treaty Office website, retrieved 15 May 2016, 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions. The focus regarding the echr has been on     
Art. 10 on the right to freedom of expression, disregarding notably Protocol No. 12 on 
an ‘autonomous’ non-discrimination provision. 
 Beiter, Karran and Appiagyei-Atua 
 
44  
 
d) to freely communicate or receive accurate information by any 
means of dissemination whatsoever. The law shall regulate the right 
to invoke personal conscience and professional secrecy in the exer- 
cise of these freedoms. 
4.  These freedoms find their limitation in the respect for the rights 
recognised in this Title, in the provisions of the laws implementing it, 
and, especially, in the right to honour, to privacy, to one’s own image, 
and to the protection of youth and childhood. 
Article 27 
1. Everyone has the right to education. … 
7.   Teachers,  parents, and, where appropriate, students shall participate  
in the control and administration of all centres maintained by the Ad- 
ministration out of public funds, under the terms established by the law. 
10. The autonomy of universities is recognised, under the terms established 
by the law. 
The constitutions of all eu Member States132 protect the right to freedom of 
expression (Indicator A.2.1.). Express provisions are found in the (written) con- 
stitutions of 27 states. In the uk, this right should be considered part of that 
state’s unwritten constitution.133 Whereas the provisions of the Greek, Irish, 
and Romanian Constitutions are problematic (‘partial compliance’), that of 
the Hungarian Fundamental Law is seriously deficient (‘non-compliance’). Ar- 
ticle 14(3) of the Greek Constitution 1975, for example, allows the seizure of 
newspapers and other publications in cases of ‘an offence against the Chris- 
tian or any other known religion,’ or ‘an insult against the person of the Presi- 
dent of the Republic.’134 The Hungarian Fundamental Law 2011 substantially 
constrains political campaigning in non-public media, and provides that 
 
 
 
132 This refers to the constitutions and constitutional-status documents as in force on 1 Janu- 
ary 2014. It is refrained from providing full official citations of these texts here. 
133 There is some case law holding that ‘[there exists] a constitutional right to freedom of 
expression in England.’ Moreover, the Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, has modified the 
largely ‘residual nature’ of human rights protection available under common law. See 
E. Barendt, ‘Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom under the Human Rights 
Act 1998,’ Indiana Law Journal 84(3) (2009) 851–866, at 852–855. 
134 The Irish Constitution 1937 forbids blasphemy (art. 40(6)(1)(i)), the Romanian Constitu- 
tion 1991 ‘defamation of the country and the nation’ (art. 30(7)). 
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freedom of speech may not violate ‘the dignity of the Hungarian nation,’ in 
Article ix(3) and (5), respectively. 
Express provisions on the right to academic freedom (Indicator A.2.2.) – in 
the form of a right to freedom of science135 – may be found in the constitutions 
of 18 countries.136 These protect the right either as part of provisions (also) 
addressing the right to freedom of expression (Germany and Spain), the right 
to education/educational rights (Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy, and Sweden), 
rights related to science, arts, culture, universities and research institutions 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia), the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Czech Re- 
public), or both the right to education/educational rights and rights related to 
science, arts, and culture (Portugal). The provisions contained in the Czech, 
Greek, and Hungarian Constitutions may be considered to be problematic 
(‘partial compliance’). Regarding the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms 1992, it is submitted that the right to freedom of thought, con- 
science, and religion in Article 15 provides too narrow a basis as to cover all 
aspects of the right to academic freedom (Art. 15(2)). Article 16(8) of the Greek 
Constitution 1975 prohibits the establishment of private universities, thereby 
also preventing opportunities for diversified notions of academic freedom 
to flourish in different contexts.137 Although academic freedom does require 
regulation, the provisions of Article x(1) of the Hungarian Fundamental Law 
2011 – also in the light of the Constitution’s generally paternalistic, even au- 
thoritarian, stance – to the effect that the right to academic freedom is ensured 
‘within the framework laid down in an Act’ does not augur too well for the 
protection of that right. 
Express provisions on institutional autonomy (Indicator A.2.3.) are con- 
tained in 15 constitutions (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, North 
Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Por- 
tugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain), provisions on self-governance (Indica- 
tor A.2.4.) in only three (Bavaria (Germany), Portugal, and Spain). All of these 
are ‘fully compliant,’ except Hungary’s provisions on institutional autonomy, 
 
135 Although, as has been explained at n 27 above, there are differences between the right 
to freedom of science – potentially in the sense of ‘Wissenschaftsfreiheit’ or ‘the right to 
free scholarship’ – and the right to academic freedom, the approach here has been not to 
differentiate between the two. The Spanish Constitution 1978, as has been seen, protects 
both freedom of science (art. 20(1)(b)) and academic freedom (art. 20(1)(c)). 
136 In the uk, ‘there is no constitutional guarantee of academic or scientific freedom.’ See 
Barendt (n 27) 74–75. 
137 Art. 13(4) icescr protects ‘the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct 
educational institutions.’ 
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which must be held to be ‘non-compliant.’138 Article x(3) of the Hungarian 
Fundamental Law 2011 provides that ‘[h]igher education institutions shall be 
autonomous in terms of the content and the methods of research and teach- 
ing; their organisation shall be regulated by an Act. The Government shall, 
within the framework of an Act, lay down the rules governing the financial 
management of public higher education institutions and shall supervise their 
financial management.’139 
Finally, regarding the robustness of constitutional provisions (Indicator 
A.2.5.), the question was whether the normative context of constitutions (val- 
ues reflected by relevant provisions, specific or general limitations clauses, 
etc.) fully supports the effective protection of the rights concerned, specifically 
the right to academic freedom.140 It is interesting to note, for example, that 
Article 5 of the German Basic Law 1949, in Paragraph 1, protects the right to 
freedom of expression, and, in Paragraph 2, allows this to be subjected to limi- 
tations imposed by law to protect, for example, young persons or the right to 
personal honour, whereas, the right to freedom of science, research, and teach- 
ing, in Paragraph 3, may not be subjected to limitations. The law may regulate, 
but not limit the latter, it thus enjoying enhanced protection relative to the 
right to freedom of expression. The Estonian Constitution 1992 (Art. 123(2)), 
the Greek Constitution 1975 (Art. 28(1)), and the Polish Constitution 1997 (Art. 
91(2)), it may be observed, grant international agreements (naturally also those 
dealing with human rights) priority over ordinary legislation. In Austria, the 
echr has even been accorded the same status as the constitution (Art. ii 
No. 7, Federal Constitutional Law of 4 March 1964). Many constitutions, such 
as those of Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, or Spain, 
moreover, call upon states to actively promote the development of science, 
arts, and culture, this implicitly requiring that respect for academic freedom 
be furthered. Factors negatively affecting protective standards encompass, 
for example, excluding non-citizens from the protection against discrimina- 
tion on the ground of political opinions (see Malta), or adopting far-reaching 
 
138 See Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Eötvös Károly Policy Institute & Hungarian Civil Lib- 
erties Union, Main Concerns Regarding the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law 
of Hungary (Statement, 26 February 2013) point 9 (stating that ‘the Fourth Amendment 
entirely abolishes the autonomy of universities in financial questions’). 
139 Art. 9(4)(d) of the Hungarian Fundamental Law 2011 further provides for the President 
of the Republic to appoint university rectors. A similar provision may be found in 
Art. 102(1)(h) of the Slovak Constitution 1992. 
140 It may be noted that all those states whose constitutions do not contain express provi- 
sions on the right to academic freedom have maximally been considered to be in ‘partial 
compliance’ in this respect. 
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Table 1 Country Ranking – Ratification of International Agreements and Constitutional 
Protection 
 
Country Percentage & Score / 
20 in brackets 
1. Portugal, Spain 100 (20) 
2. Finland, Italy 95 (19) 
3. Slovakia 90 (18) 
4. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia 
87,5 (17,5) 
5. Latvia, Sweden 82,5 (16,5) 
Average 78,04 (15,61) 
6. Czech Republic, Greece 77,5 (15,5) 
7. Belgium, France, Luxemburg 70 (14) 
8. Cyprus, Denmark, Netherlands, Romania 62,5 (12,5) 
9. Hungary, Ireland 57,5 (11,5) 
10. Malta, United Kingdom 55 (11) 
 
constitutional amendments entailing a general erosion of universally accepted 
constitutional principles (see Hungary).141 
8.2 The Express Protection of Academic Freedom in Higher Education 
Legislation 
If constitutional provisions on the right to academic freedom legitimately may 
be rather concise, then – in accordance with what has been stated regarding 
the requirement of ‘legislation’142 – all salient aspects of that right need to be 
concretised and operationalised by way of parliamentary legislation (Indica- 
tor B). Further detail can be regulated in subordinate legislation. A state’s Act 
on Higher Education should thus make it clear that academic freedom (stricto 
sensu) entails a right to carry out research, a right to teach, and a right to study 
without undue restrictions. Ideally, each of these elements should then be de- 
fined. The recent Act on the Future of Higher Education of September 2014 of 
North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), for example,143 provides in Section 4: 
 
141 See Maltese Constitution 1964, art. 45(1), (3), (4)(b). See n 138 above regarding Hungary. 
For detail on individual state performance regarding Indicator A.2.5., see the Annex. 
142 See Part 2 above. 
143 Hochschulzukunftsgesetz (hzg nrw), 16 September 2014, gv. nrw. 2014, No. 27, 29 Sep- 
tember 2014, 543. See Barendt (n 27) 117–160, on the legal protection of academic freedom 
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(1) The Land and institutions of higher education shall guarantee that the 
members of an institution, in fulfilling their duties, are in a position to 
exercise their rights in the spheres of teaching and research as protected 
in the first sentence of Article 5(3) of the Basic Law and in this law. Insti- 
tutions of higher education shall guarantee in particular the freedom to 
disseminate and exchange scholarly views. 
(2) Freedom of research shall cover in particular the topic of research, the 
methodological approach applied, and the evaluation and dissemination 
of research findings. Freedom of teaching shall cover in particular the 
holding of classes within the framework of the teaching duties allocated, 
including the way classes are structured in terms of content conveyed 
and methods applied, as well as the right to express scholarly … views 
on doctrinal issues. Without prejudice to study and examination regula- 
tions, freedom of study shall cover in particular the free choice of classes, 
the right, within a study course, to freely choose one’s areas of focus, as 
well as the formulation and expression of scholarly … views also on the 
content, structure, and holding of classes. 
(3) Freedom of research, of teaching, … and of study shall not absolve 
any person from allegiance to the Basic Law. Decisions by the compe- 
tent bodies of an institution of higher education may be taken to the 
extent that they refer to the organisation of research activities as well 
as of teaching and study activities, and the proper implementation of 
the latter. Beyond that, they may be taken to the extent that they refer 
to the promotion and coordination of research projects, the formulation 
of the areas of focus for research and the evaluation of research …, the 
adoption and observance of study and examination regulations, fulfil- 
ment of the mandate to provide further education and the evaluation 
of teaching … as well as guaranteeing the orderly pursuit of studies. 
Decisions under sentences 2 and 3 shall not impair freedom of research 
and teaching. … 
Furthermore, legislation should reflect that academic freedom serves as a 
guiding principle for activity within he, as would be evidenced by ‘academic 
freedom’ forming part of a general part of the he Act on ‘general principles’ 
and/or it being referred to in various contexts throughout he legislation. 
Latvia’s Law on Institutions of Higher Education of 1995, for example, in 
Chapter 1 on ‘General Provisions,’ in Section 6, specifically dealing with 
 
 
in Germany. See ibid 317–318, for a select bibliography of relevant literature on the situa- 
tion in Germany. 
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‘Academic Freedom,’ requires academic freedom to be ensured in institutions 
of he (Para. 1), to then shed some light on the meaning of each of freedom 
of study, freedom of research, and freedom of teaching (Paras. 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively).144 References to academic freedom recur in various sections of 
the Law: Institutions of he are thus expected to guarantee the academic free- 
dom of academic staff and students in their statutes (Sect. 5(6)). The rector is 
called upon to protect academic freedom of staff and students (Sect. 171(4)). 
The academic arbitration tribunal – as one of the organs of an institution of he 
provided for by the Law – is competent to consider claims submitted by staff 
and students to the effect that their academic freedom has been restricted or 
infringed (Sect. 19(1)(1)). All members of staff are obliged to promote freedom 
of study, research, and teaching (Sect. 26(2)). Students’ rights cover the right 
of students to exercise their rights relating to freedom of study and research 
(Sect. 50(1)(4)).145 
Legislation should, moreover, spell out that members of the academic 
staff, in exercising their academic freedom, are bound by a duty of ‘scholarly 
honesty,’ requiring them to obey ‘the generally accepted principles of good 
scholarly practice’ – thus Section 4(4) of the North Rhine-Westphalian Act on 
 
 
144 Augstskolu likums, 2 November 1995, Latvijas Vēstnesis 179 (462), 17 November 1995, 
Ziņotājs 1, 11 January 1996. To mention another example, also Croatia’s recent Act on 
Science and Higher Education of 2013 (Zakon o znanstvenoj djelatnosti i visokom 
obrazovanju, Narodne novine broj 123/03, 198/03, 105/04, 174/04, 2/07 – ousrh, 46/07, 
45/09, 63/11, 94/13, 139/13) clearly articulates that academic freedom constitutes a guid- 
ing principle: Art. 2(3) states: ‘Higher education shall be based on: – Academic freedom, 
academic self-governance, and university autonomy, … – Reciprocity and partnership 
among members of the academic community, – the European humanistic and democrat- 
ic tradition … – Respect for and recognition of human rights, ….’ Art. 4(2) and (3) further 
provide for academic freedom, academic self-governance, and university autonomy ‘in 
accordance with the Constitution, international agreements and this Act.’ 
145 Similarly, Austria’s Universities Act of 2002 (Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Uni- 
versitäten und ihre Studien (Universitätsgesetz 2002 – ug) StF: bgbl. i Nr. 120/2002 (nr: 
gp xxi rv 1134 ab 1224 S. 111; br: 6697 ab 6717 S. 690)), in Section 2, entitled ‘Guiding 
Principles,’ refers to freedom of science, to then concretise this in various parts of the 
Act, addressing, for instance, the conclusion of target agreements with academic staff 
(§ 20(5)), the protection of personal conscience of those involved in research (§ 105), or 
the dismissal of academic staff (§ 113). See W. Berka, ‘Wissenschaftsfreiheit an staatlichen 
Universitäten: Zur Freiheit und Verantwortung des Wissenschaftlers,’ in K. Weber et al. 
(eds.), Vom Verfassungsstaat am Scheideweg: Festschrift für Peter Pernthaler (Springer, 
2005) 67–48, on the protection of the right to academic freedom in public universities in 
Austria in terms of the Universities Act of 2002. 
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the Future of Higher Education of 2014 (Germany).146 Article 310 of the Roma- 
nian National Education Law of 2011147 stipulates that plagiarism, the fabrica- 
tion of research findings, and the provision of false information in applica- 
tions for funding constitute ‘serious violations of proper conduct in scientific 
research and university activities.’ It may be noted that Article 18 of the Lithu- 
anian Law on Higher Education and Research of 2009148 creates the position of 
a supervisor of academic ethics and procedures, a state officer who examines 
complaints and initiates investigations regarding the violation of academic 
ethics and procedures. 
Finally, legislation should make it clear that he institutions themselves are 
also obliged to respect the academic freedom of members of the academic 
staff. The French Code de l’Éducation, for instance, emphasises that ‘universi- 
ties and institutions of higher education shall guarantee [to academic staff] 
the means for exercising their teaching and research activities in such con- 
ditions of independence and serenity as are indispensable for reflection and 
intellectual creation.’149 Institutional structures need to be established to fa- 
cilitate the internal enforcement of rights in this respect. As has been indi- 
cated, Latvia’s Law on Institutions of Higher Education of 1995150 provides, in 
Section 19, for an internal academic arbitration tribunal, competent to receive 
‘submissions of students and academic staff regarding a restriction or infringe- 
ment of academic freedom and [other] rights.’ 
The assessment revealed that the he legislation of Austria, Croatia, France, 
North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia contains 
express provisions on academic freedom largely in compliance with generally 
agreed criteria on academic freedom. The provisions show that academic 
freedom serves as a guiding principle for activity within he (‘full compli- 
ance’). A second group of he systems were considered to have performed 
less than wholly satisfactory (‘between full and partial compliance’), namely 
those of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Bavaria (Germany), Ireland, 
Luxemburg, Romania, and Spain. Within this group, some or other deficit in 
the otherwise commendable legislative provisions could be identified in each 
 
 
146 Hochschulzukunftsgesetz (n 143). 
147 Legea educaţiei naţionale, Law No. 1, 5 January 2011, Monitorul Oficial al României, 
Partea i, 30 August 2013. 
148 Lietuvos Respublikos mokslo ir studijų įstatymas, 30 April 2009, Nr. xi-242, Žin., 2009, 
Nr. 54–2140, 61, 101. 
149 Code de l’Éducation, art. L. 123–9. See generally Beaud (n 128), on the protection of aca- 
demic freedom in France. 
150 Augstskolu likums (n 144). 
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case. The Bulgarian Higher Education Act of 1995,151 in Article 19(3), provides 
that ‘[a]cademic autonomy shall include academic freedom, academic self- 
governance, and inviolability of the premises of an institution of higher edu- 
cation.’ It should rather have been made clear that ‘academic freedom’ is the 
superseding right covering the others, including institutional autonomy. The 
latter finds its confines in individual academic freedom, not the other way 
round.152 The Czech Act on Higher Education Institutions of 1998,153 in Part 1 
on ‘Fundamental Provisions,’ in Section 4, after emphatically proclaiming that 
academic freedom is to be guaranteed in he institutions goes on to enumer- 
ate its constituent elements. Nowhere in the remainder of the Act, however, 
is academic freedom again referred to when concretising the legal framework 
applicable to he. The Higher Education Act of 2006 of Bavaria (Germany),154 
in Article 6(3), provides that the statutes of he institutions may regulate when 
permission to publish may have to be obtained, stipulating – vaguely, but 
rather drastically – that this may be denied ‘if by reason of the publication 
material interests of an institution of higher education would be affected.’ 
A third group of he systems (held to be in ‘partial compliance’), namely 
those of Flanders (Belgium), Wallonia (Belgium), Cyprus, the Netherlands, 
and Poland, merely refer to the principle of academic freedom in their he 
legislation.155 Article 8 of the Wallonian Décret définissant le paysage de 
 
151 Зaкoн зa виcшeтo oбpaзoвaниe, Oбн., ДB, бp. 112 oт 27.12.1995 г. [Higher Education Act, 
prom. State Gazette No. 112, 27 December 1995]. 
152 A similar conceptual problem is encountered in Art. 6 of the Italian Law of 9 May 1989, 
No. 168, on the Establishment of the Ministry of Universities and Scientific and Techno- 
logical Research (Legge del 9 maggio 1989, n. 168, Istituzione del Ministero dell’università 
e della ricerca scientifica e tecnologica, Gazz. Uff. 11 May 1989, No. 108, S.O.), Art. 74 of the 
Portuguese Law on the Legal Status of Institutions of Higher Education of 2007 (Lei n.° 
62/2007 de 10 de Setembro, Regime jurídico das instituições de ensino superior, Diário da 
República 1st Ser., No. 174, 10 September 2007), and Art. 6 of the Slovene Law on Higher 
Education of 1993 (Zakon o visokem šolstvu (ZViS), Uradni list rs, No. 67/93, 17 Decem- 
ber 1993). The preferable way of formulation is that reflected in Art. 2(3) of the Spanish 
Organic Law on Universities of 2001 (Ley Orgánica 6/2001, de 21 de diciembre, de Univer- 
sidades, boe No. 307, 24 December 2001): ‘The activity of the university and its autonomy 
are based on the principle of academic freedom, which encompasses the freedom to 
teach, carry out research and study.’ 
153 Zákon 111/1998 Sb., 22 April 1998, o vysokých školách a o změně a doplnění dalších zákonů 
(Zákon o vysokých školách), Sbírka zákonů ČR No. 39/1998, 5388. 
154 Bayerisches Hochschulgesetz (BayHSchG), 23 May 2006, gvbl. 2006, 245. 
155 In the case of Italy and Portugal, he legislation contains more than mere references to 
academic freedom. The overall situation in these countries, however, reflects a status best 
described as that of ‘partial compliance.’ 
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l’enseignement supérieur et l’organisation académique des études of 2013 
(Belgium),156 for example, solely states, in its second sentence, that ‘every 
member of the staff of an establishment of higher education, in the exer- 
cise of his or her duties, enjoys academic freedom.’ The legislation in a fourth 
group of he systems, those of Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden, 
and the uk, addresses academic freedom, but in a way less satisfactory than 
that in the previous group (‘between partial and non-compliance’). There may, 
therefore, be a mere reference to academic freedom, simultaneously flawed in 
some respect or another, or there may be more structured provisions which, 
however, seriously fall short of  the standards defined in unesco’s Recom- 
mendation. Article 3(1) of the Greek Law on Structure, Functioning, Quality 
Assurance of Studies, and Internationalisation of Higher Education Institu- 
tions of 2011,157 for instance, briefly states that, ‘[i]n institutions of higher 
education, academic freedom in research and teaching, as well as freedom of 
expression and the exchange of ideas shall be guaranteed.’ Article 4(3) then 
proceeds to state that institutions of he are to be run in terms of rules that are 
in compliance with certain principles, these including ‘a) freedom in research 
and teaching,’ and ‘d) efficiency and effectiveness in the management of staff, 
resources, and infrastructure,’ the two principles seemingly ranking on a par. 
This seems to imply the legitimacy of trade-offs between academic freedom 
and pure considerations of economy. Unless a situation of a clear shortage of 
resources prevails, considerations of ‘efficiency’ may never lead to limitations 
of  academic freedom.158 To mention another example: The uk’s Education 
Reform Act of 1988,159 in Section 202(2)(a), stipulates that ‘academic staff 
have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to 
put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions.’ However, the 
Act recognises this freedom only whilst simultaneously, and in the context 
of, abolishing academic tenure. In terms of Sections 202 to 204, university 
 
 
156 Décret définissant le paysage de l’enseignement supérieur et l’organisation académique 
des études, 7 November 2013, Moniteur Belge, 18 December 2013. 
157 Nόμoς υπ’ αριθ. 4009, Δoμή, λειτoυργία, διασφάλιση της πoιότητας των σπoυδών kαι 
διεθνoπoίηση των ανωτάτων εkπαιδευτιkών ιδρυμάτων [Law No. 4009, Structure, Function- 
ing, Quality Assurance of Studies, and Internationalisation of Higher Education Institu- 
tions], Eφημερίς Tης Kυβερνήσεως, Tεύχoς Πρώτo, Aρ. Φύλλoυ 195 [Government Ga- 
zette, 1st Iss., Ref. Sheet 195], 6 September 2011, 4255. 
158 Similar formulations may be found in Section 14(1) of the Irish Universities Act, 1997 
(No. 24 of 1997), and Art. 118(1) of the Romanian National Education Law of 2011 (Legea 
educaţiei naţionale (n 147)). 
159 Education Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40. 
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Table 2 Country Ranking – Express Protection of Academic Freedom in he Legislation 
 
Country Percentage & Score / 
20 in brackets 
1. Austria, Croatia, France, North Rhine-Westphalia 
(Germany), Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia 
100 (20) 
2. Germany 87,5 (17,5) 
3. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Bavaria 
(Germany), Ireland, Luxemburg, Romania, Spain 
75 (15) 
Average 59,38 (11,88) 
4. Belgium, Cyprus, Flanders (Belgium), Italy, Nether- 
lands, Poland, Portugal, Wallonia (Belgium) 
50 (10) 
5. Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
25 (5) 
6. Estonia, Malta 0 (0) 
 
commissioners are to be appointed to ensure that dismissals notably for rea- 
sons of redundancy (which the Act legitimises) do not violate academic free- 
dom. It seems that, in practice, no such commissioners have been appointed 
to perform that function. Altogether, the Act reflects a minimalist view of 
academic freedom.160 Finally, there is a fifth group of he systems (Estonia 
and Malta), whose he legislation contains no reference to academic freedom 
whatsoever (‘non-compliance’). 
8.3 The Protection of Institutional Autonomy in Higher Education 
Legislation 
he legislation should expressly provide for he institutions to be autonomous, 
detailing the various constituent elements of meaningful autonomy (organ- 
isational, financial, staffing, and academic), to then weave the parameters of 
these into the fabric of the legislative framework as a whole. 
Thirty he systems having been assessed, the he Acts of 9 contain an 
express and adequate provision on autonomy, 20 an express, but in certain 
respects problematic or incomplete provision, and one a seriously deficient 
 
 
 
160  See Barendt (n 27) 73–116, on the legal protection of academic freedom in the uk. See 
ibid 316–317, for a select bibliography of relevant literature on the situation in the uk. 
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provision.161 Section 6 of the Slovak Act on Higher Education Institutions of 
2002,162 for example, contains a provision on institutional autonomy by and 
large satisfying criteria to be considered ‘adequate.’ Whereas Section 2(1) states 
that institutions of he are separate legal entities, Section 6(1) mentions their 
various competences, these including those relating to internal organisation, 
number of students to be admitted, admission requirements and procedures, 
design and implementation of curricula, organisation of studies, objectives 
and organisation of research, conclusion and termination of employment con- 
tracts, numberof staff andstaff structure, andfinancialandassetmanagement– 
accordingly, broadly encompassing all four elements of autonomy. Ideally, the 
provision should additionally have stated – as Article 2 of the Spanish Organic 
Law on Universities of 2001, for instance, does – that universities have ‘[a]ny 
other competence necessary for the appropriate fulfilment of [their] func- 
tions,’ underlined that university autonomy is based on academic freedom, 
and pointed out that universities are accountable to society for the use of their 
means and resources.163 Externally, university autonomy should be buttressed 
by guaranteeing the inviolability of university premises – a principle long 
since recognised by human rights bodies.164 Bulgaria’s Higher Education Act 
 
161 Indicator C.1.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
162 Zákony 131/2002 Z.z., 21 February 2002, o vysokých školách a o zmene a doplnení 
niektorých zákonov, Zbierke zákonov No. 58/2002, 1462. 
163 Ley Orgánica 6/2001 de Universidades (n 152), art. 2(2), (3), (4), respectively. For some 
more recent literature on academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and self-governance 
in Spain, see, e.g., E. Expósito, ‘Libertad de cátedra del professor universitario: Conteni- 
do y amenazas en el contexto actual de reforma del modelo de universidad pública,’ 
Revista de Educación y Derecho No. 7 (October 2012–March 2013) 1–17, retrieved 15 May 
2016, http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/RED/article/download/5866/7627; L.A. Galindo, 
‘Academic Freedom and Higher Education Regulations: Spanish Universities before the 
European Systems,’ Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution 2(2) (2010) 20–32; G. Ion and 
D. Castro, ‘Governance in Spanish Universities: Changing Paradigms,’ Journal of Hispanic 
Higher Education 11(4) (2012) 336–350; J. Pérez de Munguía, ‘New Requirements for High- 
er Education, Academic Freedom and Business Interests,’ Especial Educación Superior 
No. 10 (2009) 37–45; D. Vallespín Pérez, ‘La gobernanza de la universidad: El camino hacia 
un “Cambio Razonable” compatible con el respeto de la autonomía universitaria y la liber- 
tad de cátedra,’ Revista de Educación y Derecho No. 7 (October 2012–March 2013) 1–8, re- 
trieved 15 May 2016, http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/RED/article/download/5862/7624. 
164 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supervising implementation of 
the icescr, has thus, following the examination of state reports, expressed its concern 
in cases where university campuses have been put under military guardianship, or 
commented that ‘police presence on university campuses may infringe on the freedoms 
necessary for academic and cultural expression.’ See Beiter (n 34) 599–600. 
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of 1995,165 for example, provides in Article 19(3) that ‘[a]cademic autonomy 
shall include … inviolability of the premises of an institution of higher educa- 
tion,’ to then stipulate in Article 22(2) that ‘[t]he autonomy of an institution 
of higher education shall not be violated by … the organs of public order and 
security entering and remaining [on] [the premises] without the consent of 
the academic authorities, except to prevent immanent or already commenced 
crime, to arrest perpetrators, and in case of natural disasters and accidents.’ 
Concerning the assessment of institutional autonomy in detail in terms 
of compliance (or not) with certain key requirements on organisational, fi- 
nancial, staffing, and academic autonomy (i.e. requirements, compliance with 
which may be considered to be highly indicative of a more general compliance 
with institutional autonomy), the following may be stated:166 Regarding deter- 
mination of the rector: The state should not be involved in this, i.e., the rector 
should not be required to be appointed or the election to be confirmed by the 
state – also not formally at the highest executive level by the state president, 
the cabinet, or a minister, as this conveys an undesirable image of ‘closeness’ 
of state and he institutions. In 14 of the he systems examined, the state is 
involved in some way or another – usually in the stated symbolic manner – in 
the process.167 Regarding competence to decide on internal structures, the law 
should clearly not prescribe the specific faculties, departments, or institutes 
to be created. Article 19(1) of the University of Cyprus Law 1989 to 2013,168 
for example, prescribes that there be a Faculty of Humanities and Social Sci- 
ences, a Faculty of Natural and Applied Sciences, and a Faculty of Economics 
and Management. The state should further not be required to set up or dis- 
solve faculties, departments, or institutes at the request of he institutions, or 
to confirm their establishment/dissolution (the former being the case, e.g., in 
Bulgaria), and should not of itself be able to create a faculty, department, or 
institute within a he institution (see, e.g., Romania).169 Financial autonomy 
requires, inter alia, that he institutions receive state funds as a block grant 
(global budgets), leaving them ‘free to divide and distribute their funding in- 
ternally according to their needs.’ Whereas 11 he systems fully comply with 
 
165 Higher Education Act (n 151). 
166 See also Estermann et al. (n 94) 20–52, for an assessment of compliance by European 
states in the light of the indicators addressed in this paragraph (but also other indicators). 
167 Indicator C.2.1.1.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
168 Oι περί Πανεπιστημίoυ Kύπρoυ Nόμoι τoυ 1989–2013 [University of Cyprus Law 1989 to 
2013] (Aριθμός 144 τoυ 1989 – Aριθμός 116(I) τoυ 2013 [No. 144 of 1989 – No. 116(I) of 2013]). 
169 This is not to say that the state may not encourage and promote certain structural devel- 
opments within he institutions. Indicator C.2.1.2.: For detail on individual state perfor- 
mance, see the Annex. 
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this requirement, another 17 accept it in principle, but apply minor restric- 
tions. It appears that only Cyprus and Greece still make use of a line-item bud- 
get, which ‘pre-allocates university funding to cost items and/or activities.’170 
he institutions should further be competent to acquire funding additional to 
that directly allocated by the state from various sources. Notably, they should 
be able to perform (publicly or privately) commissioned research against pay- 
ment. Although this is actually the case in all he systems analysed,171 not all 
of them clearly spell this out in their primary legislation.172 Core competences 
entailed by institutional autonomy should be addressed in parliamentary leg- 
islation. Staffing autonomy means that the law should lay down a minimum 
of detail regarding the academic positions available and the requirements for 
positions. In the uk, the law, in fact, refrains from regulating these matters. 
In Sweden, the Higher Education Act of 1992 limits itself to stipulating that 
‘[h]igher education institutions shall employ professors [“professorer”] and 
senior lecturers [“lektorer”],’ adding that ‘each higher education institution 
shall itself decide which categories of teachers, apart from professors and 
senior lecturers, it shall employ, and on the qualifications and assessment 
criteria that shall apply to the appointment of  such teachers.’173 Subject to 
observing academic freedom, entitlements relating to job security (including 
tenure), and fair terms of employment, there should further be no or only 
minor restrictions concerning the recruitment and promotion of academic 
staff. There should also be no requirement to the effect that the appointment 
of professors be performed or confirmed by the state. In France, Decree No. 
84–431 of 1984174 states that ‘[u]niversity professors shall be appointed by de- 
cree of the President of the Republic.’175 Regarding the selection of first-cycle 
(Bachelor) students, while respecting duties flowing from the right to educa- 
tion, he institutions should be granted the competence both to determine 
 
170 Estermann et al. (n 94) 30–31. Indicator C.2.2.1.: For detail on individual state performance, 
see the Annex. 
171 See Eurydice (n 109) 77–78. 
172 Indicator C.2.2.2.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
173 Högskolelag, 17 December 1992, sfs No. 1992:1434, ch. 3, §§ 2 (1st sent.), 6, respectively. 
The accompanying Higher Education Ordinance of 1993 (Högskoleförordning, 4 February 
1993, sfs No. 1993:100) does lay down requirements in respect of professors and senior 
lecturers (e.g. qualifications, assessment criteria, and appointment procedures), but these 
rather give expression to broader principles applicable. See ch. 4. 
174 Décret n°84–431 du 6 juin 1984 fixant les dispositions statutaires communes applicables 
aux enseignants-chercheurs et portant statut particulier du corps des professeurs des uni- 
versités et du corps des maîtres de conférences, jorf 8 June 1984 1784. 
175 Indicator C.2.3.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
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the selection criteria for, and to conduct the actual selection of such students 
largely themselves. This is the case in 9 he systems. In 13, the responsibili- 
ties in this regard are shared between the state and he institutions. In 8, the 
state plays a dominant role in this respect.176 Finally, as quality control in 
he should essentially be left to be organised by he institutions themselves 
(jointly and/or severally), the requirement of having degree programmes ac- 
credited by the state or some external agency must be considered inimical to 
academic autonomy. Only 6 of the he systems examined dispense with the 
requirement of accreditation of first-cycle programmes.177 
Generally addressing the extent of government powers regarding he insti- 
tutions, a reading of a state’s he legislation should reflect wide competences 
for he institutions and a minimal measure of involvement of the state in regu- 
lating their activity. This is not to aver that the state does not hold ultimate 
responsibility in respect of the he sector. The state should, however, merely 
supervise whether legal requirements have been complied with (German: 
‘Rechtsaufsicht’), but not review decisions on their merits (German: ‘Fachauf- 
sicht’). he institutions should be in a position to enact most regulations and 
take most decisions without these requiring prior approval or subsequent con- 
firmation by the state. Chapter 7 of the Estonian Universities Act of 1995,178 
dealing with ‘Auditing, Supervision, and Reporting,’ thus makes it clear that 
the state authorities do not exercise ‘Fachaufsicht,’ Section 53 stating that 
‘[s]tate supervision over the legality of the activities of universities is exercised 
by the Ministry of Education and Research.’179 In a handful of the he systems 
examined, he legislation reflects a ‘lack of separation’ of state and university 
sector. In terms of the Danish (Consolidation) Act on Universities of 2012,180 
for example, the responsible minister is granted wide-ranging competences to 
regulate matters or to lay down general or specific rules on a variety of top- 
ics, using formulations such as: ‘The minister may set maximum enrolment 
quotas for degree programmes’ (§ 4(5)), ‘The minister shall lay down the rules 
regulating the acquisition of doctoral degrees’ (§ 6(2)), ‘The minister shall lay 
down rules regarding the education provided, including tests, examinations, 
and grading’ (§ 8(1)), or ‘The minister may lay down rules on the appointment 
of academic staff and teachers’ (§ 29(3)).181 Most of the he systems examined 
 
 
176 Indicator C.2.4.1.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
177 Indicator C.2.4.2.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
178 Ülikooliseadus, 12 January 1995, Riigi Teataja rt i 1995, 12, 119. 
179 Emphasis added. 
180 Bekendtgørelse af lov om universiteter (universitetsloven), lbk No. 960, 14 August 2014. 
181 On the extensive regulation of the he sector by the Danish government in furthering 
he ‘as a component of the national economy’ and limited self-governance in Danish 
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may be considered to be in ‘partial compliance,’ about one fifth in ‘full com- 
pliance,’ in respect of ensuring that their he legislation reflects restraint in 
granting governments powers to regulate he institutions.182 
Finally, the independence of he institutions vis-à-vis private interests 
should enjoy a notable measure of protection in he legislation. Croatia’s Act 
on Science and Higher Education of 2013, for example, provides that ‘[u]niver- 
sities … may be funded only from those sources that do not affect their inde- 
pendence and dignity.’183 The University of Cyprus Law 1989 to 2013 permits 
chairs to be established with finance deriving from the private sector – but 
only ‘on such conditions as shall safeguard the independence of the university 
from the grantor of this financial support.’184 Laudable in itself, these state- 
ments are not enough. The statement emphasising that private funding may 
not compromise the independence of teaching and research in he institutions 
needs to be linked to an obligation of he institutions to reveal the sources and 
scope of private funding. It seems only one he system roughly complies with 
this requirement. The recent Act on the Future of Higher Education of Sep- 
tember 2014 of North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany),185 in Section 71 on ‘Third 
party-funded research,’ thus provides that a member of the academic staff may 
undertake such research, ‘provided this does not prejudice the performance of 
other tasks of the he institution, his or her freedom in science, research, teach- 
ing, and study as well as the rights and duties of other persons’ (§ 71(2)). In 
Section 71a, entitled ‘Transparency regarding third party-funded research,’ the 
he Act then calls upon ‘[t]he rector [to inform] the public in an adequate man- 
ner about completed research projects in terms of [Section] 71(1)’ (§ 71a(1)). 
A similar requirement, obliging public research institutions to provide an 
annual overview of private financing of research conducted at such institu- 
tions, also exists in Denmark.186 This has not been provided for in terms of 
legislation, however, but by way of guidelines issued by the Ministry of Science, 
 
universities, see, e.g., E. Kalpazidou Schmidt and K. Langberg, ‘Academic Autonomy in 
a Rapidly Changing Higher Education Framework: Academia on the Procrustean Bed?,’ 
European Education 39(4) (2007–2008) 80–94; S. Wright and R. Boden, ‘Markets, Mana- 
gerialism, and Measurement: Organisational Transformations of Universities in uk and 
Denmark,’ in J.E. Kristensen et al. (eds.), University Performance Management: The Silent 
Managerial Revolution at Danish Universities (djøf Publishing, 2011) 79–99; S. Wright and 
J.W. Ørberg, ‘Autonomy and Control: Danish University Reform in the Context of Modern 
Governance,’ Learning and Teaching 1(1) (2008) 27–57. 
182 Indicator C.3.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
183 Zakon o znanstvenoj djelatnosti i visokom obrazovanju (n 144), art. 107(2). 
184 University of Cyprus Law (n 168), art. 21(2). 
185 Hochschulzukunftsgesetz (n 143). 
186 See Eurydice (n 109) 85. 
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Table 3 Country Ranking – Protection of Institutional Autonomy in he Legislation 
 
Country Percentage & Score / 
20 in brackets 
1. Finland 75 (15) 
2. United Kingdom 67,5 (13,5) 
3. Croatia, North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany) 65 (13) 
4. Ireland 62,5 (12,5) 
5. Austria 60 (12) 
6. Lithuania 55 (11) 
7. Estonia, Flanders (Belgium), Malta 52,5 (10,5) 
8. Latvia 50 (10) 
9. Poland 47,5 (9,5) 
Average 46,29 (9,26) 
10. Germany 46,25 (9,25) 
11. Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, Luxemburg, Nether- 
lands, Portugal 
45 (9) 
12. Belgium, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain 42,5 (8,5) 
13. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Romania 40 (8) 
14. France 35 (7) 
15. Sweden, Wallonia (Belgium) 32,5 (6,5) 
16. Bavaria (Germany) 27,5 (5,5) 
17. Greece 22,5 (4,5) 
18. Hungary 12,5 (2,5) 
 
Technology, and Innovation. In sum, one he system may be held to be in ‘full 
compliance,’ five in ‘partial compliance,’ and all the others in ‘non-compliance’ 
with the requirement of adopting legislation protecting the independence of 
he institutions against threats emanating from private sources.187 
8.4 The Protection of Academic Self-Governance in Higher Education 
Legislation 
Also the core elements of the right of academic self-governance should be 
clearly articulated in he legislation and then be given concrete shape in the 
various provisions on the institutional/faculty/departmental governing and 
 
187  See ibid, on accountability measures for private funds in he in Europe. Indicator C.4.: 
For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
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representative organs of he institutions. The right of self-governance being 
a central component of meaningful academic freedom, he legislation which 
does not articulate and operationalise its essential features does not comply 
with the right to academic freedom. Granted, it is in the interest of enhanced 
institutional autonomy to leave the regulation of many aspects in this context 
to institutions of he themselves; nevertheless, criteria such as those requiring 
academic staff to be able to elect a majority of representatives to the senate, 
or requiring them to be entitled to exercise ‘control’ over who is chosen as the 
rector, need to be guaranteed at the level of primary legislation. Where the 
uk’s Education Reform Act of 1988 thus merely refers to ‘the academic board 
of an institution,’ providing no further particulars,188 this falls short of mini- 
mum standards of compliance. The same holds true where he legislation does 
not deal with issues of governance at faculty/departmental level at all, as is the 
case, for example, in Flanders (Belgium), Ireland, or Lithuania. 
Thirty he systems having been assessed, the he Acts of only 3 contain an ex- 
press and adequate provision on self-governance, 12 an express, but in certain 
respects problematic or incomplete provision, and 15 no express provision.189 
An example of an express and adequate provision on self-governance would 
perhaps be that in Section 37, entitled ‘General Principles of Participation,’ of 
the German Framework Act on Higher Education in its version of 1999:190 
(1) It is the right and the duty of all members of an institution of higher 
education to participate in the institution’s self-governance. The nature 
and scope of participation by the various groups of members and within 
these groups shall vary in accordance with members’ qualifications, func- 
tion and responsibility, and the extent to which a matter affects them. 
With regard to representation on bodies made up of groups of mem- 
bers, professors, other academic staff (‘wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter’), 
students, and non-academic staff shall principally each constitute one 
group; all groups of members shall be represented and, as a matter of 
principle, in accordance with the provisions of the second sentence, par- 
ticipate in decision-making with a right to vote. … 
(2) With the exception of ex officio members, the members of a body shall be 
appointed or elected for a certain term of office; they shall not be bound 
by any instructions. … 
 
188 Education Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40, § 125(2), sched. 7A, para. 3. 
189 Indicator D.1.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
190 Hochschulrahmengesetz in the version of 19 January 1999, bgbl. i, at 18, last amended by 
Art. 2 of Law, 12 April 2007, bgbl. i, at 506. 
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(3) The members of an institution of higher education shall not suffer 
any disadvantage by reason of their participation in the institution’s 
self-governance. 
A majority – ideally between 60 and 70 percent – of the members of the 
senate (or its equivalent) should be representatives of academic staff. Students 
should, however, also be adequately represented.191 Article 2(f) of the Italian 
Law of 30 December 2010, No. 240, on Rules on the Organisation of Universities, 
Academic Staff and Recruitment, as well as Governance to Enhance the Qual- 
ity and Efficiency of the University System,192 for example, provides for ‘the 
constitution of the academic senate on an elective basis’: It is to ‘include the 
rector and an elected representation of the students,’ and to be ‘compos[ed] 
by at least two thirds of academic staff (‘docenti di ruolo’), at least one third 
of whom are heads of departments, elected in a way as to respect the differ- 
ent scientific-disciplinary fields of the university.’ Clearly, this reflects compli- 
ance with the 60–70 percent ideal.193 Quite a number of he Acts remain vague 
when commenting on the composition of the senate (or its equivalent). The 
Estonian Universities Act of 1995 thus provides for academic staff representa- 
tives on the council of the university, not stipulating how many representatives 
there should be, adding that there may also be ‘other persons prescribed by the 
statutes’ on the council.194 Others do not make provision for a senate, and con- 
tain only scant information in respect of alternative arrangements. The Flem- 
ish Decree Amending Various Decrees regarding the University of Antwerp 
of 1995 (Belgium) (separate decrees existing for various Flemish universities), 
not catering for a senate, merely states that ‘the academic governing bodies 
include at least a college of deans, a teaching council, a research council, and 
a council for scientific and operational services,’ to then leave all detail to be 
regulated by the board of governors.195 
 
 
 
191 Indicator D.2.1.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
192 Legge, 30 dicembre 2010, n. 240, Norme in materia di organizzazione delle università, 
di personale accademico e reclutamento, nonché delega al Governo per incentivare la 
qualità e l’efficienza del sistema universitario, Gazz. Uff. 14 January 2011, No. 10, S.O. No. 11. 
193 On recent (rather delicate) developments in the sphere of governance of he institutions 
in Italy, see, e.g., D. Donina et al., ‘Higher Education Reform in Italy: Tightening Regula- 
tion Instead of Steering at a Distance,’ Higher Education Policy 28(2) (2015) 215–234. 
194 Ülikooliseadus (n 178), § 14(2). 
195 Decreet houdende wijziging van diverse decreten met betrekking tot de Universiteit Ant- 
werpen, 22 December 1995, Belgisch Staatsblad, 1 February 1996, art. 5(2). 
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Rectors should be scholars coming from within the he institution they are 
to serve,196 the academic staff of that institution should be able to exercise 
‘control’ over who is chosen as the rector (for instance, by holding a majority of 
votes), rector and staff should govern ‘co-operatively,’ and the academic staff 
should also be able to exercise ‘control’ over the rector’s dismissal by means 
of a vote of no-confidence. Although principles of ‘managerial efficiency’ may 
perhaps call for a different governance regime, the one above is that most 
beneficial to promoting ‘the free search for truth’ and is required in terms of 
human rights criteria, including the principles of self-governance and colle- 
giality as enshrined in the unesco Recommendation.197 Article 14(2) of the 
University of Cyprus Law 1989 to 2013,198 for example, states that ‘[t]he rector 
shall be elected from among the professors of the university.’ Clearly, the rector 
here is ‘a scholar’ from within the he institution. The assessment has shown 
that rectors increasingly may come from outside the institution and often it is 
not expressly stated that they should be academics.199 Regarding the particu- 
lar manner in which rectors are chosen, the models employed in this respect 
in the he systems examined are highly varied.200 Accordingly, academic staff 
may be entitled – in a more or less direct manner –to take part in determining 
the rector. In terms of Article 23 of the Slovene Law on Higher Education of 
1993,201 ‘[t]he rector shall be elected by all higher education teachers, scien- 
tific staff, and higher education employees …. Students shall also have a vot- 
ing right – namely, a fifth of the votes ….’ Under Article 20(2) of the Spanish 
Organic Law on Universities of 2001,202 ‘[t]he rector shall be elected by the 
senate, or by the university community through direct elections and by univer- 
sal suffrage, as indicated by the statutes of each university.’ Section 10(2) of the 
 
 
 
196 This does not mean that provision may not be made for external ‘management expertise’ 
being available to rectors, e.g., through the appointment of appropriately qualified rector- 
ate members from outside the he institution without voting rights. 
197 See Georg Krücken, ‘Lässt sich Wissenschaft managen?,’ Wissenschaftsrecht 41(4) (2008) 
345–358 (generally expressing doubt as to whether science and research are susceptible 
to ‘management principles’ whatsoever). 
198 University of Cyprus Law (n 168). 
199 Indicator D.2.2.1.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
200 Indicator D.2.2.2.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. Apart from 
verifying the extent of academic staff participation, the assessment has also taken into 
account whether or not general principles of democratic elections/selection procedures 
have been complied with. 
201 Zakon o visokem šolstvu (n 152). 
202 Ley Orgánica 6/2001 de Universidades (n 152). 
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Slovak Act on Higher Education Institutions of 2002203 stipulates that ‘[t]he 
rector shall be appointed and dismissed at the proposal of the senate … by the 
President of the Slovak Republic.’204 The general trend, however, is ‘to do away 
with’ direct or indirect participation of academic staff and to have the rector 
appointed by a ‘third body,’ to wit he institution boards, many introduced in 
the wake of ‘new university management’ policies en vogue since the 1990s. 
Customarily, all or the majority of the members of these boards are external, 
representing a variety of – including government and corporate – interests. 
The bodies sometimes merely perform a supervisory function, but in many 
cases they play a decisive role in strategic decision-making.205 In terms of the 
Danish (Consolidation) Act on Universities of 2012, the board – there being no 
senate or its equivalent206 – appoints the rector. Although there are also mem- 
bers representing academic staff on the board, the majority of members must 
be external members, who ‘have experience in management, organisation, and 
finance.’207 Under the Finnish Universities Act of 2009, also the board – again, 
no provision having been made for a senate or its equivalent – elects the rec- 
tor. Academic staff is represented on the board, but as also other personnel 
and students are represented, and at least 40 percent of board members must 
be ‘other persons’ ‘with expertise in social life and the sciences,’ it is not cer- 
tain that members representing academic staff will hold a majority of votes.208 
In the Netherlands, the Law on Provisions concerning Higher Education and 
Scientific Research of 1992 envisages all members of the rectorate (college 
van bestuur), including the rector, to be appointed by the raad van toezicht, 
 
 
 
203 Zákony o vysokých školách (n 162). 
204 In Austria, the senate proposes candidates, but the council (consisting of external ex- 
perts) then elects the rector (Universities Act of 2002 (n 145), §§ 21(1)(4), 23a, 23(3), 25(1) 
(5a)). In Bulgaria, the general assembly, a body which is separate from the academic coun- 
cil (equivalent of a senate) and has a clear two-thirds majority of academic staff mem- 
bers, elects the rector (Higher Education Act of 1995 (n 151), arts. 27, 29(1)(4)). In Greece, 
the council (i.e. not the senate), with a slight preponderance of academic staff members, 
decides on candidates subsequently voted on directly by academic staff (Law on Struc- 
ture, Functioning, Quality Assurance of Studies, and Internationalisation of Higher Edu- 
cation Institutions of 2011 (n 157), art. 8(16)). 
205 See Eurydice (n 109) 33–42, or Estermann et al. (n 94) 20–29, attesting to these develop- 
ments, but commenting on them neutrally. 
206 I.e. apart from academic councils, PhD committees, and boards of studies ‘established by 
the rector.’ 
207  Universitetsloven (n 180), §§ 10(7), 12(1), (3). 
208  Yliopistolaki (Lag), No. 558/2009, 24 July 2009, §§ 14(2)(7), 15(2)–(4). 
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consisting of three to five external members, appointed by the minister.209 
What has been stated regarding the particular manner rectors are chosen 
may also be observed in as far as their dismissal is concerned. Some of the 
he systems leave the powers in this respect to academic staff. In terms of Sec- 
tion 13(6) of the Hungarian Act on National Higher Education of 2011,210 the 
senate may thus, by the affirmative vote of two thirds of the members, initiate 
the dismissal of the rector.211 In Poland, where the rector, under the Law on 
Higher Education of 2005,212 is either elected by an electoral body (not defined 
more closely) or determined by way of a competitive procedure, as specified in 
the statutes of a he institution, he or she may, in terms of Article 78(1) to (3), be 
dismissed by a three-quarter majority vote of the electoral body or a two-thirds 
majority of all members of the senate, as the case may be. Nevertheless, also 
in this respect the trend is for those he systems in which the rector is chosen 
by a board to grant the latter also the competence to dismiss the rector. Thus, 
in Denmark, Finland, or Lithuania, the board appoints/elects the rector and 
dismisses him or her.213 
In some of the he systems assessed, the rector and the senate (or its equiva- 
lent) retain responsibility for strategic decision-making. This is so, for exam- 
ple, in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, or Romania. In these 
cases, there may additionally be certain other bodies that include external 
experts, but these are then assigned solely advisory or supervisory powers. 
As has been pointed out, however, provision is increasingly made for sepa- 
rate boards, composed entirely or to a large extent of external members, with 
important decision-making powers in strategic matters. They are usually com- 
petent to appoint and dismiss rectors, often coming from outside the he in- 
stitution. The rectors (or sometimes rectorates) may be granted far-reaching 
executive powers. Together, rector and board decide on issues such as internal 
structure, the heads of units, teaching and research strategy, budgets, and ad- 
ministrative set-up. It may well be asked to what extent the principles of self- 
governance and collegiality permit ‘managerial’ governance structures being 
introduced in he institutions. Strengthening the rector’s (rectorate’s) powers, 
 
209 Wet van 8 oktober 1992, houdende bepalingen met betrekking tot het hoger onderwijs en 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek (whw), Stb. 1992, 593, ch. 9, tit. 1, arts. 9.3.1.-2., 9.7., 9.8.1.a. 
210 2011, évi cciv, törvény a nemzeti felsőoktatásról, Magyar Közlöny 165, 30 December 2011, 
41181. 
211 On this basis, the Minister may recommend the dismissal of the rector to the President of 
the Republic. See Act on National Higher Education, § 64(2)(c). 
212 Ustawa, z dnia 27 lipca 2005 r., Prawo o szkolnictwie wyższym, Dziennik Ustaw 2005, 
No. 164, Item 1365, as amended. 
213 Indicator D.2.2.3.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
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or providing for a board making available external expertise and involved in 
strategic decision-making, would probably be permissible provided these mea- 
sures are adequately counterbalanced by securing effective participatory and 
control rights for academic staff, to ensure the system of governance does not 
become ‘detached’ from the academic staff whom it should serve.214 It is sub- 
mitted that academic staff should thus retain the power to elect the rector from 
among their midst and, where appropriate, express a lack of confidence in him 
or her. Academic staff should further ideally have at least 50 percent representa- 
tion on the board.215 In Portugal, the general council (replacing general assem- 
bly and senate) has a majority of representatives of academic staff, and at least 
30 percent external members.216 In Lithuania, academic staff are represented 
by slightly less than 50, namely about 45, percent of council members, there be- 
ing an equal share of external members, the final 10 percent reflecting student 
representation.217 The scope of academic staff representation is sometimes left 
rather unclear. The governing authority in Irish universities could accordingly 
include up to about 75 percent external members. Representation of academic 
staff may be as low as 13 or as high as somewhat more than 50 percent.218 As 
for the University of Malta, there must be external members on the council, 
and, depending on the circumstances, ‘academic’ members would constitute 
between 10 and 45 percent of council members.219 In the so-called ‘post-1992’ 
 
214 See Hamburgisches Hochschulgesetz case, Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
(2010) (n 61), paras. 88–95 (114–118) (the court in this case, in the German context, point- 
ing out that, where bodies such as the rector (rectorate) or dean (dean’s office) are granted 
substantive decision-making powers that have a bearing on science and scholarship, aca- 
demic staff must retain effective participatory and control rights). 
215 Cf. L. Elton, ‘Collegiality and Complexity: Humboldt’s Relevance to British Universi- 
ties Today,’ Higher Education Quarterly 62(3) (2008) 224–236, at 232 (stressing the need 
for ‘a democratic form of leadership, distributed throughout an organisation, very dif- 
ferent from the current form of top-down leadership’ in he), and at 233 (emphasising 
that the vice-chancellor should be the ‘university’s first servant’). Cf. also M. Shattock, 
‘Re-balancing Modern Concepts of University Governance,’ Higher Education Quarterly 
56(3) (2002) 235–244, at 240 (arguing in support of ‘moving back to a more evenly bal- 
anced approach to governance – the “shared governance” concept’). 
216 Lei n.° 62/2007, Regime jurídico das instituições de ensino superior, n 152, art. 81. For an 
account of more recent changes in Portuguese he, see, e.g., A. Magalhães et al., ‘Gover- 
nance of Governance in Higher Education: Practices and Lessons Drawn from the Portu- 
guese Case,’ Higher Education Quarterly 67(3) (2013) 295–311; R. Santiago and T. Carvalho, 
‘Managerialism Rhetorics in Portuguese Higher Education,’ Minerva 50(4) (2012) 511–532. 
217 Mokslo ir studijų įstatymas (n 148), art. 20(3). 
218 Universities Act, 1997 (No. 24 of 1997), § 16. 
219 Education Act, Act xxiv of 1988 (Cap. 327, Laws of Malta, 1988), arts. 74(10), 76. 
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English universities, at least half of the 12 (13) to 24 (25) members of the gov- 
erning body must be ‘independent.’ Up to two members may be teachers at the 
institution nominated by the academic board. There are further one to nine 
co-opted members among the members, who could potentially be teachers 
at the institution.220 It may, however, also be clear that all the members of 
the board are to be external experts. In the University of Luxemburg, all seven 
members of the governing council are external members, at least four of which 
‘must exercise or have exercised university responsibilities.’221 An arrangement 
in terms of which there are (mainly) external members on the board, but aca- 
demic staff are in a position to determine at least half of these – as is the case, 
for instance, in Austria222 – would perhaps still pass muster, but only at the 
level of ‘partial compliance.’223 
The above enquiry has been replicated at the level of the units of he institu- 
tions (faculties and departments). First of all, have collegial bodies been pro- 
vided for at faculty/departmental level?224 Do these bodies adequately repre- 
sent academic staff?225 Further, are deans/heads of departments required to be 
scholars from within their respective unit, at any rate their institution?226 Do 
academic staff exercise ‘control’ over who is chosen as the dean/head of de- 
partment, or do they exercise certain, but more restricted rights of participa- 
tion in this respect – or, in fact, none at all?227 Likewise, are they able to exercise 
‘control’ over the dean’s/head of department’s dismissal by means of a vote of 
no-confidence, or have they been accorded qualified or no rights of participa- 
tion in this regard.228 The criteria of compliance and the rationale underly- 
ing these resemble those at the institutional level and need not be repeated 
here. A number of the he systems assessed (Austria, Flanders (Belgium), 
Wallonia (Belgium), Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the uk) fail to regulate the right of self- 
governance at the unit level whatsoever or they do so in a clearly insufficient 
 
220 Education Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40, sched. 7A, para. 3 (composition of governing body). 
221 Loi du 12 août 2003 portant création de l’Université du Luxembourg, MEMORIAL Journal 
Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg A – No. 149, 6 October 2003, 2989, art. 19(1) (the 
government proposes candidates, the Grand Duke appoints them). 
222 Universitätsgesetz (n 145), § 21(6) (50% of the council members ‘determined’ by academic 
staff (elected by the senate), 50% appointed by the government). 
223 Indicator D.2.3.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
224 Indicator D.3.1.1.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
225 Indicator D.3.1.2.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
226 Indicator D.3.2.1.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
227 Indicator D.3.2.2.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
228 Indicator D.3.2.3.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
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Table 4 Country Ranking – Protection of Academic Self-Governance in he Legislation 
 
Country Percentage & Score / 
20 in brackets 
1. Bulgaria 72,5 (14,5) 
2. Croatia 70 (14) 
3. Cyprus, North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
62,5 (12,5) 
4. Germany 61,25 (12,25) 
5. Bavaria (Germany), Spain 60 (12) 
6. Portugal 57,5 (12,5) 
7. Czech Republic, Slovenia 55 (11) 
8. Greece, Latvia 52,5 (10,5) 
9. Austria, Hungary 45 (9) 
Average 42,99 (8,6) 
10. Wallonia (Belgium), Italy 40 (8) 
11. Belgium 37,5 (7,5) 
12. Flanders (Belgium) 35 (7) 
13. Denmark, France 32,5 (6,5) 
14. Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta 30 (6) 
15. Netherlands 27,5 (5,5) 
16. Estonia 22,5 (4,5) 
17. Finland, Ireland, Sweden 15 (3) 
18. United Kingdom 0 (0) 
 
 
way. As has been underlined, although the particular manner governance at 
the unit level is concretised should as far as possible be left to he institutions 
themselves to decide, human rights aspects of self-governance at this level 
need to be provided for in primary legislation. 
8.5 The Protection of Job Security (including ‘Tenure’) in Relevant 
Legislation 
The legal framework governing the duration of contracts of service of aca- 
demic staff in he at post-entry levels (i.e. following any stage of doctoral 
employment) should envisage permanent contracts/commencement on a 
tenure-track. he systems whose laws are in compliance with this requirement 
 Beiter, Karran and Appiagyei-Atua 
 
68  
 
include, amongstothers, Flanders(Belgium), Bulgaria, or France.229 Article 48(1) 
of the Bulgarian Higher Education Act of 1995230 thus provides that ‘[t]he 
academic staff in higher education institutions shall comprise: 1. for ha- 
bilitated teachers – associate professor and professor; 2. for non-habilitated 
teachers – assistant and senior assistant,’ Article 54(1) further stating that 
‘[t]he positions under [Article 48(1)], except for the position of “assistant,” shall 
entail a contract of service for an indefinite period.’ The legal framework of 
some of the he systems assessed – for example that in place in Luxemburg or 
Poland – leaves it to he institutions themselves to decide whether or not to 
offer permanent contracts. In these cases, the use of fixed-term contracts may 
be subject to fairly strict limitations as to legitimate cases of use, maximum 
number of successive contracts, and their maximum cumulated duration. 
Article 35(1) of the Law of 12 August 2003 on the University of Luxemburg231 
thus states that the employment of enseignants-chercheurs may be fixed-term 
or permanent. Although the general rule under the Code du Travail is that 
fixed-term contracts may only be concluded for ‘the execution of tasks which 
are specific and not durable’ (Art. L. 122–1(1)), these may expressly be conclud- 
ed with enseignants-chercheurs of the University of Luxemburg (Art. L. 122–1(3) 
(1)). The latter contracts are renewable (also more than twice, this constituting 
the limit otherwise),232 but there is an overall limit of 60 months (including 
renewals) (ordinarily this is 24 months) for which they may be entered into.233 
The use of fixed-term contracts may, however, also be subject to rather lax re- 
quirements. In Poland, academic staff are either appointed (entailing higher 
employment security) – applicable only if the academic title of profesor has 
been awarded – or engaged under contracts of employment governed by the 
Labour Code of 1974.234 Appointments ‘shall be for an indefinite or definite pe- 
riod of time.’235 Ordinary employment contracts may likewise be permanent or 
fixed-term. Although the legislator has now effected changes, the only restric- 
tion hitherto applicable to the latter contracts has been that they could not 
be concluded more than twice.236 They could be concluded for any period of 
 
229 Indicator E.1.1.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
230 Higher Education Act (n 151). 
231 Loi portant création de l’Université du Luxembourg 2003 (n 221). 
232  Code du Travail, art. L. 122–5(1), (3)(1). 
233  Ibid art. L. 122–4(1), (4). 
234  Prawo o szkolnictwie wyższym 2005 [Law on Higher Education 2005] (n 212), art. 118(1). 
235  Ibid art. 121(2). 
236  Ustawa, z dnia 26 czerwca 1974 r., Kodeks pracy [Act, 26 June 1974, Labour Code], Dziennik 
Ustaw 1974, No. 24, Item 141, art. 251, § 1 (as prior to the 2016 amendments). 
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time.237 Whereas cases such as that of Luxemburg should be held to constitute 
instances of ‘partial compliance,’ those in the nature of the former Polish 
situation should be considered cases of ‘non-compliance.’ Clearly also ‘in 
non-compliance’ are he systems, whose legal framework expressly envisages 
fixed-term contracts for academic staff at post-entry levels, even those with 
senior positions (associate or full professors), there being little or no pros- 
pect of permanent contracts being concluded. The Estonian Universities Act 
of 1995,238 in Section 39(1), thus states that ‘[t]he positions of regular teach- 
ing and research staff at a university shall be filled for up to five years by way 
of public competition with equal conditions for all participants ….’ It is fur- 
ther stipulated, in Section 391(1), that ‘[t]he successive conclusion of fixed- 
term employment contracts with teaching or research staff shall not cause 
the employment relationship to become one for an unlimited term.’ In fact, 
‘[a]n employment contract for an unlimited term shall [only] be concluded 
with a person who has been employed in the same university and has worked 
as a professor for at least eleven years, following evaluation under conditions 
and procedures established by the council of the university’ (§ 391(2))!239 
The situation in practice regarding the duration of contracts of service in 
many instances is not as one would expect it to be in terms of the letter of the 
law in force.240 In some cases, protective legislation does not actually have a 
 
237 As from 2016 onwards, there may not be more than two renewals, and the overall period 
may not exceed 33 months (amendments to the Labour Code of 25 June 2015). These 
changes could not yet be taken into consideration for purposes of the present assessment. 
238 Ülikooliseadus (n 178). 
239 See also European Commission, Commission Asks Estonia to Apply the Fixed-Term Em- 
ployment Directive Fully in Academia and the Arts (24 October 2012), retrieved 15 May 
2016, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=de&catId=157&newsId=1707&further 
News=yes (reporting that the European Commission has asked Estonia to provide fixed- 
term staff in universities with protection against successive fixed-term employment 
contracts in accordance with Council Directive 99/70, 1999 o.j. (L 175) 43 (ec) (Directive 
concerning the Framework Agreement on Fixed-Term Work Concluded by etuc, unice, 
and ceep), this establishing a framework to prevent abuse arising from the use of succes- 
sive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships). Legislative provisions similar to 
those in Estonia exist in Croatia, Latvia, and Slovakia. 
240 Indicator E.1.2.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. Various sourc- 
es of information have been used to assess compliance regarding this indicator, e.g., 
G. Ates and A. Brechelmacher, ‘Academic Career Paths,’ in U. Teichler and E.A. Höhle 
(eds.), The Work Situation of the Academic Profession in Europe: Findings of a Survey in 
Twelve Countries (Springer, 2013) 13–35, or Idea Consult et al., Support for Continued Data 
Collection and Analysis Concerning Mobility Patterns and Career Paths of Researchers 
(Final Report more2, Prepared for European Commission, Research Directorate-General, 
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protective effect. In Germany, theprovisionsof the Acton Fixed-Term Contracts 
of Employment in Science of 2007,241 intended to restrict the use of fixed-term 
contracts, allowing these only where staff are financed primarily out of third 
party funds, are being abused by converting ordinary academic positions into 
third party-funded positions.242 In other cases, a legal framework not in accor- 
dance with required standards yet does not prevent a high level of protection 
in practice. In the Netherlands, for instance, academic staff are civil servants 
under the Central and Local Government Personnel Act.243 Actual protective 
standards, however, are only provided for at the level of more ‘volatile’ second- 
ary legislation and collective labour agreements.244 In practice, about 75 per- 
cent of academic staff either have permanent contracts or fixed-term contracts 
with long-term prospects.245 In the uk, despite the absence of parliamentary 
legislation on the matter, almost 90 percent of academic staff either have per- 
manent contracts or fixed-term contracts with long-term prospects.246 
The he legislation of roughly a third of the he systems assessed contains 
provisions prohibiting dismissals of academic staff on operational grounds 
(restructuring, down-sizing, reorganisation, or economic difficulties) or laying 
down some protective standards for cases where such dismissals take place.247 
Ireland and Portugal expressis verbis require academic staff to enjoy ‘tenure.’ 
Section 25(6) of the Irish Universities Act of 1997 insists that ‘[a] university … 
shall provide for the tenure of officers.’248 Article 50 of the Portuguese Law 
 
 
Brussels, August 2013), retrieved 15 May 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/pdf/research_ 
policies/more2/Final%20report.pdf. 
241 Gesetz über befristete Arbeitsverträge in der Wissenschaft (Wissenschaftszeitvertragsge- 
setz – WissZeitVG), 12 April 2007, bgbl. I, at 506. 
242 See, e.g., A. Sartor, 2013, ‘Forschen auf Zeit: Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter sind meistens 
befristet angestellt – warum eigentlich?,’ Zeit Online, 18 June 2013, retrieved 15 May 2016, 
http://www.zeit.de/campus/2013/04/wissenschaftliche-mitarbeiter-befristung. 
243 Ambtenarenwet van 12 december 1929, bwbr0001947. 
244 See Algemeen Rijksambtenarenreglement, besluit van 12 juni 1931, bwbr0001950, minis- 
teriële regelingen (ministerial regulations), arts. 5(1), (2) (providing for recourse to fixed- 
term contracts by way of exception only), 6(6) (imposing limits on the conclusion of 
fixed-term agreements), and Collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst (cao) Nederlandse Uni- 
versiteiten, 1 januari 2011 tot en met 31 december 2013 (collective labour agreement), arts. 
2.2(1) (exceptional nature of fixed-term contracts), 2.3(1), (7) (limits on the conclusion of 
fixed-term contracts). 
245 See Ates and Brechelmacher (n 240) 27 (figures for 2007/08). 
246 See ibid 27 (figures for 2010). 
247 Indicator E.2.1.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
248 Universities Act, 1997 (No. 24 of 1997). See Section 3(1) for a definition of the term ‘officer.’ 
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on the Legal Status of Institutions of Higher Education of 2007249 states that, 
‘[s]o as to guarantee their scientific and pedagogical autonomy, higher edu- 
cation institutions must have a permanent staff of teachers and researchers 
benefiting from an enhanced level of employment stability (tenure).’ In the 
case of Greece and Poland, dismissals of certain academic staff for reasons of 
redundancy are not allowed or restricted. In Greece, professors may only be dis- 
missed for reasons of a criminal conviction, a grave disciplinary breach, illness 
or disability, or professional incompetence.250 In Poland, those ‘appointed’ to 
their position and holding the title of ‘professor’ may generally not be dismissed 
for reasons of redundancy.251 In the case of Austria, Finland, and the uk, he 
legislation contains provisions to the effect that a contract of service may not 
be terminated because a member of the academic staff has exercised his/her 
freedom to teach or carry out research, this precluding ‘redundancy’ serving as 
a pretext for ‘getting rid of’ certain members of staff.252 The Bulgarian Higher 
Education Act of 1995,253 in Article 58(1)(3), countenances dismissals for rea- 
sons of redundancy, but only if there are no opportunities for reallocation to 
another department or re-qualification in a related discipline. In a number of 
he systems, all or at any rate senior members of the academic staff are civil/ 
public servants/public sector workers, i.e. not ‘ordinary’ employees in terms 
of private law. This status may entail their dismissal on operational grounds 
being excluded (even where he legislation does not expressly affirm such 
protection). Such status entailing prohibition of dismissal exists in Flanders 
(Belgium), Wallonia (Belgium), Croatia, Cyprus, Bavaria (Germany), North 
Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. In the 
case of France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Slovenia, academic staff who are 
civil servants may (at least in theory) be dismissed on operational grounds.254 
Concluding the comments on this indicator, it may be noted that the he 
legislation (in the form of parliamentary enactments) of none of the he 
systems assessed contains a full-fledged provision generally prohibiting 
 
249 Lei n.° 62/2007, Regime jurídico das instituições de ensino superior (n 152). 
250 This is, in fact, provided for in terms of the Greek Constitution 1975. See art. 16(6). 
251 Prawo o szkolnictwie wyższym 2005 [Law on Higher Education 2005] (n 212), arts. 118(1), 
123–128. Art. 125 does, however, provide for termination ‘on other compelling grounds.’ 
252 Universitätsgesetz 2002 (n 145), § 113 (Austria); Yliopistolaki 2009 (n 208), § 32 (Finland); 
Education Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40, §§ 202–204 (uk). 
253 Higher Education Act (n 151). 
254 See C. Demmke and T. Moilanen, The Future of Public Employment in Central Public Ad- 
ministration: Restructuring in Times of Government Transformation and the Impact on 
Status Development (Study Commissioned by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of 
the Republic of Poland, November 2012) 49, retrieved 15 May 2016, http://www.eupan.eu/ 
files/repository/2013021293522_Study_The_future_of_public_employment.pdf. 
 Beiter, Karran and Appiagyei-Atua 
 
72  
 
dismissals on operational grounds, and providing adequate protection – 
requiring the consideration of alternatives, the observance of suitable priority 
criteria, the following of a formalised procedure, and the guarantee of proce- 
dural safeguards – in those exceptional cases where they may take place. 
To the extent that he legislation does not address the issue of the termi- 
nation of contracts of service on operational grounds, recourse needs to be 
had to the provisions of ‘ordinary’ civil service/labour law. These may provide 
adequate, some, or insufficient protection to academic staff in this regard. 
Adequate protection would imply that the notice of termination clearly state 
the grounds of termination, that alternatives to termination (such as transfer 
to another similar position within the institution, transfer to another similar 
position in another institution, or retraining) be considered, and that, where 
termination cannot be avoided, suitable priority criteria (e.g. length of service 
or age) be followed. On the whole, 12 he systems provide a rather high level of 
protection in this context, 11 a medium, and 7 a low level of protection.255 
Adequate provision for advancement of academic staff to a higher position 
based on an objective assessment of competence should further be made. Some 
of the he systems assessed do so through a tenure-track system.256 Article v.29 
of the Flemish Codification of the Decretal Provisions concerning Higher Edu- 
cation of 2013 (Belgium)257 thus provides for a tenure-track system (which is 
optional for universities, however), in terms of which a ‘docent’ may, following 
a positive evaluation of his/her performance, be promoted to the position of 
‘hoofddocent.’ Similarly, Austria and the Netherlands provide for tenure-track 
systems entailing promotion following positive evaluation. In Austria, the 
 
 
255 Indicator E.2.2.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. Various 
sources of information have been used to assess compliance regarding this indicator, 
e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, oecd Employment 
Outlook 2014 (oecd, 2014), retrieved 15 May 2016, http://www.keepeek.com/Digital 
-Asset-Management/oecd/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2014_empl_outlook 
-2014-en#page1, or legislative texts as found in the ilo Employment Protection Legisla- 
tion Database – EPLex, retrieved 15 May 2016, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/eplex/termmain. 
home?p_lang=en, or on the websites of national governments. 
256 See H.-J. Schiewer et al., Tenure and Tenure Track at leru Universities: Models for Attrac- 
tive Research Careers in Europe (League of European Research Universities, Advice Paper 
No. 17, September 2014), retrieved 15 May 2016, http://www.leru.org/files/publications/ 
LERU_AP17_tenure_track_final.pdf, for an overview of tenure-track systems (most of 
them not based on parliamentary legislation) in a number of European countries. 
257 Codificatie van 11 oktober 2013 van de decretale bepalingen betreffende het hoger onder- 
wijs, as endorsed by Decreet tot bekrachtiging van de decretale bepalingen betreffende 
het hoger onderwijs, gecodificeerd op 11 oktober 2013 (1), 20 December 2013, Belgisch 
Staatsblad, 27 February 2014. 
 Academic Freedom in the Law of European States 
 
73  
 
system envisages advancement from assistant to associate professor. In the 
Netherlands, the applicable provisions lay down a potential procedure on 
which advancement of academic staff in he may be based. However, whereas 
the Flemish tenure-track system has its origin in parliamentary legislation, 
the systems of Austria and the Netherlands have been provided for in collec- 
tive labour agreements only.258 Other he systems create entitlements relating 
to promotion otherwise than through a tenure-track system. Article 18(3) of 
the Greek Law on Structure, Functioning, Quality Assurance of Studies, and 
 
 
Table 5 Country Ranking – Protection of Job Security (including ‘Tenure’) in Relevant 
Legislation 
 
Country Percentage & Score / 
20 in brackets 
1. Greece 100 (20) 
2. France 77,5 (15,5) 
3. Italy 57,5 (11,5) 
4. Spain 55 (11) 
5. Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia 52,5 (10,5) 
6. Flanders (Belgium), Cyprus 50 (10) 
7. Bulgaria 47,5 (9,5) 
8. Belgium 46,25 (9,25) 
9. Wallonia (Belgium), Malta, Sweden 42,5 (8,5) 
10. Bavaria (Germany), North Rhine-Westphalia 
(Germany), Germany, Hungary 
40 (8) 
Average 37,28 (7,46) 
11. Netherlands 35 (7) 
12. Denmark, Romania, United Kingdom 27,5 (5,5) 
13. Austria, Lithuania, Poland 25 (5) 
14. Croatia 22,5 (4,5) 
15. Luxemburg 17,5 (3,5) 
16. Finland, Latvia 15 (3) 
17. Czech Republic 10 (2) 
18. Estonia, Slovakia 7,5 (1,5) 
 
258 See the Kollektivvertrag für die ArbeitnehmerInnen der Universitäten (2013), § 27(5), for 
Austria, and the Collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst (cao) Nederlandse Universiteiten, 
1 januari 2011 tot en met 31 december 2013, art. 6.5a, for the Netherlands, respectively. 
 Beiter, Karran and Appiagyei-Atua 
 
74  
 
Internationalisation of Higher Education Institutions of 2011259 lays down 
that ‘assistant and associate professors have the right to request a vacancy 
at the next level after a stay at the rank they hold after six and four years, 
respectively …. In this case, the vacancy notice is mandatory …. If assistant 
and associate professors are not promoted to the next level, they have the right 
to request a re-announcement of the position after a lapse of at least three 
years following the decision not to be promoted.’ At the very opposite end of 
the scale are he systems such as that of Lithuania, Article 65(4) of its Law on 
Higher Education and Research of 2009260 providing that ‘[p]ersons shall gain 
access to a higher position in the teaching or research staff by way of an open 
competition [only].’ Altogether, he systems fail to adequately deal with the 
issue of advancement. Only the Greek arrangements have been considered to 
be in ‘full compliance,’ those of 16 other he systems in ‘non-compliance.’261 
8.6 The Legal Protection of the Right to Academic Freedom in Europe: 
Overall Country Ranking 
Table 6 on the following page depicts the overall country ranking for the legal 
protection of the right to academic freedom in Europe. For each country, it 
adds up the scores out of twenty for each of the five main categories of assess- 
ment (1. ratification of international agreements and constitutional protec- 
tion, 2. express protection of academic freedom in he legislation, 3. protection 
of institutional autonomy in he legislation, 4. protection of academic self-gov- 
ernance in he legislation, and 5. protection of job security (including ‘tenure’) 
in relevant legislation), to arrive at a score out of hundred (a percentage mark). 
On the basis of the latter, the country’s position in the ranking is determined. 
 
9 Analysis and Observations: The State of Health of the Legal 
Protection of the Right to Academic Freedom in Europe 
The assessment has shown that by and large the 28 eu Member States for- 
mally ascribe to the value of academic freedom. In general, they have ratified 
relevant international agreements providing protection to the right to aca- 
demic freedom (iccpr, icescr, echr, etc.) and give recognition to the 
right (or related rights) at the constitutional level. Table 1 reflects countries 
to have scored an average of 78 percent in this category. Also at the level of 
 
259 Law on Structure, Functioning, Quality Assurance of Studies, and Internationalisation of 
Higher Education Institutions of 2011 (n 157). 
260 Mokslo ir studijų įstatymas (n 148). 
261 Indicator E.3.: For detail on individual state performance, see the Annex. 
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Table 6 Overall Country Ranking: Legal Protectionof the Rightto Academic Freedomin Europe 
 
Country Total (%) & Grade (A-F) 
1. North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany) 71 B 
2. Croatia 69 C 
3. Spain 66,5 C 
4. Bulgaria 65,5 C 
5. Germany 64,5 C 
6. Austria 63,5 C 
7. France 63 C 
8. Portugal 61 C 
9. Slovakia 60,5 C 
10. Latvia 60 C 
11. Lithuania 59,5 D 
12. Bavaria (Germany) 58 D 
13. Italy 57,5 D 
14. Greece 55,5 D 
15. Finland 55 D 
16. Poland 54,5 D 
17. Romania 53,5 D 
18. Cyprus 53 D 
Average 52,79 D 
19. Ireland, Slovenia 52,5 D 
20. Czech Republic, Flanders (Belgium) 51,5 D 
21. Belgium 49,25 E 
22. Luxemburg 47,5 E 
23. Wallonia (Belgium) 47 E 
24. Netherlands 44 E 
25. Sweden 39,5 F 
26. Denmark 38,5 F 
27. Hungary, Malta 36 F 
28. United Kingdom 35 F 
29. Estonia 34 F 
 
he legislation, academic freedom enjoys express recognition in most he sys- 
tems, Table 2 showing that an average of 59 percent compliance was achieved 
in this category. There are, however, some he systems – those of Denmark, 
Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia, Sweden, and the uk – whose he 
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legislation does not, or not adequately, refer to academic freedom. Whereas 
all he systems, in a more or less satisfactory manner, expressly provide for the 
autonomy of institutions of he in their he legislation (Indicator C.1.), rights 
of self-governance of academic staff (Indicator D.1.), and tenure in the sense 
of employment stability (Indicator E.2.1.) are accorded express recognition in 
such legislation in 15 and 8 he systems, respectively, with a rating of ‘full com- 
pliance’ having been awarded in only three cases/one case, respectively. 
If one turns to analysing the way aspects of the right to academic freedom 
have been concretised in the he and other legislation of the states concerned, it 
will be noted that performance levels are far less satisfactory than those identi- 
fied in view of that right’s formal protection. The average score for institutional 
autonomy lies at 46 percent (Table 3), that for academic self-governance below 
that at 43 percent (Table 4), and that for job security (including ‘tenure’) at a 
mere 37 percent (Table 5). Many a commentator would perhaps disagree and 
consider institutional autonomy to enjoy a higher level of legal protection than 
borne out here. However, as has been stressed above, institutional autonomy in 
the context of this study means institutional autonomy as limited by academic 
freedom and human rights. he institutions in many of the he systems assessed 
do possess wide competences to include external members in their governing 
bodies, to levy and decide on the amount of study fees (study fees generally 
contradicting Article 13(2)(c) icescr), to dismiss academic staff for reasons 
of ‘redundancy,’ and to freely engage in collaborative activities with private 
industry to acquire funding subject to only limited public control. Such un- 
bridled powers, however, are not concomitant with institutional autonomy – 
rather, they expose a misinterpretation of the concept! Table 3 shows Finland 
and the uk to be the top performers in the category ‘institutional autonomy.’ At 
the bottom of the table is Hungary, Hungarian he legislation generally reflect- 
ing a paternalistic role of the state in regulating he. 
The autonomy of an institution of he can, moreover, not be divorced from 
the guarantee of academic self-governance. he institutions that possess wide 
powers, but in which the academic community – encompassing academic 
staff, but also students – does not retain the competence to sufficiently par- 
ticipate in the taking of decisions directly or indirectly having a bearing on 
science and scholarship, can at most be seen to be nominally autonomous – 
and they are certainly not in accordance with the standards of the unesco 
Recommendation. The assessment has revealed that the he legislation of 
European states inadequately protects the right of ‘sufficient participation,’ 
which is increasingly being eroded by promoting an ‘alternative model.’ 
At the institutional level, states achieve an average score of just 49,4 percent 
(the percentage average of the sum of the scores for indicators under D.2.), and, 
 Academic Freedom in the Law of European States 
 
77  
 
at faculty/departmental level (where a large-scale failure to regulate aspects of 
self-governance whatsoever by way of legislation may be observed), merely 35 
percent (the percentage average of the sum of the scores for indicators un- 
der D.3.) for their implementation of the right to self-governance. Legislative 
changes adopted in the past five to ten years, in some instances also before that, 
have accordingly entailed the powers of senates (or their equivalents) having 
been restricted to purely academic matters (or worse, senates (or their equiv- 
alents) having been replaced by ‘committees of  academics,’ often presided 
over by non-elected managers), the introduction of institutional boards with 
strategic decision-making powers, composed of various stake-holders, many 
external and representing government and corporate interests (academic staff, 
in the worst case, not being represented and having no control over candi- 
dates appointed), and the strengthening of the executive powers of rectors and 
deans/departmental heads, who frequently come from outside the institution, 
academic staff not being able to adequately participate in their election or 
dismissal. But also generally, governance structures in he institutions increas- 
ingly exclude academics, recruiting instead a new ‘caste’ of personnel with 
administrative, but little or no subject-specific academic expertise, responsible 
for ‘managing’ he institutions and their affairs.262 Interestingly, states such as 
Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania that are not yet in the tow of Bologna reforms 
perform best in the category of ‘self-governance.’ The uk, a top performer on 
‘institutional autonomy,’ fares worst on ‘self-governance.’ 
Institutional autonomy is also limited by the requirements of security of 
employment, including ‘tenure or its functional equivalent, where applicable.’ 
he institutions in Europe, however, in ‘managing’ their affairs, have come to 
view their academic staff as strategic capital. If staff are not ‘useful’ in accor- 
dance with ‘strategic objectives’ anymore, they forfeit their right to remain with 
the he institution concerned. The assessment has shown that states achieve 
 
262 In this vein with regard to universities in the uk, Dr. M. Waring (Cardiff Metropolitan 
University), researcher on human resource management in he and senior trade union 
official, in a talk on ‘Management technologies and academic freedom,’ delivered on 
9 September 2014 at unike (Universities in the Knowledge Economy) Workshop 4: 
Management Technologies, held from 8–10 September 2014 at the University of Roe- 
hampton, London. See also T. Docherty, ‘Thomas Docherty on Academic Freedom,’ Times 
Higher Education, 4 December 2014, retrieved 15 May 2016, https://www.timeshigher 
education.co.uk/features/thomas-docherty-on-academic-freedom/2017268.article (hold- 
ing that ‘[m]anagerial fundamentalism has taken hold in universities, with scholars 
viewed as resources that must be controlled’). See further P. Taylor, ‘Humboldt’s Rift: 
Managerialism in Education and Complicit Intellectuals,’ European Political Science 3(1) 
(2003) 75–84 (referring to the phenomenon of ‘supinely acquiescent academics,’ who 
disagree with ‘managerialism,’ but do not ‘speak out’). 
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an average score of just 47,3 percent (the percentage average of the sum of 
the scores for indicators under E.1.) and merely 43,8 percent (the percentage 
average of the sum of the scores for indicators under E.2.) for the assurance 
of stable employment in terms of the duration of contracts of service and the 
protection against dismissals on operational grounds, respectively. While the 
premise in academia used to be that ‘the university does not employ academ- 
ics, it facilitates their work,’ this notion appears to be absent in he institutions 
today. As Boden and Epstein point out, ‘[a] facilitator provides resources and 
eases one’s path towards one’s goals. But an employer regards employees as 
resources – along with other inputs – to be managed to achieve organizational 
objectives.’263 The ‘he institution as facilitator’ notion is that underlying the 
unesco Recommendation and its conception of the right to academic free- 
dom. States in Southern and Western Europe (Greece, France, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal) are among the ‘top’ performers in the category ‘security of employ- 
ment,’ only 7 states altogether, however, achieving a score above 50 percent. 
Finally, turning to Table 6 showing the overall country ranking on the legal 
protection of the right to academic freedom in accordance with the assess- 
ment, it will have to be conceded that it is difficult to identify clear trends. One 
he system – that of North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany) – scored more than 70, 
namely 71 percent (Grade B), eight between 60 and 69,9 percent (Grade C),264 
twelve between 50 and 59,9 percent (Grade D),265 three between 40 and 
49,9 percent (Grade E),266 and six between 30 and 39,9 percent (Grade F).267 
he systems that used to be steeped in the Humboldtian tradition with its 
emphasis on Lernfreiheit (freedom of study), Lehrfreiheit (freedom of teach- 
ing), Forschungsfreiheit (freedom of research), and further the Einheit von 
Forschung und Lehre (the unity of research and teaching) – those of Austria, 
Bavaria (Germany), and North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany) – still seem to 
 
 
 
263 R. Boden and D. Epstein, ‘A Flat Earth Society? Imagining Academic Freedom,’ Socio- 
logical Review 59(3) (2011) 476–495, at 481 (citing M. Waring, ‘Labouring in the Augean 
Stables? hrm and the Reconstitution of the Academic Worker,’ International Journal of 
Management Concepts and Philosophy 3(3) (2009) 257–274 in this respect). 
264 In the order of performance: Croatia (69%), Spain (66,5%), Bulgaria (65,5%), Austria 
(63,5%), France (63%), Portugal (61%), Slovakia (60,5%), Latvia (60%). 
265 In the order of performance: Lithuania (59,5%), Bavaria (Germany) (58%), Italy (57,5%), 
Greece (55,5%), Finland (55%), Poland (54,5%), Romania (53,5%), Cyprus (53%), Ireland 
(52,5%), Slovenia (52,5%), Czech Republic (51,5%), Flanders (Belgium) (51,5%). 
266 In the order of performance: Luxemburg (47,5%), Wallonia (Belgium) (47%), Nether- 
lands (44%). 
267 In the order of performance: Sweden (39,5%), Denmark (38,5%), Hungary (36%), Malta 
(36%), United Kingdom (35%), Estonia (34%). 
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benefit from this in terms of their position in the overall ranking.268 The he sys- 
tems of Southern and Western Europe – those of Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain – also appear in the upper half of the table. The he systems 
of the Beneluxstates– thoseof Flanders(Belgium), Wallonia(Belgium), Luxem- 
burg, and the Netherlands – feature in the lower half of the table. So do those of 
Scandinaviancountries,i.e.thehesystemsof Denmark,Finland,andSweden.269 
Also the he systems of Anglophone Europe – those of Ireland, Malta, and the 
uk – are found in this part of the table. The picture is rather diffuse for the Baltic 
states, asitisforcountriesof Eastern Europe. Thehe systemsof Latviaand Lithu- 
ania lie on positions ten and eleven, respectively, but that of Estonia on place 
28. Croatia lands on the second place and Slovenia on the 19th; Bulgaria on the 
fourthplaceand Romaniaonthe 17th; Slovakiaontheninthplaceandthe Czech 
Republiconthe20th;Polandonthe16thplaceandHungaryonthe27th. 
The overall average lies at 52,8 percent – and demonstrates that the state of 
the legal protection of the right to academic freedom in Europe is one of ‘ill- 
health.’ This being disappointing in itself, what is a matter of greater concern 
is that, when compared to the situation that existed prior to the changes in 
he legislation effected during the last ten or more years in the states assessed, 
a downward trend in protection levels may be observed.270 The concept of 
institutional autonomy is increasingly being misconstrued as autonomy not 
subject to the requirements of academic freedom, self-governance, and secu- 
rity of employment, including ‘tenure.’ Self-governance itself has, at all levels 
in he institutions, largely become eroded. The same may be stated to be the 
case with regard to employment security, including ‘tenure,’ of academic staff. 
Although the various changes may in some instances be the result of ‘subopti- 
mal legislative draftsmanship skills’ (this might perhaps be so for Estonia, for 
example), they usually are part of a deliberate reform agenda for the he sector 
implemented by states in Europe. 
 
 
268 See M.G. Ash, German Universities: Past and Future. Crisis or Renewal? (Berghahn Books, 
1997) [German transl.: Mythos Humboldt: Vergangenheit und Zukunft der deutschen 
Universitäten (Böhlau, 1999)], on the Humboldtian tradition in Germany. See P. Josephson 
et al. (eds.), The Humboldtian Tradition: Origins and Legacies (Brill, 2014), for a critical 
examination of the relevance of Humboldtian ideals in modern he. 
269 For a discussion of academic freedom and institutional autonomy in the Scandinavian 
countries, see, e.g., T. Nokkala and A. Bladh, ‘Institutional Autonomy and Academic Free- 
dom in the Nordic Context: Similarities and Differences,’ Higher Education Policy 27(1) 
(2014) 1–21. 
270 This has become apparent when, in the course of examining the he legislation of the 
states concerned, present laws were compared with those existing prior to the laws in 
operation now. 
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10 Violations of the Right to Academic Freedom and the Right 
to Education 
The academic community has traditionally been – and in many parts of the 
world continues to be – a particularly vulnerable target of direct state repres- 
sion.271 In Europe, however, it is nowadays rather sources of a different nature 
from which direct threats to academic freedom emanate, the state having be- 
come a (seemingly innocent) actor in the background. The state has assigned 
he institutions fairly wide-reaching powers (as it were, delegated many of its 
powers to these institutions). In practice, this has had the effect that he institu- 
tions themselves have become direct violators of academic freedom. Research 
funding bodies are yet another source of peril to academic freedom. It may 
hence be asked whether the system en vogue today of research funding having 
to be applied for internally, or externally through ‘independent’ research coun- 
cils/foundations, etc., on a competitive basis for virtually all research projects, 
does not by its very nature favour research on ‘fashionable’ topics and yield- 
ing short-term results, obstructing research of real or long-term significance 
for society (elementary research).272 Likewise, the reluctance to install effec- 
tive control mechanisms targeting the activities of private or corporate actors 
providing finance to he institutions has made it possible for the activities of 
such actors to compromise the independence of research in he institutions.273 
 
271 See generally P.G. Altbach, ‘Academic Freedom in a Global Context: 21st Century Chal- 
lenges,’ in The nea 2007 Almanac of Higher Education (National Education Association, 
2007) 49–56, on the state of academic freedom in different parts of the world. 
272 In this vein, see L. Bennich-Björkman, ‘Has Academic Freedom Survived? An Interview 
Study of the Conditions for Researchers in an Era of Paradigmatic Change,’ Higher Edu- 
cation Quarterly 61(3) (2007) 334–361, at 348–352 (addressing research funding systems; 
the publication presents the results of an interview study of academic staff in Swedish 
universities, the results, according to the author, reflecting the general European experi- 
ence). See also J. Thorens, ‘Liberties, Freedom and Autonomy: Reflections on Academia’s 
Estate,’ Higher Education Policy 19(1) (2006) 87–110, at 100 (critically discussing the role of 
research councils and funding decisions). 
273 See Rendel (n 65) 83 (way back in 1988, before private industry funding assumed the impor- 
tanceinhe ithasatpresent, warningthatthosecommissioningresearch‘maywantanswers 
only within their own frame of reference’); D. Robinson, ‘Corrupting Research Integrity: 
Corporate Fundingand Academic Independence,’ in G. Sweeneyetal.(eds.), Global Corrup- 
tionReport:Education (Transparency International/Routledge, 2013) 202–210, 202,  retrieved 
15  May  2016, http://files.transparency.org/content/download/675/2899/file/2013_GCR 
_Education_EN.pdf (stating that ‘[t]he increasing industrial sponsorship of university- 
based research is raising widespread concerns about how these arrangements can corrupt 
and distort academic research’); M. Rostan, ‘Challenges to Academic Freedom: Some Em- 
pirical Evidence,’ EuropeanReview 18 (Suppl. No. 1)(2010) S71–S88, at S78–S80 (commenting 
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As has been indicated, only in very few cases does the law in Europe oblige he 
institutions to account to the public for private financing. 
he institutions have become direct violators of academic freedom because 
they find themselves in an environment where they often cannot but violate 
that right. These days, he follows a neoliberal logic. Whereas it used to be a 
public good, paid for by the state, available free of charge to students, and 
based on the idea that (also) ‘knowledge for its own sake’ merits pursuit and 
transmission, he has now ‘become the arm of national economic policy,’ de- 
fined both as the problem, failing to produce a skilled workforce and market- 
able academic output, and the solution, in that it should upgrade skills and 
create a source of earnings.274 The commercialisation of he is to go hand in 
hand with reductions in government spending for and ‘new public manage- 
ment’ methods in he.275 States consider that he institutions will use public 
money responsibly and produce ‘measurable’ outcome only, if they have to 
acquire a substantial part of funding through state and non-state sources 
themselves (by levying study fees, ‘selling’ academic ‘merchandise’ and ‘servic- 
es’ (e.g. marketing intellectual property rights or carrying out commissioned 
 
 
on the threats posed by research funding by private actors); ibid S80–S85 (commenting on 
thethreatsarisingfromlinksconnectingacademicstotheeconomicsector). 
274 J. Blackmore, ‘Globalisation: A Useful Concept for Feminists Rethinking Theories and 
Strategies in Education,’ in N.C. Burbules and C.A. Torres (eds.), Globalisation and Edu- 
cation: Critical Perspectives (Routledge, 2000) 133–155, at 134. See T. Metz, ‘A Dilemma 
Regarding Academic Freedom and Public Accountability in Higher Education,’ Journal 
of Philosophy of Education 44(4) (2010) 529–549, on the notion that academic freedom 
also covers pursuing and transmitting ‘knowledge for its own sake.’ 
275 On the commercialisation of and ‘new public management’ in he, see, e.g., R. Brown with 
H. Carasso, Everything for Sale? The Marketisation of uk Higher Education (Routledge, 
2013), or A. McGettigan, The Great University Gamble: Money, Markets and the Future of 
Higher Education (Pluto Press, 2013), regarding the uk; E. Schrecker, The Lost Soul of Higher 
Education: Corporatization, the Assault on Academic Freedom and the End of the American 
University (The New Press, 2010), regarding the usa; H. Woodhouse, Selling out: Academic 
Freedom and the Corporate Market (McGill-Queen’s up, 2009), regarding Canada; C. Shore 
and M. Taitz, ‘Who “Owns” the University? Institutional Autonomy and Academic Free- 
dom in an Age of Knowledge Capitalism,’ Globalisation, Societies and Education 10(2) 
(2012) 201–219, regarding New Zealand. See generally H.G. Schuetze et al. (eds.), University 
Governance and Reform: Policy, Fads, and Experience in International Perspective (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012); F. Rochford, ‘Academic Freedom and the Ethics of Marketing Educa- 
tion,’ in P. Tripathi and S. Mukerji (eds.), Cases on Innovations in Educational Marketing: 
Transnational and Technological Strategies (igi Global, 2011) 160–182. See W.G. Tierney 
and M. Lanford, ‘The Question of Academic Freedom: Universal Right or Relative Term,’ 
Frontiers of Education in China 9(1) (2014) 4–23, at 14–18, on ‘Commercialization as a New 
Infringement on Academic Freedom.’ See also the sources cited in n 282 below. 
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research), their academic staff applying for external research funding on a 
competitive basis and producing state income-generating publications, etc.), 
and further if they have to account for public money ‘at every inch of the road’ 
(internal and external audits, staff appraisals, student evaluations of staff, na- 
tional research assessment exercises, etc.).276 This new model – substituting 
that in terms of which a solid measure of trust is placed in the competence of 
academics to be good teachers/researcher and responsible recipients of ade- 
quate finance – compels he institutions ‘to do well’ in he institution rankings, 
if they wish to remain able to attract fee-paying students and be awarded con- 
tracts for their academic ‘merchandise’ and ‘services.’ These rankings them- 
selves apply questionable criteria of measuring excellence.277 They do not ask, 
for example, whether students from disadvantaged backgrounds can still afford 
 
276 Ironically, therefore – although neoliberalism customarily advocates ‘deregulation’ – it 
has entailed a rise of standards and audits in he in practice. Frequently, these instru- 
ments have awkward consequences for the quality of teaching or research. The national 
uk research assessment exercises, e.g., require submission of a certain number of research 
outputs. In practice, this has meant an increased ‘production’ of shorter publications on 
‘easy’ topics at the expense of more thoroughly researched, longer (including monograph) 
publications on ‘more demanding’ topics. Research is also required to ‘have impact’ be- 
yond the institutional context. It may well be asked, how it should be shown, for instance, 
that a feminist critique has actually changed stereotyped attitudes. See S. Wright, ‘What 
Counts? The Skewing Effects of Research Assessment Systems,’ Nordisk Pedagogik 29 
(special edition) (2009) 18–33, on the ‘skewing effects’ of research assessment systems. 
Also assessments of teaching performance potentially unjustifiably interfere with the 
right to academic freedom. See, e.g., W. Höfling, ‘Die Lehrfreiheit: Gefährdungen eines 
Grundrechts durch die neuere Hochschulrechtsentwicklung?,’ Wissenschaftsrecht 41(2) 
(2008) 92–105. Although the article deals with the situation in Germany, most of its state- 
ments are equally applicable in a more general sense. 
277 For a critique of university rankings, see, e.g., S. Amsler, ‘University Ranking: A Dialogue 
on Turning towards Alternatives,’ Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 13(2) (2013) 
155–166; B.M. Kehm, ‘Global University Rankings: Impacts and Unintended Side Effects,’ 
European Journal of Education 49(1) (2014) 102–112; K. Lynch, ‘New Managerialism, Neo- 
liberalism and Ranking,’ Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 13(2) (2013) 141–153; 
B. Pusser and S. Marginson, ‘University Rankings in Critical Perspective,’ Journal of Higher 
Education 84(4) (2013) 544–568; D. Robinson, ‘The Mismeasure of Higher Education? 
The Corrosive Effect of University Rankings,’ Ethics in Science and Environmental Poli- 
tics 13(2) (2013) 65–71; K.I. Stergiou and S. Lessenich, ‘On Impact Factors and University 
Rankings: From Birth to Boycott,’ Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 13(2) (2013) 
101–111; M. Taylor et al., ‘Rankings are the Sorcerer’s New Apprentice,’ Ethics in Science and 
Environmental Politics 13(2) (2013) 73–99; S. Wright, ‘Ranking Universities within a Glo- 
balised World of Competition States: To What Purpose, and with What Implications for 
Students?,’ in H.L. Andersen and J.C. Jacobsen (eds.), Uddannelseskvalitet i en globaliseret 
verden (Samfundslitteratur, 2012) 81–102. 
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good quality higher education. They do not enquire whether academic staff 
can exercise rights of academic freedom. They assess teaching quality quanti- 
tatively, but not by having recourse to scientifically sound qualitative methods. 
They do not assess whether research addresses ‘the major questions of human- 
ity’ and, moreover, does so in sufficient depth. Instead, the rankings rely upon: 
the volume of research income scaled against staff numbers, the ‘number of 
papers’ published in ‘high-quality peer-reviewed’ journals, the ‘number of cita- 
tions’ of published work, the ability ‘to help industry with innovations, inven- 
tions, and consultancy,’ opinion polls of ‘experienced scholars,’278 or the ‘sat- 
isfaction’ of students. On the latter point, that of student satisfaction, it may 
be noted that this criterion, coupled with the fact that students are required 
to pay ever-increasing fees for their studies, has made them ‘customers’ of he, 
quasi-entitled to good marks and a qualification, with corresponding duties on 
teachers ‘to deliver,’ relinquishing the ideal of the student as a mature young 
adult bearing responsibilities also him/herself to master the subject.279 The 
new model in he also induces he institutions to compel academic staff to ‘de- 
liver’ under ‘target/performance agreements,’ as staff output equals revenue. 
Usually imposed on staff, structured by revenue considerations, and their very 
premise being that the production of scientific truth can ‘be planned,’ ‘target/ 
performance agreements’ more often than not are highly arbitrary (‘wissen- 
schaftsinadäquat’).280 It may further be noted that he institutions these days 
 
278 See ‘World University Rankings 2013–14 Methodology,’ Times Higher Education, 1 October 
2014, retrieved 15 May 2016, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university 
-rankings-2013-14-methodology (mentioning inter alia the stated parameters; detailing 
‘the essential elements in our world-leading formula.’). 
279 For a critique of the notion of the student as ‘customer,’ see, e.g., M. Albanese, ‘Students Are 
Not Customers: A Better Model for Medical Education,’ Academic Medicine 74(11) (1999) 
1172–1186; M.F. D’Eon and C. Harris, ‘If Students Are Not Customers, What Are They?,’ Aca- 
demic Medicine 75(12) (2000) 1173–1177; L. Eagle and R. Brennan, ‘Are Students Customers? 
tqm and Marketing Perspectives,’ Quality Assurancein Education: An International Perspec- 
tive 15(1) (2007) 44–60; T. Kaye et al., ‘Criticising the Image of the Student as Consumer: Ex- 
amining Legal Trends and Administrative Responses in the us and uk,’ Education and the 
Law 18(2 & 3)(2006) 85–129; J.A. Newson,‘Disruptingthe“Studentas Consumer” Model: The 
New Emancipatory Project,’ International Relations 18(2) (2004) 227–239; G. Svensson and 
G. Wood, ‘Are University Students Really Customers? When Illusion May Lead to Delusion 
for All!,’ International Journal of Educational Management 21(1) (2007) 17–28. See also M. 
Molesworthetal.(eds.), The Marketisationof Higher Educationandthe Studentas Consumer 
(Routledge, 2011). See D. Hayes, ‘Academic Freedom and the Diminished Subject,’ British 
Journal of Educational Studies 57(2) (2009) 127–145, at 143–144 (lamenting that a ‘dimin- 
ished’ viewof humanityinhe institutionshasalsoentaileda‘diminished’ viewof students). 
280 Paragraph 47 of the unesco Recommendation on ‘Appraisal’ points out that the major 
function of evaluation must be ‘the development of individuals in accordance with their 
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expect academics to perform so many administrative tasks – preparing budget 
plans, seeking funding, etc. – that this has left them with less time to do what 
they do best – teaching and carrying out research.281 As borne out by the as- 
sessment undertaken here, the new model in he as described above is easiest 
implemented by engaging ‘managers’ of various sorts ‘to control’ academics/ 
teaching/research, by excluding academic staff from meaningful participa- 
tion in decision-making, and by introducing ‘executive-style’ management in 
he. In sum, he institutions have become subject to various pressures result- 
ing from the new design of he. Reacting to these pressures, these institutions 
themselves have become direct violators of academic freedom. 
These ‘developments’ – which foreshadow the decline of European univer- 
sities and other he institutions as entities of genuine public and social sig- 
nificance along the lines of their us American counterparts282 – have their 
basis in legislation designed and implemented by the state, i.e. they are the 
consequence of deliberate state action. The state, therefore, ‘pulling the strings 
in the background,’ is the ultimate human rights violator! In fact, the violation 
of the right to academic freedom has its root causes in the violation by states 
of another – the overarching – right to education. Article 13 of the Interna- 
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, read with Article 2(1) 
of the Covenant, provides for the obligation of states parties – all states ex- 
amined here having ratified the icescr – to take steps to the maximum of 
their available resources, with a view to progressively making he available and 
‘equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity’ (Art. 13(1), (2)(c)). There is an 
obligation to progressively introduce free he (Art. 13(2)(c)), to actively pursue 
 
 
interests and capacities,’ that it must be based ‘only on academic criteria of competence,’ 
and that it must ‘take due account of the difficulty inherent in measuring personal 
capacity, which seldom manifests itself in a constant and unfluctuating manner,’ (para. 
47(a)–(c), respectively.). 
281 See Bennich-Björkman (n 272) 352–354. 
282 At least, such a ‘decline’ regarding he in the us has been held to have taken place. See, 
e.g., C. Nelson, No University is an Island: Saving Academic Freedom (New York up, 2010); 
C. Newfield, Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-Year Assault on the Middle Class 
(Harvard up, 2008); Schrecker (n 275). See also Ivory Tower (cnn Films 2014) (produced 
by A. Rossi). See B. Readings, The University in Ruins (Harvard up, 1996), or T. Docherty, 
Universities at War (sage, 2015), generally observing a decline of the university. As regards 
universities in Europe, see, e.g., J.C. Bermejo Barrera, La aurora de los enanos. Decadencia 
y caída de las universidades europeas (Foca, 2007). Specifically as regards universities in 
France, see, e.g., Beaud (n 128), in Germany, e.g., B. Zehnpfennig, ‘Die Austreibung des 
Geistes aus der Universität,’ Wissenschaftsrecht 46(1) (2013) 37–53, and in Spain, e.g., 
J. Hernández Alonso et al. (eds.), La universidad cercada: Testimonios de un naufragio 
(Anagrama, 2013). See also the sources cited in n 275 above. 
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the development of a system of he institutions (Art. 13(2)(e)), and to continu- 
ously improve the material conditions of teaching staff in he (Art. 13(2)(e)).283 
Article 13 should not be understood as merely protecting ‘a right to receive edu- 
cation.’ It rather provides the normative basis for a full-fledged, rights-based 
education system, including in the sphere of he, also covering the rights of 
teaching/research staff.284 Consequently, to the extent that states – relying on 
the maximum of their available resources – are in a position to finance he in 
such a way that it can be made available free of charge and that academic staff 
can properly attend to teaching and carrying out research285 – and this may be 
held to be the case for most of the states examined, keeping in mind that inter- 
national human rights law envisages general taxation as the principal model 
for financing education (study, teaching, and research) and other rights under 
the Covenant286 – they must do so! In such circumstances, the principle of 
 
283 With regard to the uk, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has thus 
‘note[d] with concern that the introduction of tuition fees and student loans, which is in- 
consistent with article 13, paragraph 2(c) … has tended to worsen the position of students 
from less privileged backgrounds, who are already underrepresented in higher education.’ 
See un, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Crown Dependencies and the 
Overseas Dependent Territories (4th periodic reports), 28th Session, un Doc. e/2003/22, 
para. 225. See Beiter (n 34) 387–388, 400–401, 458, 526, 572–573, 594, 651, generally on the 
topic of the legitimacy of study fees in he in the context of the icescr. 
284 See, e.g., Beiter (n 34) 460–462, in support of such a wide reading of Art. 13 icescr (citing 
in support of his view inter alia P. Gebert, Das Recht auf Bildung nach Art. 13 des uno- 
Paktes über wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Rechte und seine Auswirkungen auf das 
schweizerische Bildungswesen (Leo Fürer, 1996) 286–288). 
285 The obligation generally to have recourse to resources that are ‘available’ becomes clear 
from the statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (even 
if made only with regard to free he) on the report submitted by South Korea, to the ef- 
fect that in that state party ‘[o]nly primary education is provided free of charge,’ but that 
‘given the strength of the Korean economy it appears appropriate that free education 
should also extend to the … higher [sector].’ See un, Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Republic of Korea (initial report), 12th Session, 
un Doc. E/1996/22, para. 76. In the case of the Czech Republic, the Committee referred 
to the ‘constant decrease in the budget expenditure allocated to education and the 
consequences thereof on the enjoyment of the right to education,’ and suggested to the 
Czech Republic that it ‘consider increasing the budget allocation for education.’ See un, 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Czech 
Republic (initial report), 28th Session, un Doc. E/2003/22, paras. 91, 110. 
286 The former un Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Katarina Tomaševski, has 
pointed out that ‘[i]nternational human rights law assumes that states are both will- 
ing and able to generate resources needed for education through general taxation.’ See 
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progressive realisation, as a matter of principle, forbids cutbacks of standards 
achieved.287 Hence, state legislation in Europe which compels he institutions, 
in their quest of ensuring their financial survival, to violate the right to aca- 
demic freedom, also violates Article 13 icescr! 
Envisaging ‘a full-fledged, rights-based education system,’ Article 13 icescr 
doesnotonlyaddressinfrastructure, access, andcosts. Article 13(1) ‘recognise[s] 
the right of everyone to education,’ stipulating the primary aim of education to 
be ‘the full development of the human personality.’288 This relates to the qual- 
ity or content of education provided, and, by necessary implication, also to 
the quality of teaching and research, and, therefore, to the rights and duties of 
academic staff in this context.289 Nobel Literature laureate John Coetzee has 
remarked that ‘allowing the transient needs of the economy to define the goals 
of higher education is a misguided and short-sighted policy: indispensable to a 
democratic society – indeed, to a vigorous national economy – is a critically lit- 
erate citizenry competent to explore and interrogate the assumptions behind 
the paradigms of national and economic life reigning at any given moment.’290 
He goes on to point out that it is important to ‘believe in the humanities and in 
the university built on humanistic grounds, with philosophical, historical and 
philological studies as its pillars.’291 A he system which is ‘the arm of national 
economic policy,’ does not value the pursuit and transmission of ‘knowledge 
for its own sake,’ and does not breathe the full spirit of academic freedom can 
never further ‘the full development of the human personality’ of students. At 
the same time, it constitutes an assault on the dignity of academics and their 
profession. But, what is worse, such a he system ultimately erodes the very 
foundations of civilised society! 
 
 
K. Tomaševski, Free and Compulsory Education for All Children: The Gap Between Promise 
and Performance (Right to Education Primers, No. 2, 2001) 21. 
287 This is clearly borne out by Paragraph 14(e) of the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1997, a document prepared by international 
experts on human rights and published in Human Rights Quarterly 20(3) (1998) 691–704. 
288 See General Comment No. 13 (n 28) para. 4. See also Beiter (n 34) 470–471. 
289 See General Comment No. 13 (n 28) paras. 38–40, in support of the view that Art. 13 icescr 
covers the right to academic freedom. See also the observations to the same effect made 
by the former un Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Katarina Tomaševski, in 
two of her annual reports: Tomaševski (n 74) paras. 42–44; K. Tomaševski, Annual Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Submitted Pursuant to Commission 
on Human Rights Resolution 2001/29, un Doc. e/cn.4/2002/60 (7 January 2002) 13. 
290 J.M. Coetzee, ‘Foreword,’ in J. Higgins (ed.), Academic Freedomina Democratic South Africa: 
Essays and Interviews on Higher Education and the Humanities (Bucknell up, 2014) xi, xii. 
291 Ibid xiii. 
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Annex: Legal Protection of the Right to Academic Freedom in Europe – Overview of Results for All Indicators for 
Individual Countries 
 
Country A. Ratification of International Agreements and 
Constitutional Protection 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 1.1.1. 1.1.2. 1.1.3. 1.1.4.   1.2. 2. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Austria 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 9 (2) (2) (1) 
2.1. Belgium: Flanders 10 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (4) 4 (2) (0) (0) 
2.2. Belgium: Wallonia 10 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (4) 4 (2) (0) (0) 
3. Bulgaria 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 9 (2) (2) (1) 
4. Croatia 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 9 (2) (2) (1) 
5. Cyprus 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 4 (2) (0) (0) 
6. Czech Republic 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 7 (2) (1) (0) 
7. Denmark 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 4 (2) (0) (0) 
8. Estonia 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 9 (2) (2) (1) 
9. Finland 10 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (4) 9 (2) (2) (1) 
10. France 10 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (4) 4 (2) (0) (0) 
11.1. Germany: Bavaria 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 9 (2) (2) (0) 
11.2. Germany: N.R.W. 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 9 (2) (2) (1) 
12. Greece 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 7 (1) (1) (1) 
13. Hungary 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 3 (0) (1) (0) 
14. Ireland 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 3 (1) (0) (0) 
15. Italy 10 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (4) 9 (2) (2) (1) 
16. Latvia 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 8 (2) (2) (0) 
17. Lithuania 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 9 (2) (2) (1) 
18. Luxemburg 10 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (4) 4 (2) (0) (0) 
19. Malta 7 (0) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 4 (2) (0) (0) 
20. Netherlands 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 4 (2) (0) (0) 
21. Poland 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 9 (2) (2) (1) 
22. Portugal 10 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (4) 10 (2) (2) (1) 
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(0–
0,5
–1) 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Express 
Protection 
of Academic 
Freedom 
in HE 
Legislation 
C. Protection of Institutional Autonomy in HE Legislation 
 
2.4.  2.5. 1. 2. 2.1.1.    2.1.2.   2.2.1.   2.2.2.  2.3.  2.4.1.  2.4.2.  3. 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0) (4) 10×2=20 2 6 (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (0) (1) 2 2 
(0) (2) 5×2=10 2 4,5 (1) (1) (1) (0,5) (1) (0) (0) 4 0 
(0) (2) 5×2=10 2 2,5 (0) (1) (0,5) (0,5) (0) (0) (0,5) 2 0 
(0) (4) 7,5×2=15 4 3 (1) (0) (0,5) (1) (0) (0,5) (0) 2 0 
(0) (4) 10×2=20 4 5 (1) (0,5) (0,5) (1) (0) (1) (1) 2 2 
(0) (2) 5×2=10 2 2 (1) (0) (0) (0,5) (0) (0,5) (0) 2 2 
(0) (4) 7,5×2=15 4 2 (0) (0,5) (0,5) (0,5) (0) (0,5) (0) 2 0 
(0) (2) 2,5×2=5 2 5 (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (0) (0) 0 2 
(0) (4) 0 2 6,5 (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (0,5) 2 0 
(0) (4) 7,5×2=15 4 7 (1) (1) (0,5) (1) (2) (1) (0,5) 4 0 
(0) (2) 10×2=20 2 3 (1) (0,5) (0,5) (1) (0) (0) (0) 2 0 
(1) (4) 7,5×2=15 2 1,5 (0) (0) (0,5) (1) (0) (0) (0) 2 0 
(0) (4) 10×2=20 2 5 (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (0) (0) 2 4 
(0) (4) 2,5×2=5 2 0,5 (0) (0) (0) (0,5) (0) (0) (0) 2 0 
(0) (2) 2,5×2=5 0 2,5 (0) (0,5) (0,5) (0,5) (0) (1) (0) 0 0 
(0) (2) 7,5×2=15 2 6,5 (1) (1) (1) (0,5) (1) (1) (1) 4 0 
(0) (4) 5×2=10 2 3 (0) (0,5) (1) (0,5) (0) (1) (0) 2 2 
(0) (4) 10×2=20 2 4 (0) (1) (0,5) (1) (1) (0,5) (0) 4 0 
(0) (4) 10×2=20 4 5 (1) (1) (0,5) (1) (1) (0,5) (0) 2 0 
(0) (2) 7,5×2=15 2 5 (0) (0) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) 2 0 
(0) (2) 0 2 6,5 (1) (0,5) (0,5) (0,5) (2) (1) (1) 2 0 
(0) (2) 5×2=10 2 5 (0,5) (0,5) (1) (0,5) (2) (0,5) (0) 2 0 
(0) (4) 5×2=10 2 5,5 (1) (1) (0,5) (1) (1) (0,5) (0,5) 2 0 
(1) (4) 5×2=10 4 3 (0,5) (0,5) (0,5) (1) (0) (0,5) (0) 2 0 
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(Subtotal) 
 
Country A. Ratification of International Agreements and 
Constitutional Protection 
 
 
 
 
1. 1.1.1. 1.1.2. 1.1.3. 1.1.4.   1.2. 2. 2.1.     2.2.   2.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. Romania 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 4 (1)    (0)   (1) 
24. Slovakia 10 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)   (4) 8 (2)    (2)   (0) 
25. Slovenia 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 9 (2)    (2)   (1) 
26. Spain 10 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,5)   (4) 10 (2)    (2)   (1) 
27. Sweden 8,5 (1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (0) (4) 8 (2)    (2)   (0) 
28. uk 7 (1,5) (0) (1,5) (0) (4) 4 (2)    (0)   (0) 
 
 
Country D. Protection of Academic Self-Governance in HE Legislation 
 
 
1. 2. 2.1. 2.2.1. 2.2.2. 2.2.3. 2.3. 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Austria 1 7 (3) (0) (0,5) (0,5) (3) 1 
2.1. Belgium: Flanders 0 6 (0) (1) (0,5) (0) (4,5) 1 
2.2. Belgium: Wallonia 0 8 (1,5) (1) (0,5) (0,5) (4,5) 0 
3. Bulgaria 1 9,5 (1,5) (1) (0,5) (0,5) (6) 4 
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(0–
0,5
–1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0–
0,5
–1) 
 
 
 
 
B. Express 
Protection 
of Academic 
Freedom 
in HE 
Legislation 
C. Protection of Institutional Autonomy in HE Legislation 
 
2.4.  2.5. 1. 2. 2.1.1.    2.1.2.    2.2.1.   2.2.2.  2.3.  2.4.1. 2.4.2.  3. 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0)  (2)   7,5×2=15 4 2 (0) (0) (0,5)  (1) (0)  (0,5)  (0) 2 0 
(0)   (4)   10×2=20 4 2,5 (0) (0,5)   (0,5)  (1) (0)  (0,5)  (0) 2 0 
(0)   (4)   2,5×2=5 2 4,5 (1) (1) (0,5)   (0,5)   (1)  (0,5)  (0) 2 0 
(1)  (4)   7,5×2=15 4 2,5 (0) (0) (1) (1) (0)  (0,5)  (0) 2 0 
(0)   (4)   2,5×2=5 2 4,5 (0) (1) (0,5)   (0,5)   (2)  (0,5)  (0) 0 0 
(0)   (2)   2,5×2=5 2 7,5 (1) (1) (1) (0,5)  (2)  (1) (1) 4 0 
 
 
E. Job Security (including ‘Tenure’) in Relevant 
Legislation 
 
3.1.1.   3.1.2. 3.2.1.   3.2.2. 3.2.3. 1. 1.1. 1.2. 2. 2.1. 2.2. 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0) (0) (0,5) (0,5) (0) 2 (2) (0) 1,5 (1,5) (0) 1,5 
(1) (0) (0) (0) (0) 4 (4) (0) 3 (1,5) (1,5) 3 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 4 (4) (0) 3 (1,5) (1,5) 1,5 
(1) (1) (1) (0,5) (0,5) 8 (4) (4) 1,5 (1,5) (0) 0 
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(Subtotal) 
 
 
Country D. Protection of Academic Self-Governance in HE Legislation 
 1. 2. 2.1. 2.2.1. 2.2.2. 2.2.3. 2.3. 3. 
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4. Croatia 1 9,5 (1,5) (1) (0,5) (0,5) (6) 3,5 
5. Cyprus 0 7,5 (3) (1) (0,5) (0) (3) 5 
6. Czech Republic 1 7 (1,5) (0) (0,5) (0,5) (4,5) 3 
7. Denmark 1 3,5 (1,5) (0,5) (0) (0) (1,5) 2 
8. Estonia 0 3,5 (0) (0,5) (0) (0) (3) 1 
9. Finland 0 2 (0) (0,5) (0) (0) (1,5) 1 
10. France 1 3,5 (0) (0,5) (0) (0) (3) 2 
11.1. Germany: Bavaria 2 6 (1,5) (0,5) (0,5) (0,5) (3) 4 
11.2. Germany: N.R.W. 2 7 (1,5) (0) (0,5) (0,5) (4,5) 3,5 
12. Greece 0 7 (1,5) (0,5) (0,5) (0) (4,5) 3,5 
13. Hungary 0 9 (3) (0,5) (0,5) (0,5) (4,5) 0 
14. Ireland 0 3 (1,5) (0) (0) (0) (1,5) 0 
15. Italy 0 6 (3) (0,5) (0,5) (0,5) (1,5) 2 
16. Latvia 2 7 (1,5) (0,5) (0,5) (0) (4,5) 1,5 
17. Lithuania 1 5 (0) (0,5) (0) (0) (4,5) 0 
18. Luxemburg 0 3,5 (1,5) (0,5) (0) (0) (1,5) 2,5 
19. Malta 0 3 (1,5) (0) (0) (0) (1,5) 3 
20. Netherlands 1 3 (0) (0) (0) (0) (3) 1,5 
21. Poland 1 9 (1,5) (1) (0) (0,5) (6) 2,5 
22. Portugal 1 9 (1,5) (0,5) (0,5) (0,5) (6) 1,5 
23. Romania 1 8 (1,5) (0,5) (0,5) (1) (4,5) 3,5 
24. Slovakia 1 8,5 (1,5) (0) (0,5) (0,5) (6) 3 
25. Slovenia 0 7 (1,5) (0) (1) (0) (4,5) 4 
26. Spain 0 8,5 (3) (1) (0,5) (1) (3) 3,5 
27. Sweden 0 3 (1,5) (0) (0) (0) (1,5) 0 
28. UK 0 0 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 0 
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(0–
0,5
–1) 
 
 
 
 
E. Job Security (including ‘Tenure’) in Relevant 
Legislation 
 
3.1.1.   3.1.2. 3.2.1.   3.2.2. 3.2.3. 1. 1.1. 1.2. 2. 2.1. 2.2. 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (1) (0,5) (0,5) (0,5) 0 (0) (0) 4,5 (1,5) (3) 0 
(1) (2) (1) (1) (0) 4 (2) (2) 3 (1,5) (1,5) 3 
(1) (1) (0) (0,5) (0,5) 2 (0) (2) 0 (0) (0) 0 
(0,5) (1) (0,5) (0) (0) 4 (2) (2) 0 (0) (0) 1,5 
(1) (0) (0) (0) (0) 0 (0) (0) 1,5 (0) (1,5) 0 
(1) (0) (0) (0) (0) 0 (0) (0) 3 (1,5) (1,5) 0 
(1) (0) (1) (0) (0) 8 (4) (4) 4,5 (1,5) (3) 3 
(1) (1) (1) (0,5) (0,5) 2 (2) (0) 4,5 (1,5) (3) 1,5 
(1) (1) (0,5) (0,5) (0,5) 2 (2) (0) 4,5 (1,5) (3) 1,5 
(1) (1) (1) (0,5) (0) 8 (4) (4) 6 (3) (3) 6 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 8 (4) (4) 0 (0) (0) 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 6 (2) (4) 4,5 (1,5) (3) 0 
(1) (1) (0) (0) (0) 4 (2) (2) 4,5 (1,5) (3) 3 
(1) (0) (0) (0,5) (0) 0 (0) (0) 3 (0) (3) 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 2 (2) (0) 3 (0) (3) 0 
(1) (0) (1) (0,5) (0) 2 (2) (0) 1,5 (0) (1,5) 0 
(1) (1) (0,5) (0,5) (0) 4 (0) (4) 1,5 (0) (1,5) 3 
(1) (0) (0,5) (0) (0) 4 (0) (4) 1,5 (0) (1,5) 1,5 
(1) (1) (0,5) (0) (0) 2 (0) (2) 3 (1,5) (1,5) 0 
(0,5) (1) (0) (0) (0) 6 (4) (2) 4,5 (1,5) (3) 0 
(1) (1) (0,5) (0,5) (0,5) 4 (2) (2) 1,5 (1,5) (0) 0 
(1) (1) (0) (0,5) (0,5) 0 (0) (0) 1,5 (0) (1,5) 0 
(1) (1) (1) (1) (0) 6 (2) (4) 3 (0) (3) 1,5 
(1) (1) (1) (0,5) (0) 8 (4) (4) 3 (1,5) (1,5) 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 4 (2) (2) 3 (0) (3) 1,5 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 4 (0) (4) 1,5 (1,5) (0) 0 
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